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Abstract 
While there is an abundant literature on the moderating effects of formal institutions on 
changes in economic incentives, there is still little understanding on whether informal 
institutions – such as beliefs, values and social norms - exert a similar effect. In the current 
European context, with increasing demands to reform the welfare systems, the question 
becomes all the more relevant.  With this in mind, and focusing on social norms about the 
role of the family, this thesis aims to provide insights into the following question: are the 
effects of family values on individual behaviour resilient to changes in economic incentives? 
Using EU survey micro data the thesis analyses the interplay between the effects of family 
values and changes in economic incentives in shaping individual behaviour in social care. 
The results suggest that the effects of family values remain resilient to changes in economic 
incentives. The first paper confirms that, in line with the existing literature, family values 
affect individual behaviour. Most importantly, however, it shows that this effect can be 
overridden by certain individual socio-economic characteristics. The second paper focuses 
on the strength of the effects, showing that the effect of family values on individual 
behaviour is strongest when economic incentives are changed in ways that do not directly 
challenge prevailing family values. Finally, the third paper demonstrates that the effect of 
family values on individual behaviour is resilient to a policy reform that conflicts with them. 
The extent of the resilience depends on the socio-demographic characteristics of the 
individuals. These results have direct implications in the EU context, suggesting that 
convergence of economic outcomes might be difficult to achieve given that the impact of 
common problems and policies differ depending on the prevailing family values. At the very 
least, these differences should be taken into account when designing EU-wide policies.  
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Note on the structure of the thesis 
This thesis conforms to the requirements of a doctoral thesis from the London School of 
Economics and Political Science. Guidelines state a minimum of three papers of publishable 
standard – in addition to introduction and conclusion chapters – not exceeding 100,000 
words. Accordingly, this thesis presents an introduction chapter which gives the overview, 
motivation and objectives, conceptual framework research question and relevant 
background as well as a presentation of data and methodology used. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 
are presented in the style of journal articles and form the main body of the thesis. One of 
these chapters (chapter 4) has been published as a CESifo working paper (working paper 
5185) and at the LEQS Discussion Paper Series (No. 96). Chapter 5 brings together the main 
findings and present policy recommendations, future avenues for research and limitations. 
  
14 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
European economic integration has been regarded by many as the tool to achieve the 
lasting goals in Europe: stability and peace. On these grounds the economies of Europe have 
gradually become intertwined, underpinned by the existence of common problems and 
shared solutions. What started as the European Coal and Steel Community developed 
towards the Single Market and was followed, some years later, by the Single Currency. This 
transfer of political and economic power to the supranational level has gradually been 
coupled with EU regulations and the encouragement of ‘best practices’ in national fiscal, 
economic and social policies. This trend has brought some scholars to label the EU as a 
“massive transfer platform” (Radaelli, 2000:26), with knowledge about policies, 
institutions and ideas being spread across different societies.  
As useful as policy transfers are as learning tools, it is not always the case that they succeed; 
that is, they do not necessarily ensure convergence in outcomes across societies. Similarly, 
common problems do not always lead to the same consequences everywhere. More 
generally, changes in economic incentives, be they policy changes or changes caused by a 
problem, may have very different effects on behaviour depending on the context.  This 
thesis is motivated by this idea and is concerned with one factor that can potentially cause 
heterogeneity of behaviour after a change in economic incentives takes place: social norms.  
Mary Burke and Peyton Young (2011) define social norms as a “standard, customary, or 
ideal form of behaviour to which individuals in a social group try to conform” (p.313). 
Drawing on the literature on social economics, this thesis takes the effects of social norms 
on individual behaviour as a starting point and focuses on the resilience of such effects in 
the light of a change in economic incentives. The question to be answered therefore is:  are 
the effects of social norms on individual behaviour resilient to changes in economic 
incentives?  
The thesis narrows down the focus of research in three ways. First, it studies individual 
behaviour and preferences in different policy contexts, namely elderly care, parental 
support to adult children and parental leave. Second, it analyses three types of economic 
incentives: individual level of education, a change in employment status and a parental 
leave policy reform. Third, the social norms studied are those related to the family, namely 
family values. This concept is defined according to the strength and resilience of family 
loyalties, allegiances and authority within a society (Reher, 1998). 
Following this focus, the thesis comprises three empirical chapters or papers. The first 
paper is an examination of the resilience of the effect of family values on individual 
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behaviour for individuals facing different economic incentives. More specifically, the paper 
uses individual European data to analyse whether the effect of family values on individual 
preferences for elderly care is resilient to different education levels. The findings suggest 
that family values affect preferences for elderly care, with individuals living in more 
traditional environments having a higher probability of preferring informal care than their 
counterparts in more liberal environments. Such an effect, however, only prevails for lower 
education groups. In contrast, for the rest the effect of educational attainment is strong 
enough to override the family values effect.   
The second paper analyses the resilience of the effect of family values on individual 
behaviour when faced with a change in economic incentives which a priori does not 
challenge family values. For this purpose it uses European data to examine the impact of 
family values on parental support given to adult children when the latter suffer an adverse 
change in employment status. The results suggest that such a change reinforces the effects 
of the family values in place, with individuals in more traditional societies having an 
increased probability of giving help more than their counterparts living in more liberal 
societies.  
Finally, the third paper examines the resilience of the effect of family values on individual 
behaviour when a policy reform challenging traditional values is put in place. More 
specifically, the chapter focuses on the effects of a parental leave policy reform in Germany 
in 2007 on the pace of returning to work following childbirth for mothers with different 
family values backgrounds. The results show that the policy reform partially overrides the 
effects of family values on individual behaviour. The probability of a fast return to work 
increases more for mothers with a traditional family background than for their 
counterparts with a liberal family background, therefore pointing towards convergence on 
the pace of return to work after childbirth. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the convergence 
is dependent on the education levels of the mother, with mothers with vocational education 
exhibiting the highest level of convergence. 
Taken together these results point towards an existing but limited resilience of the effect of 
family values on individual behaviour in the face of changes in economic incentives. They 
show that first, family values affect economic behaviour, although the effect is subject to 
individual socio-economic characteristics. This suggests that whenever family values are in 
conflict with individual socio-economic characteristics, the latter may have enough power 
to override the effect of the former. Second, the effect of family values on individual 
behaviour is exacerbated when changes in economic incentives that do not present a direct 
challenge to prevailing family values take place. And third, the effect of family values on 
individual behaviour is only partially resilient to a policy reform that conflicts with them. 
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The extent of the resilience depends on the socio-demographic characteristics of the 
individuals.  
The policy implications of these results are manifold and highlighted in the conclusion of 
the thesis. For now it is sufficient to state that there are direct implications for the EU policy 
transfer agenda. The results suggest that policies implemented with no regard for the 
family values of the society in question may first fall short of achieving the expected results 
and, second and more importantly, may exacerbate differences in economic behaviour 
within societies, with certain individuals barely reacting to the policy in question.  
1. Motivation and objectives 
Since its onset the European Union has been involved in a process of construction, diffusion 
and institutionalisation of rules, policy paradigms and styles, which are referred to as 
‘Europeanisation’ (Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003:30). This process has been particularly 
active in the realm of public policy, where the logic of the single market has emphasised 
harmonisation and standardisation (Stone, 1999). However, the Europeanisation process 
does not always result in a change in the status quo. At least four outcomes can emerge 
(Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003): inertia or a lack of change, retrenchment – that is, a 
negative reaction to the process of Europeanization which leads to opposition to reform, 
absorption and transformation. Whereas the line between absorption and transformation 
remains rather blurred, the former is understood as a ‘thinner’ form of learning or copying 
strategies whereas the latter would entail thinking differently, suggesting a modification of 
the belief systems, preferences and values (ibid).  
Whenever absorption or transformation take place, the process of Europeanisation can be 
understood as having resulted in policy transfer2; that is, ‘knowledge about policies, 
administrative arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or place [which] is used in 
the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time 
and/or place’ (D. Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996). This transfer, however, can be unsuccessful. 
That is, it may not result in the achievement of the aims set by the government when it 
engaged in the action of transfer (D. P. Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000); or in other words, it may 
not result in economic convergence. Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) suggest three reasons for 
the lack of convergence. First, the policy transfer might be uninformed; that is, the recipient 
country may not have had all of the necessary information available. Second, crucial 
                                                 
2 The literature on policy transfer overlaps with that of policy diffusion (Braun & Gilardi, 2006; Simmons 
& Elkins, 2004), lesson-drawing (Rose, 1991) and policy convergence (Bennett, 1991; Knill, 2005). The 
thesis is not over-concerned with the differences amongst them because, as Dolowitz and Marsh argue, ‘all 
of these studies are concerned with a similar process’ (2000). For a short review of the different terms, see 
Stone (1999). 
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elements of the policy may not have been transferred, which results in an incomplete 
transfer. Finally, differing economic, social, political and ideological contexts may have 
rendered the transfer inappropriate.  
1.1. Economic convergence and institutional constraints 
This thesis is motivated by the existing limits of convergence in economic outcomes in the 
EU, and in particular, by the idea that differing contexts may be at fault. Admittedly, EU 
countries are many times afflicted by the same problems. As Rose suggests ‘‘problems that 
are unique to one country (…) are abnormal. The concerns for which ordinary people turn 
to government – education, social security, and health care, safety on the streets, a clean 
environment and a buoyant economy – are common on many continents’. Nonetheless, 
such problems may result in asymmetric consequences depending on the societal context.  
As a result, engaging in policy transfers with the idea to solve similar problems may not 
lead to economic convergence.  
With this in mind, the thesis aims at understanding the extent to which different social 
contexts can limit the effects of changes in economic incentives, which are rooted either in 
common problems or policy changes. The ‘social context’ chosen is of an institutional 
nature; that is, the thesis is interested on the ‘filtering’ effects of institutional constraints on 
changes in economic incentives. Institutions are, according to North (1990) ‘humanly 
devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction’. He argues 
institutions ‘consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, 
and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights). 
Note that there is nothing in this definition that prevents policies being classified as one 
type of formal institution: they are clearly constraints or enablers to our actions and they 
structure political, economic and social interaction. And yet, taking a look at how the 
literature has empirically used the concept of institutions suggests that the latter are more 
encompassing than policies. Some authors talk about market institutions and legal 
institutions as being core for firms in liberal market economies (Hall & Soskice, 2001). 
Others use the concept of ‘firm-level institutions’ (R. B. Freeman, 2000) to refer to the 
organisation and policies of firms, and the OECD mentions policies that have become 
institutionalised and are therefore hard to change (Cerna, 2013). This thesis therefore 
differentiates between policies and institutions, seeing the latter as much more 
encompassing and as a contextual factor that may constrain or enable policy changes. In a 
way it could be argued that institutions are a broad set of policies and laws concerning one 
particular area. 
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Formal institutions as constraints for convergence 
Since the economic crisis ‘one-size-fits-all’ reforms concerning labour market and welfare 
have been widely branded as the remedies for the laggard Southern European countries. 
This view, however, is not uncontroversial and has encountered strong opposition, 
especially from institutionalist scholars. As the literature review below will document, it is 
now widely accepted that formal institutions affect economic outcomes. Moreover, these 
institutions are known for being persistent and difficult to change (North 1990, Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson 2005). Therefore, a change in economic incentives can clash with 
the existing institutions of the country, (Rodrik 2007) leading to different outcomes. This is 
to say, the effects of formal institutions on outcomes are likely to be resilient to changes in 
economic incentives. 
Informal institutions as constraints for convergence: the missing link 
While the ‘filtering’ effects of formal institutions on changes in economic incentives has 
been extensively analysed, the ‘filtering’ effect of informal institutions has been 
understudied. This is therefore the focus of the thesis. The overarching objective is to 
understand whether the effects of informal institutions on economic outcomes are resilient 
to changes in economic incentives. To this end, it develops a conceptual framework in which 
the research question is put into the wider context of institutional constraints, identifying 
the gap in the literature. It then analyses how different changes in economic incentives 
affects the resilience of the effects of informal institutions on economic outcomes.  
First, however, a literature review on the relationship between informal institutions, formal 
institutions and economic outcomes will describe the state of the art, hopefully providing 
the basis and rationale for the conceptual framework and the research question. In the 
following section I therefore proceed to review the literature on the relationship between 
a) formal institutions and economic outcomes; b) formal institutions and policy transfers, 
c) informal institutions and their link with both formal institutions and economic outcomes.  
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2. A literature review on institutional economics 
2.1. Formal institutions and economic outcomes 
Before new institutionalism came to the fore, neoclassical economics predicted a 
convergence of economic outcomes, based on the following assumptions: scarcity and 
competition, no information costs and well-defined property rights, rational actors and a 
Darwinian idea that only those who behave rationally will survive competition (North, 
1990). Even if transaction costs were to occur, resulting in ‘incorrect’ choices, in the long 
run they would disappear thanks to information feedback processes (ibid).  
But convergence never came. Needless to say there has been some convergence but there 
are still wide differences in terms of the economic, political and social outcomes across 
societies. And institutions, argues North (1990), are key to understanding the lack of 
convergence. In a nutshell, his argument is that first, although neoclassical economics was 
right in the scarcity and competition assumption, it failed in its understanding of 
transactions costs, and more specifically, in assuming complete information and perfect 
information feedback. Information is rarely complete and information feedbacks are 
usually insufficient. And when it is costly to transact, institutions matter (North, 1990). 
Second, such institutions are not necessarily efficient as, given that they are often created 
to serve certain interests and those in power, they can be highly persistent, with changes 
being path-dependent on the previous institutional framework.  
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) further developed the argument by focusing on 
the root cause of institutional differences across countries. They argue that at a time t 
political institutions determine the de jure political power, and at the same time, the current 
distribution of resources determines the de facto political power. These two together then 
affect the choice of economic institutions, which in turn impacts on economic performance 
as well as the distribution of resources at time t+1. This not only explains the process by 
which economic institutions are chosen, but also increases the understanding of the 
existence of persistent inefficient institutions.  
In sum, it seems clear that ‘we are all institutionalists now’ (Pierson and Skocpol 2002:706) 
and that institutions are established as active and relevant shapers of economic outcomes, 
be it for better or for worse.  
2.2. Formal institutions and changes in economic incentives 
Given that formal institutions exert an influence on economic outcomes, it is plausible to 
think that any change in economic incentives will be filtered by these institutions, giving 
rise to different outcomes. This idea is well captured in Rodrik’s book (2007) ‘One 
20 
 
economics. Many recipes’. Markets need support from non-market institutions, and that was 
visible in the failure of the policy reforms in various countries that had not taken the 
inadequacy of institutions into account. By way of example, Russia’s reforms focused on 
price reform and privatisation ignoring the absence of adequate legal and political 
institutions (Rodrik, 2007:154). As a result, Rodrik argues that appropriate growth policies 
must be context specific (p.4).  
The problem of institutional inefficiency is coupled with a problem of institutional 
persistence. Inefficient institutions do not necessarily disappear with time, as the 
neoclassical school would assume (North, 1990). This is a well-understood phenomenon 
that is covered by and large by new institutionalists, who argue that it might be related to 
informational problems (North, 1990) that tend to be frequent during the decision-making 
processes affecting public policy decisions. Moreover, individuals also have different 
constructs of reality and rulers will sometimes be focused on maximising their own 
interests and not the interests of the society (Daron Acemoglu et al., 2005). These variables 
together with the increasing returns of existing institutions deepen the path dependence of 
institutional settings and therefore explain the persistence of inefficient institutions.  
Given these filtering and persisting effects of formal institutions on changes in economic 
incentives, some policy-makers and scholars advocate a complete overhaul of the 
institutional setting of the country or society in question via ‘structural reforms’. 
Underpinning these actions is the belief that ‘there is a single peak of superior performance 
that is close to the market’ (Blanchard, Bean, & Munchau, 2006:7) and differences in 
economic behaviour and performance across countries are explained by the existence of 
inefficient institutions which consistently deviate from best-practices (see for example 
Baccaro & Rei, 2007). As a consequence, it is often the case that institutional upgrade 
demanded is based on the Ideal Economic Model of the moment (R. B. Freeman, 2000), that 
is, a ‘distinct set of institutions and organizations that has maximal fitness in the period’s 
economic environment’ (p.2). Rodrik makes the same point when suggesting that the ‘neo-
liberal’ social-economic model is the preferred model for international financial institutions 
(2007). Two immediate questions arise. First, is this bias towards one single set of 
institutions justified? And second, does it lead to the expected outcomes?  
In regards to the first question, comparative political economists and scientists suggest that 
the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach misses the point that there might exist at least two different 
types of institutional settings corresponding to equally efficient labour market 
performance (R. Freeman & Schettkat, 2001; Scharpf & Schmidt, 2000). This is the view 
held by Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (2001). In his book on Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
they ask why there exist acute institutional differences across countries. Their answer 
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revolves around firms as organisations and their relational view with other actors. They 
demonstrate that there are tight links between the strategies of firms at a micro-level and 
the comparative institutional advantages of national economies at a macro level. Theirs is 
therefore a theory that manages to understand institutional differences by linking the 
macro and the micro levels.  
The firm, in its relational role with other actors, necessarily encounters problems of 
coordination: it must coordinate wages and labour with the workers, it needs to secure a 
labour force with suitable skills, it needs to finance its activities, it requires smooth 
coordination with other firms and it benefits from employees who cooperate with each 
other. The solution to the coordination problems in these five spheres – industrial relations, 
vocational training and education, corporate governance, inter-firm relations and 
employee relations - is closely linked to the type of political economy in the country (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001). 
The authors categorise political economies into two groups (ibid): liberal market 
economies (LME) and coordinated market economies (CME). In the former, firms 
coordinate at arm’s length, and therefore, the principal institutions that foster coordination 
are market institutions and the legal system. Conversely, in CMEs, firms depend more on 
non-market coordination, and as such, the principal institutions fostering coordination will 
be employers’ associations, trade unions, networks of cross-shareholding and the like. As 
stated in the previous section, complementarities exist between the five spheres and 
therefore, an institutional change in one sphere can increase coordination problems. More 
important in this discussion, however, is the fact that these two types of political economies 
can be equally efficient given these complementarities, and therefore convergence need not 
be the ultimate goal.  
In a similar vein, although focusing on welfare state typologies, Esping-Andersen (1990) 
suggests that different welfare institutions exist because of different historical class-
coalitions, giving parties a say on how the welfare state developed. Three distinct models 
can be observed, amongst which the differences can be seen in the degree of 
decommodification and social stratification and the welfare mix (ibid). Accordingly, the 
Liberal welfare state is characterized by a market dominance in the provision of welfare 
and private provision. State intervention is minimal and oriented towards basic needs and 
the relief of poverty. The Social-democratic welfare state is the mirror image. 
Decommodification is high and social stratification low. Social policies are not there to 
underpin the market, but to provide a safety net against it. There is a limit to reliance on 
family and market in the provision of welfare and a high degree of individual autonomy. 
Finally, the Conservative model lies in-between. Occupational social insurance schemes 
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predominate and the level of decommodification is higher than in Liberal welfare states but 
still limited.  
In regards to the second question – whether this complete overhaul of institutions can lead 
to the expected outcomes – the literature seems to be pessimistic about it, although there 
are some exceptions. Acemoglu, Cantoni, Johnson and Robinson (2011) examine the 
historical reforms imposed by the French upon their conquered European neighbours in 
the aftermath of the French Revolution, and find that these led to faster economic growth 
than those in the unaffected regions. They conclude that this points towards a more 
optimistic view on whether externally imposed reforms, without concern for whether they 
are appropriate to the local conditions, can be successful. However, they also suggest in 
their conclusions that a factor for such success might be the extent of the reforms: the 
simultaneous reform of several aspects of the economy, society and politics made it more 
difficult to return to the old institutions, securing the new economic incentives in place and 
resulting in a permanent institutional change.  
Conversely, Rodrik (2007) suggests that successful policies need to be tailored to local 
economic and political realities, and not merely ‘transplanted’. He admits that ‘Big bang’ 
reforms succeeded in Poland, but he suggests that this is because Poland had already 
‘defined its future: it wanted to be a “normal” European society’ (p. 166). In general, he 
‘believes’ in institutional diversity and in the importance of local knowledge. He talks about 
the appropriateness of growth policies to be context specific and the relevance of the 
environment (p.4). Similarly, Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) construct a model to study the 
implications of changes in political institutions for economic institutions. They find that the 
change in de jure political power is offset by the de facto political power, which is possessed 
by groups as a result of wealth, weapons and the like.  
2.3. Informal institutions: relationship with economic outcomes and formal institutions 
There is evidence from the social economics literature that, first, different informal 
institutions are thought to exist within the same formal institutional framework, affecting 
the final outcomes. Secondly, informal institutions have been shown to influence the choice 
of formal institutions. And thirdly, there is also evidence that informal institutions are quite 
resilient to changes in formal institutions. Nevertheless, the resilience of the effect of 
informal institutions in the light of changes in economic incentives has not received the 
same attention.  
These points were already made by North when he stated that cultural constraints are key 
to explaining the path of historical change and they were strikingly persistent even when a 
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total change of rules took place (North 1990). He also acknowledged that the same formal 
rules imposed on different societies can produce very different outcomes depending on the 
cultural constraints (North 1990). The contribution of the literature on social economics 
has been to theoretically refine these claims and to provide new methods to test them. 
The idea that culture exerts a significant influence on economic outcomes is not a new one. 
As early as the beginning of the twentieth century Max Weber had already developed it in 
his seminal work ‘The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism’ (Weber, 2002), where 
he argued that the protestant ethic had encouraged the development of capitalism.  
Before this, culture had already been discussed by non-economists and applied in other 
relevant fields apart from economics. However, Weber’s work was the first to discuss in 
such an accurate way the role of religion in economics. The same idea, although tackling a 
different cultural trait, was brought up by Banfield (1958)  in his book ‘The Moral Basis of a 
Backward Society’. In this work he examined the case of a southern backward Italian village 
and concluded that the economic and political backwardness of the village was partially 
caused by the morality held by most of its inhabitants – that he named ‘amoral familism’ - 
which was based on the following rule: ‘Maximise the material, short-run advantage of the 
nuclear family; assume that all others will do likewise’ (p.85). 
Gradually political scientists would enter the debate by analysing different cultural aspects 
and their impact on politics and economics. Francis Fukuyama (1995) devoted his book 
‘Trust: the social virtues and the creation of prosperity’ to the importance of trust for 
economic development. Economics, he claimed, despite what many neoclassical economists 
might think, is highly intertwined with rules, social norms and culture in a society. When 
trust is in place, social capital arises, and this enhances the efficiency of the economy (p.32). 
In the same fashion the economist David Landes concluded in his book (1998)  that cultural 
factors such as thrift, hard work, tenacity, honesty and tolerance are crucial for the success 
of an economy. Slightly shifting the focus from economics to issues of democracy, Robert 
Putnam (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993) examined the differences in institutional 
performance bewteen Italian regions, where he found a strong connection between civic 
life and institutional performance. Civic engagement, he said, encouraged social capital, 
which is the key to making democracy work (p.185). 
In the realm of economics, the concept of culture had a harder time finding a place. 
Preferences had traditionally been considered exogenous parameters (Benhabib, Bisin, & 
Jackson, 2011), and social norms, values and beliefs were thought to be the result of rational 
choices, with any element of conflict being dealt with through the price system (Guiso, 
Sapienza, & Zingales, 2006). By way of example, Stigler and Becker argued in their paper De 
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Gustibus Non Est Disputandum that ‘tastes neither change capriciously nor differ 
importantly between people’ (Stigler & Becker, 1977:76). With regard to social norms and 
customs they argue that these can be explained as ‘a result from investment of time and 
other resources in the accumulation of knowledge about the environment’ (p.82). 
Fernandez (2011) and Guiso et al (2006) suggest that this reluctance on the part of 
economists to include social norms, beliefs and values in economic analyses was rooted in 
their blurred conceptualization and the lack of adequate methodology to quantify them and 
disentangle them from other confounding factors such as formal institutions and the 
economic environment, which had characterised previous analyses.  
The political economy and social policy literature have also been rather reluctant to take 
culture on board, at least until recently. Although the former has generally acknowledged 
its relevance (see for example North 1990 or Hall and Soskice 2000), the scholarly research 
has shown a bias towards the analysis of formal institutions. The social policy discipline has 
gone a long way from the notion that the idea that culture would influence social policies 
‘equated with the idea that party and gossip would determine the course of the ship’ 
(Schoor, 1984 in van Oorschot, 2007). But as with the political economy discipline, there is 
still a bias towards a focus on welfare regimes and formal institutions.  
Interestingly enough, it has been in the realm of economics that the idea that culture affects 
economic outcomes has been revived the most. Already in the 1990s, we can find some 
authors who attempted to test results that had previously been highlighted by political 
scientists. La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny (1997) documented in their article 
a strong correlation between trust and the existence of large organisations and Knack and 
Keefer (1997) found that trust is positively and significantly correlated with growth. Greif  
(1989) compared Maghribi and Genovese traders from the eleventh and twelfth centuries 
and concluded that ‘differences in the societal organization of the two trading societies can 
be consistently accounted for as reflecting diverse cultural beliefs’. (p. 914). Ellison (1991) 
documents the correlation between religion and health and Evans, Cullen, Dunaway, & 
Burton (1995) discuss the correlation between religion and criminal behaviour. A problem 
of those papers, however, is that they do not specifically address problems of endogeneity, 
and therefore we can speak of correlation, but not causality.  
As the number of studies dealing with culture and economics gradually increased in the 
twenty-first century, the concept of culture also progressed. Within the studies that related 
culture to general economic outcomes, those taking religion as a main cultural variable 
were manifold. Barro and McCleary (2003) analysed the influence of religion on the growth 
rate of per capita GDP in fifty-nine countries all over the world. In their study they 
controlled for endogeneity problems by using instrumental variables correlated to religion 
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but not to economic growth such as the existence of a state religion, measures of religious 
diversity and so on and so forth. They found that religion is good for growth although they 
pointed out that while religious belief is good to growth, church attendance is negatively 
related to it. Stulz and Williamson (2003) also relied on religion as a relevant cultural 
variable and looked at its role in creditors’ rights in about fifty countries. They found that 
Catholic countries protect creditors’ rights much less than other countries although the 
impact is diminished the more the country is open to international trade. Guiso, Sapienza 
and Zingales (2003) also studied how religious beliefs affected growth. To do so, they first 
measured the effect of religious beliefs on several attitudes and preferences conducive to 
growth (instead of growth in itself). Specifically, they examined the impact of four 
indicators of religiosity – atheism, being brought up religiously, being currently religious 
and being actively religious – on preferences towards cooperation, women, market 
thriftiness and fairness among others. They then examined the impact of these preferences 
on growth. 
Another variable used as a cultural aspect is the level of trust in a society. Guiso et al. (2004) 
and  Guiso et al. (2009) looked at the effect of trust (or social capital) on financial 
development and trade, and found that less trust leads to lower levels of financial 
development and trade. Tabellini (2010) also used trust – combined with other cultural 
traits - to look at the impact of culture on economic development. He identified four main 
cultural traits – trust, respect for others (or generalised vs. limited morality), confidence in 
the ability to improve one’s situation and obedience in a way that suppresses individualism 
– that were expected to affect economic development, which he measured by per capita 
gross value added. The novelty in his paper was that he attempted to disentangle the role 
of formal and informal institutions. In order to do so, he looked at cultural traits in several 
European regions, arguing that ‘the formal and legal institutions have been the same inside 
the European countries in our sample for 150 years or more’ (p. 678). In his paper he also 
controlled for endogeneity by using instrumental variables for the cultural attributes, 
namely literacy rates in 1880 and regional political institutions between the 12th and 19th 
centuries, finding a strong effect of culture on economic development. 
In a very similar conceptualisation as the one used in this thesis, some authors use the terms 
‘family ties’ and ‘family attitudes’. Alesina and Giuliano (2010) and Alesina et al. (2010) 
used the concept of family ties and related it to the distribution of roles of different 
members of the family in running home and market activities. They also linked it to 
geographical mobility and living arrangements as well as preferences for employment 
protection, suggesting that these have an effect on major macroeconomic and demographic 
outcomes. In a similar fashion, the term ‘family attitudes’ was used by Algan and Cahuc 
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(2007) to refer to the same idea and to understand employment rates across different 
demographic groups. 
The effect of informal institutions on formal ones is also well-documented in the literature. 
A paper by Alesina el al. (2010) claims that the strength of family ties in Southern European 
countries affects the individual choice of labour market institutions. They argue that 
individuals with strong family ties are less mobile and will rationally choose regulated 
labour markets to avoid both moving and limiting the monopsony of firms.  Algan and Cahuc 
(2006) make a similar point and argue that religion influences the demand for job 
protection and that societies with predominant male bread-winner values will ask for more 
job protection given that this regulation – as opposed to unemployment benefits - protects 
male bread-winners jobs.  Beyond labour markets, Robert Putnam (1993) found a strong 
connection between civic life and institutional performance. Similarly, Fukuyama (1995) 
found a positive relationship between the performance of all institutions in a society and 
trust.  
The effect can also go both ways. Aghion, Algan and Cahuc (2011) focus on the co-evolution 
between culture and preferences for regulatory institutions. Culture, it is argued, influences 
the demand for certain types of regulation. At the same time, the paper suggests that 
regulation also reinforces certain cultural aspects. In this context two possible equilibria 
emerge; one ‘good’ equilibrium with low levels of regulation and high levels of social capital 
and a ‘bad’ equilibrium with the opposite results. 
Finally, the existing literature also examines the resilience of informal institutions to 
changes in formal ones. To this end, some authors have used the epidemiological approach. 
This approach looks at economic outcomes and the behaviour of different groups of 
migrants and compares them to that of the locals. The idea is that migrant groups face the 
same institutional and economic environment as the native individuals in the country of 
residence but they are assumed to preserve, to a certain extent, the family values of their 
country of ancestry. Most studies3, especially the more recent ones that use a more robust 
methodology and larger datasets, find that informal institutions – i.e. social norms, culture, 
family ties and others – are resilient to changes in formal institutions. 
Raquel Fernandez has used the epidemiological approach extensively to focus on fertility 
and women’s employment outcomes (see interalia Fernandez & Fogli, 2009; Fernandez, 
                                                 
3 There are some exceptions: Carroll, Rhee and Rhee (1994), who were the first to use the epidemiological 
approach, examined the saving patterns of migrants and natives in Canada and did not find very significant 
differences. Reimers (1985) is another example of where using this approach shows mixed results. 
Fernandez (2010) suggests that in this case this might be because the analysed individuals had been in the 
US for different periods. 
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Fogli, & Olivetti, 2004). She and her co-authors argue that beliefs with regard to women’s 
roles in the labour market have considerably shaped these outcomes. Paola Giuliano (2007) 
has used the same approach to analyse the role of family ties in preferences for living 
arrangements, marriage and fertility behaviour in Western Europe. She studied second-
generation immigrants in the United States, and found that the family ties of migrants 
mimic those of the native population in Europe. Alesina and Giuliano (2010) also used the 
same method to assess the impact of family ties on the level of home production, labour 
force participation of women and youngsters and geographical mobility. They found that 
the former are a significant factor of influence for all of the mentioned outcomes.  
More recently, Acemoglu and Jackson (2014) have used game theory to test whether a 
change in the law (i.e. formal institutions) that conflicts with prevailing social norms can be 
successfully enforced. Their results confirm that a mismatch between a change in formal 
institutions (the law in this case) and the prevailing informal institutions (social norms) is 
likely to result in a backfiring of the law. They also claim that this backfiring effect can be 
attenuated with a gradual imposition of the law that takes social norms into account. On the 
other hand, Helliwell, Wang and Xu (2014) found mixed results when they looked at the 
durability of social norms. They analysed the resilience of social trust and generosity and 
argue that the effect of the source country’s social trust is strongly significant. However, 
both trust and generosity are subject to adaptation in the light of major formal institutional 
changes.  
3. Conceptual framework and research question 
The literature review therefore suggests that: a) formal institutions affect economic 
outcomes; b) formal institutions are resilient to changes in economic incentives, limiting 
the result of the latter on economic outcomes; c) informal institutions affect economic 
outcomes; d) informal institutions affect formal institutions and they tend to co-evolve; e) 
informal institutions seem to be resilient, at least in some circumstances, to changes in 
formal institutions. 
These points are summarized in the conceptual framework depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 
2. The same framework also leads to the question with which this thesis is concerned. 
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between policy change, formal institutions and 
economic outcomes and behaviours suggested by the formal institutionalists. The effect of 
formal institutions on economic outcomes and individual behaviour is represented by the 
arrows in black and marked as (a). The idea that formal institutions are resilient to changes 
in economic incentives, limiting the latter’s result on economic outcomes is represented by 
the black line between changes in economic incentives and formal institutions and marked 
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as (b). Of course, formal institutions also shape the economic incentives in place (i.e. the 
figure should be expanded on the left-hand side with arrows going from institutions to 
economic incentives). However, given that the aim is to see what happens when there is a 
change in economic incentives, this part is not illustrated.  
Figure 1. The relationship between formal institutions, outcomes and changes in 
economic incentives according to institutionalism. 
Source: author’s own 
Figure 2 adds a layer of complexity to Figure 1 to add informal institutions in the picture. 
Such additional layer including informal institutions is needed to first understand 
differences in outcomes even when formal institutions are accounted for. This is illustrated 
with the arrows which go from informal institutions to economic outcomes and behaviour, 
marked as (c). Second, the informal institutions layer is also necessary to understand one 
of the reasons why individuals across societies choose different formal institutions. And 
third they also provide a reason for the persistence of institutions: co-evolution between 
formal and informal. These two last points are illustrated with the double-sided arrows that 
link formal and informal institutions, marked as (d). Furthermore, informal institutions 
have proven fairly resilient to changes in formal institutions. This is illustrated with the 
arrows that go from ‘change’ in formal institutions to informal institutions, with a cross 
suggesting the resilience of informal institutions, marked as (e). 
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Figure 2. The relationship between informal institutions, outcomes and formal 
institutions according to the social economics literature. 
 
Source: author’s own 
To sum up, informal institutions are shown to be relevant, having a direct effect on 
economic outcomes and individual behaviour. At the same time, they seem to be durable 
and resilient to changes in formal institutions, at least under certain circumstances. Figure 
2 also makes more visible the gap that the thesis aims to fill. What happens to the effect of 
informal institutions on economic outcomes when there is a change in economic 
incentives? More specifically, the question that the thesis aims to answer is: are the effects 
of informal institutions on individual behaviour resilient to changes in economic 
incentives?  
Some preliminary clarifications on what the thesis does not do may be helpful. To answer 
the question the thesis will keep formal institutions ‘constant’ and will focus on the 
resilience of informal institutions. That is, it will not examine the resilience of formal 
institutions on changes in economic incentives; such resilience has already been 
established by the institutionalist literature. It will therefore be assumed that the change in 
economic incentives can be done within the same formal institutional framework. This is a 
plausible assumption, as many policy changes can be done under the same institutional 
framework and do not necessarily need its change.  
The thesis also assumes that the change in economic incentives does not lead to a change 
in informal institutions. That is, it assumes that informal institutions remain unchanged. 
Given the persistence of informal institutions over time, this is a plausible assumption in 
the short run, which is the ‘time period’ this thesis focuses on. That is, the thesis does not 
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deny that a change in economic incentives can led to a change in informal institutions in the 
long run. However, it is not within the scope of the thesis to analyse it.  
4. Focus of the thesis 
In order for the question above to be feasible to answer within the length of the thesis, a 
process of narrowing down is necessary. For reasons that I hope will become clear in the 
following paragraphs, the thesis focuses on individual behaviour and preferences for social 
care – namely preferences for elderly care, amount and type of parental support for adult 
children and duration of parental leave. With regard to informal institutions, the focus is on 
social norms, and more specifically, on those concerning the role of the family in society, 
that is, family values. Finally, different changes in economic incentives will be chosen. One 
is centred on changes in one socio-economic characteristic of individuals, that of education 
attainment levels. The other change in economic incentive is an adverse change in 
employment status. Finally, the last change concerns a parental leave policy reform.  
Therefore, the research question after the process of narrowing down is as follows: are the 
effects of family values on individual behaviour in social care resilient to changes in 
economic incentives?  
4.1. Policy contexts: social policy  
Economic issues were the primary focus of the founding fathers of European integration, 
and a brief comparison of economic and social integration suggests that the latter has been 
comparatively disappointing  (Leibfried in Wallace, Pollack, & Young, 2010). Social policy 
has therefore been mostly kept in the hands of national member states, something which is 
reflected in the different welfare states arrangements, which led Esping-Andersen to talk 
about three main varieties of welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
This is not to say that there have been no considerable advances. European Social Policy 
has evolved mainly through three direct channels and a more indirect one. With regard to 
the direct channels, the first one – ‘hard’ positive integration through rules, regulations and 
directives - has resulted in significant changes in the field of health and safety, working 
conditions and equality in the workplace (Falkner, 2009). The second ‘hard’ channel 
mirrors the first and refers to the so-called negative integration: that is, the ruling of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the area of the four freedoms that potentially restrict 
member states’ social policies (Leibfried in Wallace et al., 2010). 
These two ‘hard’ channels have been coupled with a softer, arguably less successful but 
more conciliating method of positive integration (Heidenreich and Zeitlin in Wallace et al., 
2010): the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). This is a mechanism of spreading best 
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practices, which facilitates convergence in policy goals (Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003) and 
which has been increasingly used in the fields of employment policy and more recently 
health, pensions, equal opportunities and social exclusion.  
Finally, integration has also been achieved through the reluctance of the member states to 
relinquish their social policies, which has been coupled with their de facto loss of control 
over them. This is not to imply that power has transferred to the supranational EU level. As 
a matter of fact, the loss of control has been greater than what the EU has gained in 
authority, suggesting that some of this power has gone directly to the markets (Leibfried in 
Wallace et al., 2010). 
Although there are clear differences between the three methods, they all share the goal – 
albeit sometimes only implicit - of achieving convergence. This is clearly the case for EU 
directives and regulations and negative integration through the courts. Similarly, and as 
previously stated, it is the goal of the OMC to reach certain convergence in outcomes. And 
arguably, this is also the effect of the more ‘indirect’ method of integration: the initial idea 
that single market could exist without any effect on the social dimension has proved to be 
naïve (Leibfried in Wallace et al., 2010:254) and runs counter to the logic of political 
economy, which as Leibfried emphasises ‘stresses that economic action is embedded within 
dense networks of social and political institutions’ (North, 1990). 
It is then in this context that the question that this thesis aims to answer –whether the 
effects of informal institutions are resilient to policy changes – takes on more relevance. 
Pierson and Leibfried (Stephan Leibfried & Pierson, 1995) talk about national welfare 
states being built in ‘increasingly constraining multi-tiered polity’, and, in a similar fashion, 
Falkner (Falkner, 2009) refers to ‘bounded varieties of welfare’. The increasing role of 
markets and judges in shaping policy changes, together with hard regulation and the softer 
mechanisms of the OMC, give little consideration to the social environment, and if the 
argument of this thesis holds, this may therefore not result in the expected outcomes. 
Within social policy, the thesis focuses on individual behaviour in social care. Social care – 
which includes parental leave and childcare, elderly care and parental support for adult 
care (also referred to as downstream intergenerational transfers) – has been the subject of 
several EU directives4, the Open Method of Coordination as well as common market 
pressures. Leave policies, including maternity and paternity leave, parental and childcare 
leave have been increasingly regulated at EU level. The aim of these policies has been to 
                                                 
4 For example, for parental leave there has been EU directives in 1991, in 1997 and the most recent one 
in 2010. 
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increase women’s labour force participation and reconcile employment and family 
responsibilities, encouraging parental sharing of the latter (Haas, 2003).  
The approach has been rather different for elderly care and, more generally, long-term care. 
As will be explained in chapter 2, the increasing needs of the old age population are not 
being coupled with an increase in resources. In fact, availability of care is diminishing due 
to the increase in female labour force participation and the decreased share of the working-
age population. Despite these challenges, this area of welfare remains underdeveloped; it 
is mostly relatives who provide for elderly and long-term care (F. Colombo, A. Llena-Nozal, 
J. Mercier, & F. Tjadens, 2011; Costa-Font, 2010). The EU has stepped in via the Open 
Method of Coordination, emphasising that major differences exist in the way care is 
provided in Member States and encouraging the sharing of best practices to adequately face 
the challenges (Committee, 2001). Interestingly enough, the approach followed by 
countries has been one of increasing choice in the financing and provision of elderly care 
(F. Colombo et al., 2011).  
Finally, the debate on the intergenerational contract has tended to focus mainly around 
health care and pension systems, and on the balance between their sustainability and their 
promise of intergenerational justice (Albertini & Kohli, 2013). This is true both at the 
national and supranational level, with the latter again using the OMC to advance in their 
integration. Nonetheless, this analysis misses the dynamics of intergenerational contract 
within one crucial institution: the family. Such dynamics are barely the focus of national 
actors, let alone EU ones (ibid).  
4.2. Social norms and family values 
In all of the above-mentioned social care areas informal institutions are likely to influence 
individual behaviour. It is not very controversial to suggest that the decision to care for a 
close member of your family will be emotionally grounded. And it is plausible to think that 
part of these individual ‘emotions’ are rooted in prevailing social norms related to the 
family that exist in the society the individual lives (which I will call ‘family values’). And yet, 
one could argue that having accounted for incentives given by formal institutions and 
policies, their relevance is, to say the least, questionable; their addition does not bring much 
added value after all.  
As the literature review on culture and outcomes has suggested (section 2.2 above), this 
was the idea stemming from the economics discipline for quite a long time. It later changed 
and has recently taken a renewed interest in social norms. In their recently edited 
Handbook on Social Economics, Benhabib, Bisin and Jackson (Benhabib et al., 2011) define 
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social economics as the study ‘with the methods of economics, of social phenomena in 
which aggregates affect individual choices’ (p. xvii). They name social norms, cultural 
identities and others as these phenomena and review the recent literature on social 
economics. In a way, what they arguably have in mind is Akerlof’s words when he states 
that he has gone ‘the opposite way of Gary Becker’ by trying to bring other disciplines into 
economics, and not the other way round (Akerlof in Swedberg, 1990). 
This thesis has borrowed the definition of social norms from Burke and Young (2011), 
contributors to the aforementioned Handbook. They define social norms as a “standard, 
customary, or ideal form of behaviour to which individuals in a social group try to conform” 
(p.313). It also borrows from the conceptualisation made by Postlewaite in the same 
volume (2011), which is helpful to understand the different ways in which social norms can 
be understood and incorporated in economic models, without compromising the 
assumption that individuals are fundamentally similar and have the same endowments and 
access to technology.   
He suggests that one way to incorporate social norms is to assume that individuals are the 
same at birth but that interactions with their different communities shape their preferences 
in such a way that when they are grown up, what makes them happy or sad is very different. 
In this case, he argues, their deep preferences are different (ibid). The other option is to 
assume that two individuals have the same deep preferences but that the social structures 
they inhabit provide different incentives for behaviour.  This would suggest that what 
differs across these fundamentally similar individuals is their preferences over the 
immediate alternatives, which he labels ‘reduced form preferences’ (ibid). 
An alternative way to introduce social norms in economics models is to use the identity 
framework provided by Akerlof and Kranton (2000). They argue that the inclusion of 
‘identity’ helps to explain behaviour that would otherwise have been not very well 
accounted for with economic tools, such as why some women opposed women’s rights 
(Akerlof & Kranton, 2000:715).  They propose a utility function that includes identity as 
well as the usual vectors of an individual’s action and others’ actions.  A person’s identity, 
they argue, depends first on his/her assigned ‘social category’, which comes with a 
prescribed behaviour. Second, it also depends in the person’s own given characteristics, 
and third, on the extent to which his/her own actions and others’ actions correspond to the 
prescribed behaviour. And in the simplest case, an individual chooses his/her actions to 
maximise utility taking the categories, prescriptions, characteristics and others’ actions as 
given (p.719). The authors later discuss the model in more depth, but this simpler 
framework can be applied to the understanding of social norms of this thesis.  
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In the empirical chapters the problem is set so that individuals need to choose their actions: 
whether to care for their young or adult children or elderly parents. Their assigned 
categories depend on the society where they live, which has certain social norms with 
regard to the role of the family. Such norms prescribe a different behaviour depending on 
the ‘assigned categories’. Of course, the action of caring also comes with some costs. This 
might be forgone income, or loss of intimacy (say, if parents help their adult children with 
co-residence) and even time. Changes in economic incentives alter these costs and, 
sometimes exacerbate them – such as in the case of a policy reform that conflicts with the 
social norms of the society. Individuals therefore take decisions based on a) costs, and b) 
identity. The point of this thesis is to see whether the effects of identity – in this case social 
norms – are strong enough to overcome the effects of a change in economic incentives.  
With regard to the type of social norms, the thesis has narrowed down the concept to 
include those norms regarding the role of the family in society. This is because such norms, 
which I will refer to as ‘family values’, are acknowledged to strongly affect many social care 
arrangements (Reher, 1998). Patterns of kin solidarity and the responsibility to care for the 
needy, vulnerable and elderly differ across societies according to these values (Ferrera, 
1996; Reher, 1998). In places with traditional family values, help tends to come mostly from 
the family, as opposed to public institutions, and many of these differences in patterns of 
support still exist today (Reher, 1998:209). The working definition of family values used in 
the thesis is therefore as follows: family values are collective definitions of socially 
approved conduct with regard to the role of different members of the household at home 
and in the market. 
Note that the understanding of family values could fit both conceptualisations of social 
norms – as deep and reduced form preferences. Strong and traditional societal family 
values could be the result of strong emotional bonds within the family which make it 
morally difficult to reject care. This explanation would be more in line with a pattern of 
distinct deep preferences across societies. At the same time, existing family values could be 
a reflection of family loyalties which result in different future rewards for a given 
behaviour. As interesting as it would be to thoroughly examine the two conceptualisations 
further, this is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Slow-moving versus fast-moving social norms 
One fairly controversial issue that arises in the social economics literature is the acceptance 
or rejection of the idea that culture is ‘slow-moving’. In their definition, Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales (2006) suggest that this is the case; an idea shared by other authors such as Roland 
(2004). In an attempt to categorise institutions, he differentiates between ‘slow-moving’ 
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and ‘fast-moving’ ones. The former comprise culture, values, beliefs and social norms, 
which tend to evolve slowly but gradually (p. 110). Conversely, fast-moving institutions 
such as political ones ‘do not necessarily change often, but they can do it very quickly – 
sometimes nearly overnight’ (p.110).  
This view however is not shared by everyone. Fernandez explicitly rejects an 
understanding of culture that implies that it is slow-moving (Fernández, 2011:4). She uses 
a definition from the Merriam Webster dictionary which states that culture is ‘the 
integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief, and behavior that depends upon the 
capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations’ and ‘the 
customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial, religious, or social group; 
(and) the set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes an 
institution or organization’. 
The idea that social norms are slow-moving is appealing for this thesis, especially because 
it allows some differentiation from formal institutions. However, it does not entirely take it 
as an assumption; the empirical chapters provide some proof that this is the case, by looking 
at the correlation of the constructed family values indexes across time.  
4.3. Economic incentives 
In this thesis I treat parental leave, changes in employment status of the offspring and 
education as economic incentives to be analysed, and I am interested in understanding 
whether different levels of education, changes in employment status and policy 
frameworks affect individuals’ behaviour differently depending on the existing social 
norms. It is therefore worth discussing more in depth the concept of economic incentives 
and how is it applied to the three incentives the thesis focuses on: education, change in 
employment status and parental leave policy reform. (Mankiw & Taylor, 2011 (1958)) 
suggest that people respond to economic incentives, meaning that people make decisions 
by comparing costs and benefits. Similarly, Bowles and Polania-Reyes define economic 
incentives as ‘interventions to influence behaviour by altering the economic costs or 
benefits of some targeted activity’ (Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012:369). 
According to this definitions, parental leave policies, employment status and education 
levels can be defined as economic incentives, as they are likely to alter economic costs or 
benefits of caring for someone. Nevertheless, it can also be argued that they can not only 
alter economic incentives, but also social norms, including family values. This is especially 
the case for education and parental leave policies. The latter may alter the idea of 
‘motherhood’ that individuals hold, and similarly, education can influence our ideas and 
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attitudes towards a number of issues. The next paragraphs discusses in more detail these 
possibilities.  
Education…. 
…as an economic incentive 
The economics literature regards education as an endowment on human capital. At a micro 
level, education levels are a strong predictor of employment status and earning levels 
(Boeri & Ours, 2013:209). This could be either because schooling enhances productivity, 
which is reflected in higher wages, or because schooling sends a signal to employers that 
the worker is hard-working and ‘inherently’ motivated. In other words, it could be that 
individuals with higher education earn more because schools have filtered those who 
possess the skills to be better workers. Schooling in this case would act as a signal (Borjas, 
2012; Evandrou, Glennerster, & Hills, 1998). Be it because of productivity gains or because 
of signalling effects, the fact that the highly educated earn on average higher wages suggests 
that educated individuals will have a higher opportunity cost of caring, and therefore, we 
would expect ‘potential carers’ with higher education to prefer formal to informal care. 
…as a trigger for norm change or as a trigger for embracing existing norms  
At the same time, education’s influence goes beyond that of enhancing human capital and 
affecting individual economic incentives. Friedman (1962) recognizes the role of education 
as a transmitter of common values and Evandrou et al. (1998) discuss the public benefits 
of education, mentioning respect for law and order, socialization into existing norms and 
values, promotion of equal access to education and a sense of social justice and promotion 
of social and racial equality, among others (2003:27). Similarly, a large body of literature 
suggests that education enhances civic engagement (Dee, 2004; Milligan, Moretti, & 
Oreopoulos, 2004 and citations therein), especially voter turnout. 
The association between education and liberal values has also been largely studied, with 
findings usually conforming to the idea that education enhances liberal values (Hyman & 
Wright, 1979) and see Sheepers, Te Grotenhuis and Var Der Slik (2002) for a review. The 
psychodynamic theory would argue that better educated people may be more liberal 
because they tend to be more self-confident and therefore to tolerate diversity better and 
see it less as a threat (see Stubager, 2008; Weil, 1985 for a review). Alternatively, the 
socialization or cognitive theory would state that better educated individuals can ‘escape’ 
the common folk culture and have access to less – prejudiced enlightened culture (Hyman 
& Wright, 1979; Jacobsen, 2001). However, some authors suggest that the relationship 
might not be as straightforward. Weil (1985) challenges the homogeneous effects of 
education on values by suggesting that education socializes students into the dominant or 
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‘official’ culture, and therefore if the culture is rather ‘illiberal’, the effects of education on 
tolerance levels will be weak.  
Similar conclusions have been reached with regard to the more specific relationship 
between education and family values. By and large the literature finds that higher 
educational attainment is associated with less traditional gender roles orientations (Harris 
& Firestone, 1998). For example, Thornton, Alwin and Camburn (1983) find that highly-
educated mothers have more egalitaritan sex-role attitudes, and so do their children. 
Similarly, Campbell and Horowitz (2016) use siblings’ data to show that earning a four-year 
college degree has a significant impact on beliefs about gender egalitarianism.  
The literature on education and values therefore suggest that education may have a direct 
effect on behaviour by changing economic incentives, but also an indirect effect through the 
change of individual values. This is relevant for Chapter 2, where the interplay between 
education and (societal) family values is analysed. Therefore, in that chapter, education can 
affect preferences for formal care either by increasing the opportunity cost of caring or by 
changing the individual family values. As will noted in chapter, the analysis cannot 
disentangle the two effects.  
Parental leave policy reform… 
… as an economic incentive 
A useful framework (albeit not the only one) to understand how maternity leave policies 
provide with economic incentives that may affect individual behaviour can be taken from 
Boeri and Van Ours (2013). They argue in their book that mandated parental leaves can be 
analysed using a small extension of the standard labour/leisure framework. Childbirth can 
arguably lead to a temporary change in preferences for work, increasing the reservation 
wage in the initial weeks after childbirth. Without a leave policy in place, this would mean 
that if the reservation wage is higher than the wage the individual gets in her job, then she 
is likely to quit the job. Instead, if there is a leave policy in place, the parent is able to stay 
with the child until the reservation wage has gone down. If the leave policy is long enough 
so that the reservation wage equals the market wage at the end of the policy, then the 
mother is likely to go back to work. Conversely, if at the end of the leave period the 
reservation wage is still higher than the market wage, then the mother might quit the job 
(Boeri and Van Ours 2013).  
Other authors have looked at the economic incentives of leave policies using the more 
standard labour approach and examining the income and substitution effects. Maternity 
leave policies have mainly two components. The first one is job protection, that is, offering 
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the option of going back to work to the same job after the leave period. Job protection is 
likely to protect wages through the leave period. The second component is income 
replacement during the leave. This one is likely to help with consumption smoothing (Low 
& Sanchez-Marcos, 2015). Therefore, the introduction of maternity leave policies which 
include some income replacement and job protection reduce both the negative income 
effect of not working and the opportunity cost of not working (substitution effect).  
… as a trigger for norm changes 
Parental leave policies can have more effects beyond changing economic incentives. One 
could argue that they also change norms about the role of mothers; including family values. 
Indeed both the social policy literature on caring behaviour and the broader economic 
literature on social norms and economic incentives admit the potential effects of policy on 
attitudes and norms.  
Himmelweit (2005) talks about feedback effects of parental leave and childcare policies at 
a social level. She argues that these policies may initially only change the behaviour of a 
subgroup of mothers, mainly those whose attitudes or identity are not in conflict with the 
policy. Nevertheless, in the long run, the behaviour of this subgroup may trigger a change 
in social norms, thus reducing the number of mothers who feel constrained by social norms. 
Therefore, the policy effects can be magnified in the long run. Whether such long-run effects 
will take place is, according to Himmelweit and Sigala (2004) partially dependent on the 
nature of the policy. Policies that enhance choice are more likely to have long-term effects 
than coercive policies, although the opposite is true in the short term. They argue that the 
underlying reason for this decreased long-term effect is that coercion diminishes the 
individual responsibility for their conflict between their identity and the economic 
incentive in place.  
Beyond the literature on care, the economics literature has also discussed the effects that 
economic incentives, including policy reforms, can potentially have on norms and attitudes. 
Bowles and Polania-Reyes argue that economic incentives can both crowd out or crowd in 
ethical norms or intrinsic individual motives (2012). That is, in some instances economic 
incentives can act as substitutes for the prevailing ethical norms, degrading economic 
performance. One example mentioned in the paper relates to a fine imposed to parents in 
Haifa who were late to pick their children up from day care centres. The fine increased 
parental tardiness, and one interpretation is that parents now felt they could ‘buy’ time, 
whereas before the fine they regarded being late as a morally dubious outcome. Conversely, 
another example in the literature – the imposition of a small tax on plastic grocery bags in 
Ireland in 2002 – achieved the expected outcome. Bowles and Polania-Reyes suggest that 
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what explains the different outcomes in the two cases has much to do with the design of the 
policy package. Whenever economic incentives are accompanied by an effort of convincing 
individuals about the benefits of the action, they will be more likely to internalize the 
incentives and change their norms accordingly. The Irish plastic bag tax was introduced 
after extensive public deliberation and marketing campaign on the effects of plastic on the 
environment. That was not the case in the Haifa fine.  
Bearing in mind the effect that parental leave policies - and more broadly economic 
incentives - may have on social norms, the chapter in which the parental leave policy is 
analysed includes a test showing that historical family values are very similar to current 
family values before and after the policy. This does not preclude that values may change in 
the long-run, but it does suggest that the effect of the parental leave policy analysed on the 
pace of return to work in the following three years is more driven by the economic 
incentives than by a change in society’s family values. 
4.4 Resilience 
The thesis is interested in understanding whether the effects of family values on outcomes 
are resilient to changes in economic incentives. The Merriam-Webster dictionary provides 
the following definitions on resilience:  “the ability of something to return to its original 
shape after it has been pulled, stretched, pressed, bent, etc” or “an ability to recover from 
or adjust easily to misfortune or change”. From these definitions the thesis understands 
that the effect of family values on outcomes can be pulled or stretched in the light of a 
change in economic incentive, especially if that economic incentive pushes the outcome in 
the opposite direction of family values. The effect of family values on outcomes is then 
resilient to a change in economic incentive if after this change has occurred, its effect on 
outcomes is still significant.  
It is important to note that the effect of family values can be resilient despite the individual 
values having changed. That is, it could be that after a change in economic incentives, some 
individuals change their own values; but nevertheless, the societal family values – which is 
the focus of this thesis – remain strong and so does its effect on outcomes. In such case the 
effect of societal family values would be labelled resilient, despite some individual value 
having changed. Alternatively, it could be that after a change in economic incentives, neither 
individual values nor societal family values change, in which case family values would also 
be labelled as resilient. In the case of resilience, therefore, the thesis cannot discern 
between the two scenarios.  
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In the same way, the effect of family values may not be resilient when a change in economic 
incentives occur. This could be the consequence of economic incentives triggering a change 
in individual and societal family values, or a consequence of economic incentives having 
more effect on the outcome than societal family values. In the latter case family values 
would still be the same as before the change in economic incentives, but their effect would 
have been cancelled out by the economic effect. Whenever is possible, the thesis tries to 
discern between the two scenarios by looking at the correlation between societal family 
values before and after the change in economic incentives.  
5. Operationalisation 
The central question of the thesis will be answered using three empirical chapters or 
papers. This section briefly outlines the questions in each paper, the working hypothesis, 
the data, the methods and the conclusions. Separate introductions, backgrounds, empirical 
analyses and conclusions are given in each paper.  
Paper 1 – Are the effects of family values on elderly care preferences resilient to 
changes in educational attainment levels? 
The thesis starts by examining the heterogeneity of the effect of family values on 
preferences for elderly care prior to any change in economic incentive or policy reform. The 
aim is to understand whether the effect of family values is resilient to different socio-
economic characteristics, and specifically, educational attainment. Borrowing from the 
above-mention identity model (see Akerlof and Kranton 2000), individuals would be 
maximising a utility function where their identity as ‘good children’ would depend on social 
categories - in this case types of family values - in which ideal behaviour would be 
prescribed. In the case of individuals living in areas with traditional family values, that 
would imply providing care.  
This of course happens at a cost, which is the potential income they can earn. The economics 
literature focusing on elderly care mentions human capital as one of the most relevant 
variables. It affects decisions within a family with regard to who will be the main carer or 
whether care will be outsourced. As the chapter emphasises, individuals with higher 
education attainment have higher attachment to the labour market, and at the same time 
their opportunity cost of taking leave is greater, as their jobs are characterised more by 
career ladders.  
The working hypotheses of the paper are as follows: 
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H1: Family values affect preferences for elderly care. Therefore, individuals living 
in societies with traditional values will have a lower probability of preferring 
formal care than their counterparts living in societies with liberal values.  
Alternative to H1: Family values do not matter significantly. Other things 
being equal, individual preferences for elderly care are similar across family 
values areas.  
H2: Educational attainment levels have a larger impact on preferences for elderly 
care for individuals living in more traditional family values areas.  Therefore, 
preferences for elderly care for highly educated individuals converge across 
societies with different family values. Note that this leaves room for different rates 
of convergence, but signals that a convergence trend is on the way. The effect of 
family values is overridden by education, and therefore resilience of the effect of 
family values is weak. 
Alternative A to H2: Educational attainment levels increase the probability 
of preferring formal care to a similar degree regardless of the family values 
area these individuals live in. Therefore the differences in preferences for 
elderly care between the two groups remain at the same level as H1 (either 
H1 or its alternative hypothesis). The effect of family values is maintained 
with higher education levels, and is therefore resilient to different education 
levels. (i.e. is positive and is maintained if H1 holds; is zero and does not 
change if the Alternative to H1 holds). 
Alternative B to H2: Educational attainment levels have a larger effect on the 
probability of preferring formal elderly care for individuals living in areas 
with liberal family values. Therefore, the differences in preferences for elderly 
care between the two groups are exacerbated. The effect of family values is 
exacerbated with education, and therefore resilient to differences in 
education levels. 
Data and methods 
The paper carries out a cross-country regression analysis using a pooled sample from the 
Eurobarometer dataset from 1997 and 2007, the two years when this question was 
available. The data was obtained from approximately 1,000 face-to-face interviews with 
individuals aged 15 or over for each EU country. The dependent variable used was stated 
preferences on elderly care, and the question asked was as follows: Imagine an elderly 
father or mother who lives alone and can no longer manage to live without regular help 
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because of her or his physical or mental health condition? In your opinion, what would be the 
best option for people in this situation? Accordingly, the answers have been categorised as 
formal or informal. The main independent variables are family values and individual 
educational attainment. Individual controls are added, together with country dummies. The 
outcomes of interest are the marginal effects of family values, educational attainment and 
the interplay between them. 
Family values are assigned to each individual as follows: first, a composite index at a NUTS 
2 level is constructed using questions from the European Value Study (EVS). The EVS was 
used because the Eurobarometer does not contain attitudes towards the family in these two 
waves. The values are further categorised into four categories, which will be called ‘areas’: 
very traditional, traditional, liberal and very liberal. Therefore, some countries in our 
analysis will have regions belonging to different family values categories, and at the same 
time, regions in different countries will share the same category. 
Conclusion 
The results of the paper suggest that the effect of family values is heterogeneous depending 
on the educational attainment of the individual. More specifically, family values influence 
elderly care preferences for those individuals with low levels of educational attainment, 
confirming H1. This translates into heterogeneous preferences for this group of individuals 
across areas with different family values. The effect of family values, however, fades away 
for individuals with higher levels of educational attainment. Their preferences are very 
similar across areas with different family values, confirming H2.  
The chapter contributes to the literature on social norms by emphasising the heterogeneity 
of their effect. Most papers have focused on the effects of social norms on outcomes, but 
heterogeneity with regard to socio-demographic aspects has, to a large extent, been 
overlooked. Moreover, it also contributes to the literature on social policy. Introducing 
values and social norms to the discussion in a time when the choice agenda for elderly care 
is prioritised may help to shed light on distributional consequences that such policies can 
have on labour market participation and income. 
Paper 2 – Are the effects of family values on parental support to offspring resilient to 
changes in children’s employment status? 
This paper examines the resilience of the effect of family values on parental support given 
to offspring when the latter experience a change in economic incentives as a result of an 
adverse change in their employment status. The aim is to understand whether the effect of 
family values is exacerbated, maintained or overridden by the adverse change in 
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employment status. Similar to paper 1, individuals would be maximising a utility function 
where their identity as ‘good parents’ would depend on assigned categories whose 
prescriptions of ideal behaviour would inform the levels and types of support given to their 
offspring. Depending on their identity, the level of support will differ. At the same time, the 
costs of types of support will also be affected by identity. The literature on co-residence 
with adult children suggests that this can increase utility for parents in societies with more 
traditional values. Instead, in societies with more liberal values co-residence might 
decrease overall utility.  
The working hypotheses of the paper are as follows: 
H1: Family values affect parental support to offspring. Therefore, individuals living 
in societies with traditional family values will have a higher probability of 
providing support to their offspring before any adverse change in employment 
status takes place.  
Alternative to H1: Family values do not significantly affect parental support 
to offspring. Therefore, individual levels of parental support do not differ 
across societies with different family values. 
H2: An adverse change in employment status results in a) greater increase in 
parental support from individuals living in traditional family values areas 
compared to their counterparts in liberal family values areas; b) the former also 
experience a greater increase in parental support in terms of co-residence than the 
latter. Therefore, the effect of family values is exacerbated by the change. 
Alternative A to H2: An adverse change in employment status results in a) a 
similar increase in parental support from individuals across different family 
values areas; b) the increase by type of support is also similar across different 
family values areas. Therefore, the effect of family values is maintained at the 
level indicated in H1/Alternative to H1. 
Alternative B to H2: An adverse change in employment status results in a) a 
greater increase in parental support from individuals living in liberal family 
values areas compared to their counterparts in traditional family values 
areas; b) such a greater increase in help is provided through either co-
residence or financial help. Therefore, the effect of family values is overridden 
by the change in employment status; parental support tends towards 
convergence.  
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Data and methods 
The paper uses waves 1, 2 and 5 (corresponding to years 2004-05, 2006-07 and 2013 
respectively) from the longitudinal Survey of Health, Retirement and Ageing in Europe 
(SHARE) for 12 EU countries. SHARE is a cross-national panel database that contains micro 
data on health, socioeconomics and family networks, as well as information on the children 
of the individuals interviewed. This information includes the amount and type of help that 
each child receives from parents as well as other socio-demographic variables. Every other 
year, interviews are conducted with individuals over 50 years old and their partners, 
regardless of their age. A proportion of these individuals are followed over the years, and 
new individuals are added to the sample in every wave. 
The unit of analysis is the paired child-parent and the dependent variables are general 
support – including financial help and co-residence, financial help only and co-residence 
only. The main independent variables are family values and employment status of the child. 
Individual controls are added, together with country dummies. The outcomes of interest 
are the marginal effects of family values, employment status and the interplay between 
them. The paper uses a random-effects panel data model, and alleviates the omitted 
variable bias by adding individual controls for both the adult children and the parents. A 
discussion of the benefits and costs of using random-effects as opposed to fixed-effects 
together with a discussion on causality is provided in the paper.  
Conclusion 
The results show that first, parental support before children are faced with a change in 
employment status is similar across individuals living in different family values areas., 
rejecting H1. When adult children are faced with an adverse change in employment status, 
parents in traditional areas have a significantly increased probability of providing 
assistance, whereas their counterparts in liberal areas barely change their behaviour. The 
results are driven both by an increase in co-residence and financial help, although the 
increase in the former type of help is larger than the increase in the latter. Parents from 
traditional areas are more likely to accommodate their children, whereas co-residence 
patterns remain unchanged for parents from liberal areas. These findings suggest that an 
adverse change in employment status produces heterogeneous responses in terms of 
parental help, both in the intensity and types of support provided, thus confirming H2. 
The chapter contributes to the literature on social norms by emphasising the magnified 
effect that they have in the light of a change in employment status. Such changes need not 
produce a similar reaction and social norms may be a root cause of heterogeneity in both 
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the magnitude of response as well as the type of support provided. At the same time, the 
findings speak to the literature on welfare states and social policy by suggesting that 
intergenerational help from parents to children might help in understanding the different 
ways in which families overcome the adverse effects of changes in employment status.  
Paper 3 – Are the effects of family values on pace of return to work after childbirth 
resilient to parental leave policy reforms? 
The final paper of the thesis examines the resilience of the effect of family values on the 
pace of return to work after a policy reform on parental leave is implemented in Germany. 
The policy aimed at incentivising mothers to return to work earlier. Therefore, the paper 
aims at understanding first whether the reaction to the policy from mothers with more 
traditional family backgrounds is similar, stronger or weaker than the reaction of their 
counterparts with more liberal family backgrounds. Second, and closely related, it aims to 
understand whether the policy reform has led to convergence in the pace of return to work 
between these two groups. Again, as in the previous papers, an identity framework is useful 
to conceptualise the analysis, with their identity as ‘good parents’ depending on their 
assigned category according to family values. This identity would play a role in informing 
the duration of parental leave. The cost of engaging in parental leave is forgone income, 
both in the short and long run.  
The working hypotheses of the paper are as follows: 
H1: Family values affect the duration of parental leave taken before the policy 
reform is implemented. Therefore, individuals with a more traditional background 
are less likely to have a faster pace of return to work than their counterparts with 
more liberal backgrounds.  
Alternative to H1: Family values do not affect the duration of parental leave 
significantly. Individuals have a similar pace of return to work regardless of 
their family background.  
H2: The policy reform has had a larger effect on the pace of return to work for 
mothers with traditional family values. Individuals from traditional family 
backgrounds converge in their pace of return to work with their counterparts from 
more liberal family backgrounds. Note that this leaves room for different rates of 
convergence, but signals that a convergence trend is on the way. The resilience of 
the effect of family values is, therefore, weak. 
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Alternative A to H2: The policy reform has similarly increased the pace of 
return to work for mothers from different backgrounds. Therefore the 
differences in the pace of return to work between the two groups remain in 
the same level as H1 (either H1 or its alternative hypothesis). The effect of 
family values is maintained with the policy reform, and is therefore resilient 
to policy changes.  
Alternative B to H2: The policy reform has had a larger effect on the pace of 
return to work for mothers with liberal family values. Therefore, the 
differences in the pace of return to work between the two groups are 
exacerbated. The effect of family values is exacerbated by the policy and is 
therefore resilient to policy changes. 
Data and methods 
The paper uses the 2005 to 2009 waves of the German Socio-economic panel data (GSOEP), 
an annual longitudinal dataset in which all members of the household were interviewed. 
The analysis is interested in the women in the sample, more specifically those who gave 
birth between 2005 and 2009 and who worked prior to childbirth. It uses a regression 
discontinuity analysis design (RDD) with a difference-in-difference specification. The 
duration of the parental leave of women who gave birth in 2005 and 2006 is used as a 
control group, and its outcome is compared to the treatment group, that is, women who 
gave birth between 2007 and 2009. The difference-in-difference approach is used to 
analyse the different impacts of the policy for mothers with different family values 
background. Because of this design, causality is better warranted, something which is 
further discussed in the paper. 
An epidemiological approach has been chosen to establish the family values background of 
each individual. This approach provides a good control for institutional and economic 
factors: migrant groups face the same institutional and economic environment as the native 
individuals in the country of residence, but they are assumed to preserve, to a certain 
extent, the family values of their country of ancestry. Individual migrants are therefore 
assigned the historic family values of their country of ancestry, which are measured using 
the questionnaire from the World Value Survey.   
Conclusion 
The results show that first, the duration of parental leave before the policy differs 
depending on the maternal family values background, confirming H1. Second, the policy 
reform accelerated the pace of return to work mainly for mothers with a traditional family 
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values background. However, the magnitude of convergence differs across education levels. 
Mothers with vocational education exhibit high levels of convergence, followed by mothers 
with low education, who exhibit low but significant levels of convergence. Conversely, 
highly-educated mothers diverge in their pace of return to work. Therefore, H2 is partially 
confirmed. One interpretation of the paper’s findings is that education might be understood 
differently depending on the family values background. Mothers with a traditional family 
values background seem to use the educational system either as way to enhance their 
cultural investment or as a marriage market, and therefore will not be very sensitive to 
changes in economic incentives. 
The findings add to the literature on social economics by providing some evidence that the 
effects of family values are resilient even to policy changes, although the magnitude of 
resilience depends on education attainment levels. Such a heterogeneous effect of the policy 
– caused by educational attainment levels - on the pace of return to work for mothers with 
traditional family values challenges the ‘conventional wisdom’ on the effects of education. 
The paper therefore encourages further research on the effect that education may have on 
policy reforms achieving their goals. 
6. Summary 
This introductory chapter has provided the rationale for the thesis. It has stated its 
motivation and objectives, followed by a review of the literature on institutional economics. 
The conceptual framework has then been developed, leading to the main research question 
of the thesis. It has then established the focus of the analysis – family values and behaviour 
in social care - and finally it has summarised the three empirical chapters or papers, stating 
their specific research questions, the data and methods used and the main conclusions and 
contributions.  
The following chapters – chapters 2, 3 and 4 – provide the empirical analyses and their 
structure is very similar. First, they present an abstract and an introductory section. Second, 
background literature on the social care element is provided. Third, the data and methods 
are described. Fourth, the empirical analysis and robustness checks are explained. Finally, 
a conclusion section provides the main key findings and contributions.  
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Chapter 2 Preferences for elderly care: the effect of education 
attainment and family values 
Who cares? The resilience of family values in shaping elderly care preferences  
Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of education levels on preferences for elderly care for 
individuals living in societies with different family values. Elderly care arrangements are 
rooted in engrained pre-existing values and beliefs about the role of the family as a provider 
of care. At the same time, they are also influenced by individual economic incentives in the 
context of the labour market. This paper aims to understand the extent to which economic 
incentives prevail over societal family values in shaping elderly care preferences. To this 
end, the paper uses cross-sectional data from the Eurobarometer to perform a regression 
analysis with stated preferences for elderly care as the dependent variable, and family 
values and education levels as the independent variables. The results of the paper suggest 
that family values have a non-negligible filtering effect in shaping preferences for elderly 
care. However, such effect only prevails for lower education groups – for the rest, the effect 
of educational attainment is strong enough to override family values. 
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1. Introduction 
Most European countries are experiencing a dramatic increase in the percentage of 
population that is old or very old. According to the OECD, the percentage of population over 
80 years old in EU27 is projected to increase from around 5% in 2010 to almost 12% by 
2050. This phenomenon represents a considerable challenge for at least two reasons. First, 
it has a direct bearing on the percentage of people in need of elderly care, which has an 
obvious impact on governments’ budgets. Second, the combination of reduction in share of 
working-age population and a gradual increase in female labour market participation will 
affect the availability of care, especially in those countries that rely greatly on informal care 
(Francesca Colombo, Ana Llena-Nozal, Jérôme Mercier, & Frits Tjadens, 2011). In spite of 
these challenges, elderly care remains one of the least developed areas of welfare (Costa-
Font, 2010), and it is still mostly relatives who provide much of the long-term care services.  
In the last decade, several countries have pursued policy reforms to tackle these challenges. 
Two common characteristics of these reforms has been an increase in the choice of 
provision between in-kind services and cash-for-care, and implementation of policies 
designed to support carers (Francesca Colombo et al., 2011). The existence of such 
institutional choice suggests budget-neutrality for the individual between formal and 
informal care. But this may be less true in practice than on paper, as the cash-for-care option 
is unlikely to be a perfect substitute for in-kind services or the wage earned by the carer in 
the market (Francesca Colombo et al., 2011:54). The emphasis on institutional choice in 
spite of imperfect substitution begs the question of how people with different individual 
characteristics and constraints will benefit differentially. Choice is usually regarded as 
being inclusive, as it can better accommodate individual carer and caree preferences, and 
may provide alternatives to informal care, thereby encouraging participation in the labour 
market. However, the same choice may also reinforce differences in economic outcomes 
across individuals, as the decision to receive cash-for-care over in-kind services usually 
comes at the expense of fewer working hours, lower labour force participation, and even 
lower wage rates in some cases (Carmichael & Charles, 2003; Francesca Colombo et al., 
2011). The determinants of individual preferences are therefore critical to understanding 
the potential consequences of institutional choice. 
With this in mind (and putting aside formal institutional factors), the literature on elderly 
care suggests there are two main sets of factors decisive in forming elderly care 
preferences. One is individual incentives or constraints, understood as socio-demographic 
variables that influence elderly care preferences. These could range from employment 
status, education levels, and income, among others. The other set of factors is related to the 
normative beliefs around the role of the family that exist in societies, hereafter referred to 
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as ‘family values’. Family values are broadly defined according to the strength and 
resilience of family loyalties, allegiances and authority within a society (Reher, 1998). This 
paper is interested in the relative importance of these two sets of factors, and in particular, 
the resilience of the effect of family values on elderly care preferences for individuals facing 
different economic incentives or constraints.  
Family values have been widely acknowledged to affect many social care arrangements 
(Reher, 1998). Patterns of kin solidarity and the responsibility of caring for the needy, 
vulnerable and elderly differ across regions according to these values (Ferrera, 1996; 
Reher, 1998). In areas with traditional family values, help tends to come mostly from the 
family rather than public institutions, and such differences in patterns of support still 
persist (Reher, 1998, p. 209:209). With regard to individual socio-demographic variables 
that affect care choice, the economics literature on elderly care suggests human capital 
levels is the decisive factor (Francesca Colombo et al., 2011). Labour market opportunities 
and earning potentials of the members of the family are critical in deciding who will be the 
informal carer, or whether formal care will be employed. Higher skills or education levels 
increase the individual’s attachment to the labour market, positively affecting their 
potential earnings. Naturally, highly educated individuals face higher opportunity costs 
when taking leaves of work to care for the elderly (relative to their less educated 
counterparts) because their jobs are usually more characterized by career ladders and 
deferred rewards (Smeaton, 2006). Likewise, choice is often dependent on the amount of 
information and knowledge of the different options available (Arksey & Glendinning, 2007), 
which is also tightly correlated with the level of education. Therefore, the question this 
paper aims to address is the following: when the effect of individual education levels on 
elderly care preferences goes in a different direction from the effect of existing societal 
family values, which one prevails? How resilient are the effects of the latter over the former? 
Three plausible outcomes may arise. One is that family values affect elderly care 
preferences, and the effect is resilient to different economic incentives. This would imply 
that first, less educated individuals have different preferences for elderly care depending 
on the family values environment they reside in. Second, the impact of education on 
individuals’ preferences is either non-existent or not significant enough to overcome the 
influence of family values on preferences. The second outcome is that family values affect 
elderly care preferences, but their effect fades away with challenging economic incentives. 
This implies that again, preferences amongst the less educated differ depending on the 
family values environment they reside in. However, for the educated, their preferences 
simultaneously differ from their less educated counterparts and are very similar across 
family values areas. Finally, we may also find that family values do not influence elderly 
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care preferences. This could be interpreted as macroeconomic and institutional factors 
completely negating the impact of family values.  
This paper draws on the pooled sample of Eurobarometer data from 1997 and 2007 – the 
two waves which contain records on elderly care preferences – for fifteen European 
countries. The paper takes advantage of the unique nature of the data to perform an 
empirical analysis of caregiving preferences. Specifically, we conduct a regression analysis 
with stated preferences for elderly care as the dependent variable, and family values and 
individual education attainment levels as independent variables. As hypothesized, the 
results of the paper suggest family values play an important role in influencing (i.e., 
filtering) preferences for elderly care. The analysis also uncovers an interactive effect with 
educational attainment, suggesting that the effect of family values fades away when 
evaluated among individuals with higher educational attainment. More specifically, results 
show that first, individuals with low education levels have different preferences towards 
elderly care depending on the family values area they live in. As expected, those in more 
liberal areas have a significantly higher likelihood of preferring formal elderly care than 
their counterparts in more traditional areas. Second, individuals with higher education 
levels living in more traditional areas are more likely to prefer formal elderly care than their 
counterparts with lower levels of education. Moreover, their likelihood is very similar to 
that of their educated counterparts living in more liberal areas. This suggests that the effect 
of education counteracts the impact of family values when the subject resides in more 
traditional areas. This mediating effect may be due to several factors including skills (and 
its opportunity cost), information and time preference.  
The results of this paper are intended to contribute to both the literature on culture and 
economics as well as broader social sciences literature. By demonstrating that family values 
matter, they support the findings from the literature on culture and economic behavior 
about the importance of taking cultural aspects into account when devising economic 
policies. At the same time, however, the paper’s finding that education can largely 
overwhelm the influence of traditional family values brings the resilience of cultural factors 
into question. These findings thus encourage more research on the circumstances under 
which cultural factors are likely to be more resilient. With regards to literature on social 
policy, much of it has thus far been centered on the impact of institutions on care. 
Introducing values and social norms to the discussion in a time when the choice agenda for 
elderly care is prioritized may help shed light on distributional consequences that such 
policies can have on labour market participation and income. The paper’s conclusions imply 
that preferences for social care may become very polarized in societies where family values 
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are still very traditional, with direct economic and social consequences. By contrast, this 
does not seem to be a major problem in societies where more liberal family values prevail.  
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the conceptual framework used in 
the paper, offering an overview of the relevant literature to which this paper relates. Section 
3 explains the data and the methodology used, and section 4 shows the results. Section 5 
reviews robustness checks performed, and finally, section 6 concludes. 
2. Background  
Conceptual framework: preferences, social norms and family values.  
Following Reher’s understanding of family values, this paper focuses on societal family 
values as opposed to individual ones, and defines them according to the strength and 
resilience of family loyalties, allegiances and authority within a society (Reher, 1998). The 
concept of ‘values’ here is understood as the most invariant part of the set of beliefs linked 
inextricably to affects (Schwartz, 2012) that guide our preferences, attitudes and 
behaviour. This idea has been put forward by several authors, including Inglehart and 
Baker (2000) who claim that ‘generations have collective memories, imprinted in 
adolescence and early adulthood that persist throughout the life cycle’, and that there are a 
basic set of values which are largely fixed once the individual reaches adulthood (ibid, 
2000)5. Individuals living in societies with traditional family values will have a tendency to 
prioritize the family over the individual, and this will shape their economic, political and 
social preferences. These societies’ display of family and kinship solidarity may be rooted 
in a strong sense of moral obligation (Flaquer in Naldini, 2003; Pfenning, Bahle, & 
Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung., 2000, p.:46), or may come as a 
result of different incentives in societies – e.g., bequests (Bernheim, Shleifer, & Summers, 
1985). Either way, individuals in these societies are more likely to turn to their family when 
in need of care. By contrast, individuals in more liberal societies have a stronger sense of 
individual personal empowerment (Esping-Andersen, 1990). While kinship solidarity may 
empower those in crisis, it may also pose problems for those individuals in the family who 
are in the position to provide help. Help is therefore expected from the state, either for those 
at the fringes of society or for everyone.  
The idea that family and family values matter is emphasised in sociology, political science 
and social policy literatures. Reher (1998) claims that family relationships and the roles 
ascribed to each member of the family in different societies have implications for the way 
                                                 
5 To be sure, there are other ‘beliefs’ which are not fixed and are thus subject to change, but, according to 
Schwartz, they differ from these ‘basic values’ in many aspects. He calls them ‘attitudes’, ‘beliefs’, ‘norms’ 
or ‘traits’. See Schwartz (2012). 
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societies function (Reher, 1998:203). Similarly, the literature on welfare regimes developed 
by Esping-Andersen (1990) has gradually incorporated into its analysis the role of the 
family in providing welfare. Some authors have even pushed for a fourth welfare regime – 
the Mediterranean one – to be included as a separate regime, with family being a part of the 
argument (Bonoli, 1997; Ferrera, 1996; S. Leibfried, 1993). The feminist criticism has been 
very explicit in prescribing the need to incorporate a discussion on the family’s role in the 
provision of welfare and care (Arts & Gelissen, 2002). Furthermore, it has highlighted the 
need to differentiate between paid work, unpaid work and welfare (Lewis, 1992), thereby 
emphasising the triple link between care, work and family, and pushing for the inclusion of 
social care as a critical dimension for analysing country variation (Daly & Lewis, 2000).  
In the economics literature, considerations for family values, and more generally, values 
and social norms have been excluded from analyses for a long time. Most economists 
recognized the idea that values and social norms matter and influence economic behaviour, 
but many were not comfortable including them in their models and analyses (Postlewaite, 
2011). They believed that such variables posed a threat to the models’ integrity, and 
presented numerous measurement problems which seemed difficult to overcome. This 
resulted in individual preferences being treated as a given (i.e., no independent role 
ascribed to values), with the price mechanism explaining everything (Guiso et al., 2006). 
But with new surveys, new methodologies emerged, making it easier to take values into 
account, and eventually giving rise to new ideas to fit social norms within economic models. 
These new developments contributed to a change in view and opened the door to relatively 
recent research within the field of economics that highlights the relevance of values, social 
norms and other concepts associated with culture6.  
One prominent idea on how to incorporate social norms and values into economic models 
is put forth by Andrew Postlewaite (2011). He suggests two different ways in which social 
norms can be included in economic models without compromising the premise that 
individuals are ‘fundamentally similar’. One is to assume that individuals are the same at 
birth, but interactions with their respective communities differentially shape their 
preferences (e.g., what makes them happy or sad) as adults. In this case, he argues, their 
‘deep’ preferences are different (ibid). The other option is to assume that two individuals 
                                                 
6 Culture is a catch-all concept which, in the realm of economics is defined very vaguely and somewhat 
differently according to different authors. Some of them focus on the most invariant part of it and define it 
as “those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged 
from generation to generation” (Guiso et al., 2006). However, others reject this slow-changing nature of 
culture and define it more broadly as “the integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief, and behaviour 
that depends upon the capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations; and 
the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial, religious, or social group; (and) the set 
of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes an institution or organization” 
(Fernandez 2010).  
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have the same deep-rooted preferences, but the social structures within which they reside 
provide different incentives for behaviour. This would suggest that what differs across 
these fundamentally similar individuals is their preferences over the immediate 
alternatives, which he labels ‘reduced form preferences’ (ibid). Our understanding of family 
values in this paper is compatible with both explanations. Strong traditional societal family 
values could be the result of strong emotional bonds within the family, which makes it 
morally difficult to reject care. This explanation would be more consistent with the pattern 
of deep preferences across societies. On the other hand, existing family values could be a 
reflection of family loyalties that are driven more by future rewards for a given behaviour. 
One evidence seen in literature on long term care is the use of bequests as a reward for 
caring responsibilities (Costa-Font, 2010). Such explanation is more consistent with the 
pattern of reduced form preferences.  
 The combination of a surge in new micro surveys on values and new methods to identify 
cultural effects has also facilitated the inclusion of cultural variables in economic analyses. 
One such method is the epidemiological approach, originally disseminated by Fernandez 
(2007) and now widely used amongst economists (see interalia Blau in A. F. Alesina et al., 
2010; Borjas & Freeman, 1992; Giuliano, 2007). This approach uses immigrants’ economic 
decisions and behaviour to analyse the impact of culture on several economic outcomes 
and individual behaviours. Immigrants may have acquired a different cultural background 
depending on their country of origin, but face the same economic and institutional factors 
as the natives. This makes it possible to disentangle cultural factors from economic and 
institutional ones.  
The findings from the economics and family values literature suggest family values have 
significant explanatory power. Alesina and Giuliano (2010) show that strong family ties 
lead to higher home production, larger families, lower labour force participation for women 
and young adults, and lower geographical mobility. Alesina et al. (2010) find that 
individuals with strong family ties also choose regulated labour market to avoid moving 
geographically, thereby limiting the monopsony power of firms. Similarly, Algan and Cahuc 
(2007) show that family attitudes and family culture are associated with stronger 
preferences for family activities, which may explain both lower female employment rate 
and the decline in employment rates among young and older people.  
This paper is closely related to this literature, and it analyses the resilience of the effect of 
family values on preferences for elderly care when individuals are faced with different 
economic incentives, and education levels in particular. It contributes to the debate in two 
main ways. First, while a wide range of individual economic behaviour related to labour 
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markets has been examined, social care has not received as much attention. Social care 
preferences are tightly linked to labour market participation, and thus it must be closely 
examined to better understand its impact on participation rates. Second, most of the 
existing literature suggests family values and social norms possess strong resilience to 
changes in economic conditions. As stated in the introduction, this paper adds some 
nuances to this conclusion, identifying the role that individual economic incentives may 
have in ‘breaking up’ this resilience. The extent to which such economic incentives prevail 
over existing societal family values remains to be seen, and is the focus of this paper.  
3. Data and methods 
This paper examines how education levels affect the preference for formal elderly care for 
individuals living in groups of regions – called areas from now onwards - with different 
family values (see below for an explanation of the construction of the variable). It uses 
individual cross-sectional time series data to conduct an econometric analysis for EU15 
countries for years 1997 and 2007, running a series of Linear Probability Model (LPM)7 
specifications as follows: 
P(Yiat=1) = α + educ + β2fva + β3 educitfva+ β4Xit + β5C  + ε;                               (1) 
where Yiat is the probability that an individual i of area a at time t prefers formal elderly 
care. It takes the value of 0 if the individual prefers informal care and 1 otherwise. This data 
is taken from Standard Eurobarometer8 (Commission, 2012a, 2012b) at two points in time 
– 1997 and 2007 (waves 47.1 and 67.3) – for EU15 countries9. The question used to define 
the dependent variable is the following: Imagine an elderly father or mother who lives alone 
and can no longer manage to live without regular help because of his or her physical or mental 
health condition. In your opinion, what would be the best option for people in this situation?’ 
Answers have been coded according to the informal-formal spectrum. 
Educ is a categorical variable which reflects the individual’s level of education. It has been 
constructed by categorizing the individual by years of education in order to allow for non-
linear effects. Educ takes the value of 0 if the individual has 16 years of education or less, 1 
if the individual has between 17 and 19 years of education and 2 if he/she has 20 or more 
                                                 
7 The model used is the Linear Probability Model (LPM). Although the dependent variable is binary, Angrist 
and Pischke (2009) suggests that LPM does a good job in estimating marginal effects. They emphasise that 
although LMP will not give the ‘true’ marginal effects from the right non-linear model, neither will the 
‘wrong’ nonlinear model. Therefore, it doesn’t really make a difference to use LPM or a nonlinear model 
such as logit or probit.  
8 The Eurobarometer is a survey carried out in European countries, and contains cross-sectional individual 
data on several issues concerning European citizenship such as health, defense, the Euro, and social 
situation among others. Each survey consists of approximately 1,000 interviews per country. 
9 No data for EU27 was available in 1997. 
56 
 
years of education.  Because national curriculums differ across countries, it is not possible 
to convert years of education to levels (i.e., primary, secondary or tertiary) consistently, but 
different combinations of years of education will also be tested nonetheless. Fva is a proxy 
for the area-based family values of each individual, coded into four categories. It takes the 
value of 0 if the area holds very traditional values, 1 for areas with traditional values, 2 for 
those with liberal values and 3 for those with very liberal values (see subsection below for 
an explanation of the construction of the family values variable). educitfvja is the interaction 
between education and family values at the area level. Xit includes a set of individual 
characteristics as controls: marital status takes the value of 0 if not married and 1 
otherwise. Gender takes the value of 1 for male and 2 for female, year takes the value of 0 
for 1997 and 1 for 2007 and employment takes the value of 0 if the individual is unemployed 
at the time when the interview is conducted and 1 if he/she is employed. Age is also 
included, but individuals aged 15-24 years old are dropped from the sample because their 
information on education is incomplete. Income of the individual is also included with a 
binary variable (0 for low income and 1 for high income) and finally, size of the community 
is included and takes the value of 0 if it is a rural area, and 1 if it is a small or mid-sized town 
and 2 if it is a large town. C are the country dummies which are included to account for 
institutional variables that may influence elderly care preferences (e.g., quality and 
availability of care in each country). Standard errors are clustered at a country level as 
opposed to regional level, following Cameron and Miller (2013). They suggest that in order 
to avoid bias, it is better to use bigger and more aggregate clusters when possible (A.C 
Cameron & Miller, 2013). The resulting dataset includes approximately 11,000 
observations.  
Data on family values at an ‘area’ level 
This paper is interested in the role that societal family values play in influencing economic 
behaviour, rather than individual family values. While we could choose to measure family 
values at the country level, an individual is arguably more likely to be affected by values 
closer to his or her own environment – that is, prevalent values in his/her city or county 
rather than those estimated at the country level. Unfortunately, because the dataset does 
not include information on the county (NUTS 3 in EU terminology) where the individual 
lives, the paper attributes societal family values at a regional level (mostly NUTS 2, see 
Appendix A for details) as the basis of the study. To do so, it takes the questions from the 
European Value Study (EVS) to construct a family values composite index at NUTS 2 level, 
then assign the values to individuals in the SHARE dataset according to the region where 
they live10. Given that many regions across Europe have similar family values, the responses 
                                                 
10 See description of the data below. 
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are clustered into four categories: very traditional, traditional, liberal and very liberal. As a 
result, regions are grouped in family-values areas. Some countries in our analysis will have 
regions belonging to different family values categories, and regions in different countries 
may belong to the same category.  
Two identification problems arise when the resilience of family values and its effect on 
economic behaviour is tested. The first one relates to the empirical isolation of the effects 
of societal family values, or more generally social norms, from the effects of institutional 
and economic variables. The strategy that this paper adopts is controlling for country fixed 
effects11. This, in effect, results in an underestimation of the effect of family values, as they 
may be engrained in the specific country. But simultaneously, this approach derives 
estimates which can more credibly be assigned to family values (Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales 2003).  
The second identification problem stems from endogeneity concerns. Decisions on 
providing elderly care are likely to be influenced by societal family values, and at the same 
time, these same decisions reinforce societal family values. The paper attempts to mitigate 
endogeneity problems by constructing family values categories with EVS questions from 
years prior to the analysis.  
Given that the Eurobarometer database does not include variables on the role of the family 
for these two years, the paper uses the European Values Study (EVS)12 (EVS, 2011a, 2011b, 
2011c, 2011d) to construct a composite index of societal family values at a regional level 
using Principal Component Analysis (PCA). I dichotomize the questions with categorical 
answers, then group and average the answers for each question at the country-region level.  
The descriptive statistics for all considered questions, as well as the details for the PCA are 
found in Appendix C.  
The questions included in the composite index are basically most of the questions from the 
EVS that relate to family values with answers available (see Appendix B for the questions 
included). In this way, this chapter (as well as chapter 3) takes a broad approach to the 
concept of family values. Variables included relate to different aspects of family values 
highlighted by several authors. Banfield (1958) suggested in his examination of an Italian 
village that the lack of trust – or rather the fact that individuals only trusted their family 
members and not the rest of the society – was behind a pervasive underdevelopment. A 
                                                 
11 The paper cannot control for regional effects as the family values variable is constructed using regional 
data and so regional dummies are collinear with family values dummies. 
12 The EVS is a cross-national longitudinal survey running since 1981 (repeated every nine years), 
containing individual data for several countries on how Europeans think about family, work, religion, 
politics and society.  
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variable on whether people can be trusted is included.  Reher (1998), mentioned above, 
relates family values with the concepts of family loyalties, allegiances and authority. 
Variables related to these concepts include beliefs about the degree that love and respect 
for parents is a duty or needs to be earned, which would speak to the concept of loyalty and 
allegiance, the list of qualities that children should learn (obedience, responsibility or 
independence) and issues of abortion and marriage, single motherhood and the need of 
having both parents, which relate to authority.  
Several authors (see for example Esping-Andersen 1999, Ferrera 1996, Castles 1995 or 
Korpi 2000) also relate societies with stronger family ties with societies in which family 
solidarity is strong and characterized by a network of intergenerational exchange, there is 
usually an unequal division of family work between men and women, and family obligations 
are women’s duty. Variables like the responsibility of parents towards children and 
viceversa are tightly linked to the concept of family solidarity and intergenerational 
exchanges, whereas variables like the approval of mothers with young children working, 
the role of women as housewife and their role as contributors of income are closely related 
to concepts of division of family work and family obligations of women.      
In order to avoid causality problems – namely, care preference affecting family values – I 
take the variables from 1981 and 199013.  In order to test how representative they are of 
family values in 1997 and 2007, I take the answers from the EVS in 1999 and 2008 to check 
the correlations between the 1981-1990 and 1999-2008 data. Most of the correlations are 
above 70%, with the exceptions of two variables for which the correlations are 60%. I 
therefore conclude that family values in 1981-1990 are fairly representative of those in 
1997 and 2007. After standardizing the variables, I multiply them by the PCA weights to 
derive a family values coefficient for each country-region. Because of the way PCA has been 
conducted, negative coefficients belong to regions which are more liberal than the average, 
and the opposite is true for positive coefficients.  
Figure 3 below shows the variability of non-dichotomized coefficients by country, and 
Appendix D shows that this variability across countries is also present within-country and 
across regions. From the figure below, it can be seen that most Nordic countries have 
negative coefficients, whereas most Mediterranean countries have high positive 
coefficients (with Continental Europe being somewhere in the middle).  Needless to say, the 
index must be carefully interpreted. Building on existing literature about the role of the 
family in different European societies, a plausible interpretation is that countries with a 
higher family values score tend to have a more communalistic ethic which emphasizes 
                                                 
13 Except for Greece and Portugal, which only have available data for 2008. 
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family ties and responsibilities, in significant contrast with the ‘individualistic’ ethic more 
predominant in Nordic countries. Using Gal’s words, regions where family values are more 
salient can be thought of as regions where there is still ‘an enduring sense of strong and 
extended family obligations […] along with the notion that care remains a family 
responsibility’ (Gal, 2010).  
Figure 3 Country-based standard deviation of family values composite index. 
 
 
I then categorize the family values coefficient using the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile, 
effectively creating four categories of family values with smaller values representing more 
traditional values (note that I have changed the signs from the PCA, where negative values 
represent liberal family values). Family values coded as 0 are "very traditional", those 
coded as 1 are "traditional", 2 are "liberal" and 3 are "very liberal", and this categorization 
is used in the regression specified above. Table 1 below shows how many regions in each 
country have very traditional, traditional, liberal and very liberal family values. 
Table 1 Family values by region and country. 
VALUES 
Obs. Country 
Very 
traditional 
Traditional Liberal 
Very 
liberal 
Total 
Num. of 
regions 
1581 FR 75% 25%   100% 8 
1587 BE 18% 45% 36%  100% 11 
1678 NL    100% 100% 12 
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Obs. Country 
Very 
traditional 
Traditional Liberal 
Very 
liberal 
Total 
Num. of 
regions 
2823 DE 25% 38% 31% 6% 100% 16 
1459 IT 53% 47%   100% 17 
812 LU   100%  100% 1 
1611 DK   33% 67% 100% 3 
1341 IE   100% 0% 100% 3 
1921 GB   33% 67% 100% 6 
1661 GR 100%    100% 3 
1460 SP 12% 88%   100% 17 
1336 PT 83% 17%   100% 6 
1635 FI    100% 100% 1 
1631 SE   38% 63% 100% 8 
1531 AT  100%   100% 9 
Own elaboration, from EVS data. 
Descriptive statistics 
The following two tables show the meaning and descriptive statistics for the variables used 
in the analysis. Table 3 shows that there are as many individuals who prefer formal elderly 
care as those who prefer informal elderly care in the sample. With regards to marital status, 
most individuals in the sample are married. And the level of education, size of the 
community they reside, age and family values for the subjects included in the study appear 
to be normally distributed.  High income dummy (0 for the two lower quartiles and 1 for 
the two higher quartiles) has a mean of 0.61, meaning that there is a slight bias in the 
direction of high income individuals in the sample. Finally, the employment variable, which 
differentiates between those who have never been employed and the rest shows that the 
sample is clearly biased towards individuals who have been employed at some point in 
his/her life.  
Table 2 Definitions of the relevant variables. 
Variable 
name 
Variable label 
care 
Categorical preferred care option for elderly (used to construct dcare): 1. They 
should live with their children, 2. One of their children should regularly visit 
them, 3. Public/private providers should visit them, 4. They should move to a 
nursing home. 
dcare 
Dependent variable - dichotomized care preference [0: informal, 1: formal, both 
home and nursing care]. 
fvv Regional family values, continuous variable. 
dfvpc Family values by area - 4 categories by percentile using fvv [1. Very traditional, 
2. Traditional, 3. Liberal, 4. Very liberal].  
country Country of survey – as reported. 
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Variable 
name 
Variable label 
region Region where the individual lives – as reported. 
married Marital status [0: not married, 1: the rest] 
yreduc Age when you finished full-time educ. 
educ Education [0: secondary or less, 1: A-levels, 2: university] 
gender Gender [0: male, 1: female] 
sizecom 
Size of the community where the individual lives [rural area, small and middle 
town, large town]. 
agegr 
Age group - six groups [15-24yo, 25-34yo, 35-44yo, 45-54yo, 55-64yo, 65 and 
older]. 
age Age as reported.  
demplnow Employment status [0: nonemployed; 1: employed] 
dempl 
Employment status [0: never employed, 1: has been in employment at some 
point in life]. 
incomemth Income per month, in quartiles [from 1 to 4]. 
dyear Dummy year [0:1997] 
highinc Dummy income [0: low income] 
doccup Dummy occupation according to ISCO categories [skills level from 1 to 4]. 
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of variables used in the analysis 
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev Min Max 
care 24,067 2.29 1.08 1 4 
dcare 24,067 0.50 0.50 0 1 
fvv 23,622 0.22 1.74 -2.77 5.22 
married 24,004 0.75 0.43 0 1 
yreduc 23,816 4.69 2.95 1 9 
gender 24,067 1.55 0.50 1 2 
sizecom 23,961 1.90 0.78 1 3 
agegr 24,067 4.02 1.42 2 6 
age 24,067 50.41 15.62 25 98 
demplnow 17,517 0.74 0.44 0 1 
dempl 24,067 0.93 0.26 0 1 
dyear 24,067 0.51 0.50 0 1 
educ 20,757 0.81 0.86 0 2 
highinc 13,846 0.61 0.49 0 1 
doccup 25,865 2.01 0.92 0 4 
dfvpc 24,067 1.55 1.14 0 3 
 
4. Empirical analysis and results 
All regressions presented here use a probability linear model (OLS) (unless indicated 
otherwise) in which the dependent variable is the probability that individuals prefer formal 
elderly care rather than an informal one. All results are presented in terms of Average 
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Marginal Effects (AME) and predicted probabilities. Parameter estimates for the effect of 
different levels of education on the probability that individuals prefer formal care are 
presented in Table 4. The first column presents the results from the estimation of the 
variables of interest – education levels and family values. Column 2 layers on controls. 
Column 3 adds the interaction effect between education levels and family values, and 
column 4 adds relevant controls. Finally, column 5 shows the results from a logit 
specification instead of OLS.  
Columns 1 and 2 suggest that the probability of preferring formal elderly care is around 6-
8% higher for individuals living in more liberal areas relative to their counterparts in other 
areas. The figures are similar for the rest of the models – when interaction and controls are 
included and a logit model is pursued – although significance levels vary. When the 
interaction effect (columns 3 and 4) between education levels and family values are added, 
the results show that first, education levels affect preferences for elderly care mostly for 
those individuals living in traditional family areas.  Individuals with 17 to 19 years of 
education and those with 20 or more in traditional areas are 10% and 8% more likely to 
prefer formal care than their less educated counterparts, respectively. In other words, the 
difference is between the less educated individuals (i.e., 16 years of education or less) and 
the rest. Individuals with 20 years or more of education in both very traditional and liberal 
areas are approximately 3% to 4% more likely to prefer formal care than their counterparts 
with less than 16 years of education, although the difference is barely statistically 
significant. Finally, individuals living in very liberal areas have similar likelihoods of 
preferring formal elderly care regardless of their education level. 
The analysis with predicted probabilities – Table 5 and Figure 4 - show that again, 
individuals living in traditional family values areas are the ones whose probability to 
choose formal elderly care is most affected by education. Low-educated individuals in these 
areas have a probability of preferring formal care of around 45%, whereas their more 
educated counterparts see this probability raise to around 53 – 55%.  
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Table 4 Average Marginal Effects of education on the probability of preferring 
formal elderly care, by family values. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Base Base + 
controls 
Base + 
interaction 
Controls Model (5) 
with logit 
Family values 
[base:v. Trad] 
     
Traditional 0.043 0.031 0.007 -0.024 0.025 
 (0.029) (0.036) (0.031) (0.036) (0.031) 
Liberal 0.062 0.071 0.045 0.060 0.059 
 (0.025)** (0.025)** (0.036) (0.039) (0.022)*** 
V. Liberal 0.081 0.066 0.095 0.077 0.055 
 (0.019)*** (0.024)** (0.023)*** (0.028)** (0.029)* 
Educ effect # fam. v.      
[base: 14-16 yr educ]        
17-19 years educ      
Average fv 0.022 0.020    
 (0.012)* (0.015)    
V. Tradit.   -0.011 -0.025 -0.024 
   (0.013) (0.019) (0.021) 
Traditional   0.072 0.097 0.091 
   (0.014)*** (0.018)*** (0.019)*** 
Liberal   0.033 0.013 0.011 
   (0.015)** (0.022) (0.021) 
V. Liberal   -0.015 -0.014 -0.016 
   (0.023) (0.031) (0.034) 
      
20+ educ      
Average fv 0.043 0.041    
 (0.009)*** (0.009)***    
V. Tradit.   0.035 0.040 0.042 
   (0.019)* (0.020)* (0.017)** 
Traditional   0.081 0.083 0.080 
   (0.020)*** (0.025)*** (0.026)*** 
Liberal   0.052 0.034 0.032 
   (0.023)** (0.026) (0.023) 
V. Liberal   0.010 0.006 0.011 
   (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) 
Employment status   0.019  0.018 0.018 
[base: not employed]  (0.015)  (0.014) (0.014) 
age  0.001  0.001 0.001 
  (0.000)*  (0.000)* (0.000)* 
Gender [base: male]  0.018  0.019 0.018 
  (0.012)  (0.012) (0.012) 
Marital status   0.017  0.018 0.017 
[base: not married]  (0.013)  (0.013) (0.013) 
size community  0.011  0.011 0.011 
  (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010) 
Highinc  0.023  0.023 0.023 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  (0.012)*  (0.013)* (0.012)* 
Year dummy  0.055 0.047 0.055 0.047 0.047 
[base:1997] (0.021)** (0.024)* (0.021)** (0.024)* (0.022)** 
Constant 0.511 0.392 0.521 0.407  
 (0.018)*** (0.049)*** (0.019)*** (0.054)***  
      
Country dum. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.17 
N 23,372 11,326 23,372 11,326 11,326 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Robust clustered st. errors by country 
 
Table 5 Predicted probabilities to prefer formal elderly care for different levels of 
education, by family values – model (4) from Table 4. 
Predicted probabilities to prefer formal elderly care for different levels of education 
 16 or less yr educ 17-19 yr educ 20 + yr educ 
    
V. Traditional family values 0.48 0.45 0.52 
 (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** 
    
Traditional family values 0.45 0.55 0.53 
 (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** 
Comparison to prob for v.traditional fv (0.04) (0.04)** (0.04) 
    
Liberal family values 0.54 0.55 0.57 
 (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** 
Comparison to prob for v.traditional fv (0.04) (0.03)*** (0.02)** 
    
V. Liberal family values 0.55 0.54 0.56 
 (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** 
Comparison to prob for v.traditional fv (0.03)** (0.04)* (0.03) 
Obs 11,326 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis. The second row of standard errors and stars refers to the difference 
in probabilities compared to the probabilities of receiving help from individuals living in very traditional 
regions. 
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Figure 4 Predicted probabilities to prefer formal elderly care for different levels of 
education, by family values. 
 
Age groups and gender as a proxy for revealed preferences 
Examining stated preferences rather than revealed preferences uncovers information 
about choices that individuals would make without the noise introduced by other 
unexpected or unwanted circumstances. However, it may also have the downside of failing 
to reveal the choice that an individual actually makes. In the case of elderly care 
preferences, where there is a potential clash between family values and economic 
incentives, the individual may underestimate the future impact of economic incentives and 
potential constraints while overestimating that of their normative values.  
One way to mitigate this drawback is by comparing the stated preferences of individuals 
who are more likely to engage in caring activities with that provided by the rest. I identify 
two groups based on two characteristics: age and gender. The literature is clear on the 
gender bias: men not only spend fewer hours in caring for the elderly on average, but also, 
the caring they do provide is less intense (Anderson, Mikuliç, Vermeylen, Lyly-Yrjanainen, 
& Zigante, 2009; Francesca Colombo et al., 2011). This phenomenon can influence 
preferences in two contradictory ways. On one hand, women may consider opportunity 
costs of care more seriously when they answer the question on care preferences because of 
higher awareness of their potential role as carers. However, some research (see for example 
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Parker, 1993) suggests that women are less likely to put their own interests or needs before 
those of their spouses. Consequently, social norms and altruistic concerns may more 
strongly influence their decision (and economic incentives would matter less). With 
regards to age,  Glendinning et al. (2009) claim that involvement in caring for an older 
person is the highest among those in the 50-64 age group (9%), followed by those in the 
35-49 age group (7%), then those in the 65 plus age group (6%). Although some authors, 
such as Anderson et al. (2009) find the percentages associated with the third group 
surprisingly low, other sources such as Grammenos (2003) and Eurofamcare (2006) 
confirm the findings. Applying a similar logic to the one employed in gender, we may expect 
that groups with greater exposure to care consider opportunity costs more seriously when 
asked about care preferences. Table 6 shows the results of regression analyses with age and 
gender subsamples. All regressions include interaction effects and the same controls seen 
in Table 4. Column 1 is the base model (i.e., model 4 from Table 4). Columns 2 and 3 depict 
results for male and female subsamples, and column 4 includes only the 35-49 and 50-64 
age groups, the two groups with the highest probability of being involved in care according 
to literature.  
Table 6 Average Marginal Effects of education on the probability to prefer formal 
elderly care, by family values - subsamples. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Base 
model 
Male 
subsample 
Female 
subsample 
35-64 year 
old 
subsample 
Family values [base:v. Trad]     
Traditional -0.024 -0.001 -0.039 -0.046 
 (0.036) (0.042) (0.035) (0.035) 
Liberal 0.060 0.052 0.069 0.068 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.040) (0.035)* 
V. Liberal 0.077 0.113 0.042 0.088 
 (0.028)** (0.031)*** (0.026) (0.028)*** 
Educ effect # fam. v. [base: 14-16 yr educ]       
17-19 years educ     
V. Tradit. -0.025 -0.052 -0.002 -0.049 
 (0.019) (0.026)* (0.020) (0.016)*** 
Traditional 0.097 0.070 0.115 0.139 
 (0.018)*** (0.032)** (0.024)*** (0.035)*** 
Liberal 0.013 0.020 0.005 0.024 
 (0.022) (0.033) (0.030) (0.022) 
V. Liberal -0.014 -0.022 -0.008 -0.021 
 (0.031) (0.034) (0.035) (0.022) 
20+ educ     
V. Tradit. 0.040 0.051 0.025 0.040 
 (0.020)* (0.041) (0.023) (0.031) 
Traditional 0.083 0.065 0.087 0.070 
 (0.025)*** (0.036)* (0.036)** (0.034)* 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Liberal 0.034 0.046 0.021 0.029 
 (0.026) (0.029) (0.031) (0.025) 
V. Liberal 0.006 0.003 0.008 -0.003 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) 
Controls and constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country & reg. dum. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
R2 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 
N 11,326 5,433 5,893 7,996 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Robust clustered st. errors by country 
 
Results from the table share some commonalities with those in Table 4. For the less 
educated individuals, those living in liberal and very liberal areas have higher likelihood of 
preferring formal care than their counterparts in more traditional areas. Furthermore, 
having higher levels of education only seems to lead to different preferences for individuals 
living in traditional areas. Similarly, the likelihood of individuals living in very liberal areas 
to prefer formal care does not vary based on education levels.  
The table also shows some differences between male and female respondents. First, among 
the lowest educated, the difference in preferences across family values areas seem to be 
higher for men than for women. Men living in very liberal areas are 11% more likely to 
prefer formal care than their counterparts in very traditional areas. For women with low 
education, this difference between very liberal and very traditional areas shrinks to 4% and 
it is not statistically significant. Second, female respondents appear to show a stronger 
reaction to education levels than their male counterparts. Women with 17 to 19 years of 
education living in traditional areas are 12% more likely to prefer formal care compared to 
their less educated counterparts. For men, this difference in likelihood is only 7%. This 
finding suggests that if anything, on average, women are more sensitive to economic 
incentives than men. With regards to age, 35 to 64 year old individuals with 17 to 19 years 
of education living in traditional areas also appear to be more sensitive to economic 
incentives than the average sample, with the former being 14% more likely to prefer formal 
care. When looking at the overall sample (column 1), the likelihood declines to 10%.  
This subsamples-based analysis hints at a potential heterogeneity of preferences between 
individuals who are more likely to be potential carers and the rest. However, this analysis 
is far from decisive, and further examinations of subsamples with this data are difficult to 
perform due to limited number of observations. The question therefore remains on 
whether revealed preferences would significantly differ from stated preferences. But if 
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anything, the analysis suggests that the role of economic incentives in stated preferences 
may be underestimated.  
5. Robustness checks 
This section conducts robustness checks on the main independent variables: education and 
family values. With regards to the education variable, the measure available in the dataset 
is years of education, which is categorized in the analysis in order to allow for non-linear 
effects. Although it is logical to expect human capital to be related to years of education, 
there are two potential measurement problems. The first one pertains to individuals who 
have invested the same or similar amount of years in education, but achieved different 
qualifications. These individuals would cluster together in the same categorization. The 
second problem concerns individuals that have taken different number of years to attain 
the same level of human capital. These subjects would be placed into different categories. 
These two measurement problems are exacerbated due to the cross-country nature of the 
study. In order to minimize the effect of these two problems, I have performed the same 
regression analysis using, 1. Years of education as a continuous variable, and 2. Substituting 
education with occupation levels. 
Including education as a continuous variable – and thus avoiding its categorization – is 
likely to partially avoid the problem of having individuals with different human capital in 
the same group (i.e., the first of the two measurement problems), as those with similar, but 
not equal years of education would be appropriately treated as having different levels of 
human capital. However, those individuals with the same number of years of education but 
different qualifications would still be incorrectly measured. Substituting occupation for 
education levels provides an alternative measure of human capital which avoids the two 
problems mentioned above. First, it enables a more accurate human capital categorization 
for those individuals who have received the same amount of education in years, but 
acquired different qualifications and skills. Second, it recognizes that different countries 
may have different education paths (including different years of education) which result in 
the same level of human capital and skills. The categorization of occupations has been 
performed according to the International Standard Classification of Occupation (ISCO) 
2008. Appendix E depicts this categorization, and Table 7 below shows the results for these 
two alternative measures of education.  
With regard to family values, the goal of the robustness check is to see whether the results 
are similar when the categorization changes. So far, the analysis has clustered regional 
family values into four categories ranging from very traditional to very liberal. Table 8 
below shows the results for care preferences when family values are measured: 1. As a four-
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category variable (our base model), then 2. As a binary variable – liberal and traditional 
family values – and 3. As a three-category variable – traditional, central and liberal family 
values.  
Table 7 Average Marginal Effects of education for each family values categorization 
(AME). Education measured as a three-category variable, continuous variable and 
proxied by occupation categories. 
Average Marginal Effects of education for each family values categorization 
 
Very 
traditional 
Traditional 
Liberal Very 
liberal 
3-cat. yrs. educ [base: 14-16 yrs. educ] 
17-19 yrs. of education  
-0.025 0.097 0.013 -0.014 
(0.019) (0.018)*** (0.022)  (0.031) 
20+ yrs. of education  
0.040 0.083 0.034 0.006 
(0.020)* (0.025)*** (0.026) (0.014) 
Years of education, continuous      
Yrs educ  
0.006 0.014 0.006 0.002 
(0.003)* (0.003)*** (0.003) (0.003) 
Occupation levels [base: Skill level 1 - low] 
Skill level 2 
-.0010 0.055 -0.008 0.000 
(0.044) 0.024)** (0.037) (0.027) 
Skill level 3 
0.037 0.059 0.012 -0.010 
(0.040) (0.049) (0.049) (0.032) 
Skill level 4 
0.044 0.147 0.014 -0.003 
(0.064) (0.034)*** (0.033) (0.022) 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Robust clustered st. errors by country 
 
Table 8 Average Marginal Effects (AME) of education for each family values 
categorization. Family values measured as four-category, two-category and three-
category variable. 
Average Marginal Effects of education for each family values categorization 
 17-19 yrs. of education 20+ yrs. of education 
Family values, 2 categories  
Traditional 
0.033 0.062 
(0.023) (0.018)*** 
Liberal 
0.007 0.025 
(0.019) (0.013)* 
Family values, 3 categories.  
Traditional 
-0.000 0.061 
(0.022) (0.024)** 
Central 
0.061 0.056 
(0.020)*** (0.020)** 
Liberal 
-0.002 0.017 
(0.029) (0.014) 
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Average Marginal Effects of education for each family values categorization 
 17-19 yrs. of education 20+ yrs. of education 
Family values, 4 categories  
Very traditional 
-0.025 0.040 
(0.019) (0.020)* 
Traditional 
0.097 0.083 
(0.018)*** (0.025)*** 
Liberal 
0.013 0.034 
(0.022) (0.026) 
Very liberal 
-0.014 0.006 
 (0.031) (0.014) 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 Robust clustered st. errors by country 
Results from Table 7 support the main results, and suggest areas for further research. The 
three measures of human capital used above confirm that the most substantial differences 
in outcomes across different levels of human capital are found in traditional areas, followed 
by those of individuals in very traditional areas. This is corroborated by both the statistical 
significance of the coefficients, as well as the magnitude of the coefficients. By contrast, 
preferences on elderly care for those individuals living in liberal and very liberal areas are 
not affected by the levels of human capital. Therefore, the resilience of the effect of family 
values is challenged with increasing levels of human capital. The results also suggest that a 
closer examination of human capital is warranted. When a three-category education 
variable is used, results show that the impact of receiving 20+ years education is similar to 
receiving 17-19 years of education when it comes to elderly care preferences (around 10% 
more likely to choose formal care). One interpretation of this finding is that the effects of 
human capital exhibit diminishing returns. This conclusion is challenged when weighing 
human capital in terms of occupation levels. Relative to individuals in low-skill occupations 
(skill level 1), individuals with low-medium and medium-high skill levels (levels 2 and 3) 
are around 5-6% more likely to prefer formal elderly care. For those individuals with high-
skill occupations (level 4), the likelihood of preferring formal elderly care increases by 15% 
(again, compared to their counterparts with low-skill occupations). This would suggest that 
preference for formal care continues to increase with greater investment in human capital.  
Results from Table 8 also confirm the previous results regarding the differential impact of 
human capital levels on elderly care preferences based on family values areas. First, all 
three categorizations of family values demonstrate that the preferences of individuals in 
more traditional areas are more likely to be affected by their level of human capital than 
those of their counterparts living in more liberal areas. With the binary categorization of 
family values variable, there is a stronger impact of education levels on preferences for 
elderly care for those individuals living in traditional areas than for those living in liberal 
areas. The impact of education is stronger when the individual has 20 or more years of 
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education. When family values are categorized into three levels – traditional, central and 
liberal – the impact of education remains stronger in both magnitude and statistical 
significance for those individuals living in traditional and central areas.  
This time, however, another pattern emerges: in traditional areas, it is only among those 
with high levels of education where there is an impact on preferences, whereas in ‘central’ 
areas, the impact is seen in those with both mid and high levels of education. Moreover, the 
impact of education in central areas seems to have diminishing returns. The analysis using 
a four-category family values variable (i.e., the one used in the main analysis) confirms this 
trend. Again, it is the individuals living in more traditional areas (rather than those living 
in more liberal ones) for whom education levels impact the preferences for elderly care. 
Moreover, the education threshold beyond which individuals are more likely to prefer 
formal care differs depending on the family values area. Results suggest that in very 
traditional areas, the likelihood of preferring formal care is higher for those individuals 
with higher levels of education (20 or more years), but not for those with medium levels of 
education (17-19 years). The likelihood of the former group to prefer formal care is 4% 
higher compared to their less educated counterparts, whereas for the latter group, the 
likelihood is actually 3% lower, although it is not statistically different from zero. By 
contrast, in traditional areas, the likelihood of preferring formal care is already higher for 
individuals with medium level of education, and from then onwards, additional years of 
education have minimal effect. Specifically, individuals with medium and high level of 
education are respectively 10% and 9% more likely to prefer formal care relative to their 
less educated counterparts. 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
Individual preferences regarding forms of elderly care are thought to be subject to 
economic incentives such as changes in the costs and benefits of certain actions such as 
caregiving. And yet, these same preferences – especially the ones related to social issues 
such as elderly care – are arguably rooted in engrained beliefs about the role of the family 
as care provider, and its responsibilities on issues of welfare for different members of the 
household. This paper has aimed to shed light on the role that engrained family values and 
economic incentives play in shaping elderly care preferences. To this purpose, it has 
examined the resilience of the effect of family values on elderly care preferences in light of 
different individual economic incentives – namely, different education levels.  
Results of this paper suggest that resilience of the effect of family values on elderly care 
preferences is mediated by the effect of education. Highly educated individuals in more 
traditional areas have a significantly higher likelihood of preferring formal elderly care than 
72 
 
their less educated counterparts. By contrast, the likelihood to prefer formal care is similar 
across educational levels for individuals living in liberal family areas. These findings 
suggest that the effects of education may be strong enough to ‘break’ the influence of family 
values on elderly care preferences. It is important to note that education acts as a catalyst 
for change in both very traditional and traditional societies. However, the shift in likelihood 
to prefer formal care happens at different levels of education. In very traditional societies, 
it is individuals with twenty or more years of education who exhibit a higher likelihood of 
preferring formal care than their less educated counterparts. In traditional societies, the 
years of education which result in a similar shift are instead between 17 and 19 years. 
Individuals with this education level have a markedly higher likelihood of preferring formal 
elderly care relative to those with low or no education. Furthermore, their preferences are 
fairly similar to those held by their more educated counterparts.  
The paper has some limitations. First, it uses stated preferences rather revealed 
preferences. The former may be considered ‘purer’ in the sense that it does not factor in 
unexpected or unwanted circumstances that may affect final decisions. However, stated 
preferences may downplay the actual role economic incentives overestimate the impact of 
norms or wishes relative to what actual choices may suggest. Further research examining 
revealed preferences is therefore desirable to complement these results. Second, the paper 
may suffer from endogeneity issues. Parental preferences for elderly care may influence 
education decisions of the individuals in the sample, which may in turn influence their own 
preferences for care. Not accounting for such effects – as was the case here due to lack of 
data – may bias the results and ascribe more importance to economic incentives than what 
is actually justified. Third, the paper uses education as an example of economic incentive. 
However, as discussed in the introduction (section 4.3) education can affect preferences on 
elderly care by increasing the opportunity cost of caring but also by affecting individual 
family values. That is, education levels could be a measure of more liberal individual family 
values. These individuals would then select themselves into higher levels of education. In 
this case, the results would be suggesting that the effect of societal family values is not 
resilient for individuals who do not individually share these values. Therefore additional 
research exploring the channel through which education acts as a counter-force to existing 
societal family values may also be warranted. In spite of these limitations, the paper 
contributes to existing literature by studying the resilience of the impact of family values 
when individuals have different levels of education, and the resultant findings have direct 
policy implications for the choice agenda.  
The paper’s finding that education limits the resilience of the effect of traditional family 
values is partially consistent with the literature on education which stresses the higher 
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opportunity costs faced by highly educated individuals when taking leaves from work (see 
Jaumotte, 2003; Smeaton, 2006). On one hand, education is seen as a challenging force to 
traditional values, which are more resilient among less educated individuals. On the other 
hand, results suggest that the impact of education is less relevant in very liberal societies, 
where preferences for elderly care are not contingent on education levels. These finding 
thus open questions on the relevance and impact of education in different family values 
areas, encouraging further research on the interaction between economic incentives and 
family values, and more generally – social norms. The paper’s finding that different levels 
of education have different effects depending on the family values area also deserves more 
attention. What is the education threshold beyond which individual preferences may shift 
in favour of formal elderly care, and does this threshold vary depending on the prevailing 
family values of the society? Wage structure – i.e., similar wages between those with low 
and medium levels of education – or the lack of exposure to ‘liberal values’ often acquired 
during education could be potential explanations. Finally, the paper has exposed education 
as a catalyst for change. What other factors have a similar effect? 
The paper primarily speaks to two bodies of literature: literature on social sciences and 
literature on economics and culture. The social policy literature has thus far focused more 
on the effects of institutional settings on preferences, rather than the effects of culture and 
social norms. The revised focus in this paper contributes to the understanding of the 
rationale behind varied preferences across distinct institutional settings. However, the 
paper stops short of differentiating the differences across institutional settings brought 
about by different family values and the effects that such values can have on people’s 
preferences. With the choice agenda increasingly embraced by several European countries, 
more attention needs to be paid to the cultural and economic incentives individuals face. 
As stated in the introduction, more choice in social care may better accommodate individual 
preferences. However, we must be careful, as such choice can also lead to polarization of 
economic outcomes associated with social care (e.g., female labour force participation) 
between individuals with different economic incentives, especially in more traditional 
societies.  
Within the literature on economics and culture, there is a broad consensus that ‘culture 
matters’. A large number of papers (see interalia A. F. Alesina et al., 2010; Fernandez, 2007; 
Guiso et al., 2006; Ichino & Maggi, 2000) show how individuals with more traditional family 
values consistently make different economic decisions and exhibit different economic 
preferences than those with more liberal family values. The epidemiological approach used 
in some of these papers provides evidence that even within the same institutional setting, 
cultural factors from the country of origin persist and affect individual economic decisions. 
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The present paper imparts some nuances to this conclusion. By finding that resilience of 
the effects of family values is weakened by human capital accumulation, it encourages more 
research on the extent and the circumstances under which cultural factors and social norms 
are resilient.  
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Chapter 3 Parental support: the effect of changes in 
employment status and family values.  
Employment status and parental support: Do family values influence parental 
support for offspring?  
Abstract 
Changes in unemployment levels have produced heterogeneous individual reactions even 
when same politics are employed in different countries. This paper examines the impact of 
family values on parental support provided to adult children when they suffer an adverse 
change in employment status. This paper uses representative longitudinal data of 
Europeans over the age of 50 from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
(SHARE) and controls for institutions and economic conditions to isolate the impact of 
family values from other factors. The results show that when adult children are faced with 
an adverse change in employment status, parents in traditional areas significantly increase 
the probability of providing assistance, whereas their counterparts in liberal areas barely 
change their behaviour. The results are driven largely by different willingness to permit co-
residence. Parents from traditional areas are more likely to accommodate their children, 
whereas co-residence patterns remain unchanged for parents from liberal areas. These 
findings suggest that an adverse change in employment status produces heterogeneous 
responses in terms of parental help, both in intensity and types of support provided.  
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1. Introduction 
In the last two decades there has been a renewed interest among economists on culture and 
the role it plays in explaining economic behaviour, both at a macro and micro level. In this 
context, culture has been used as an umbrella term that encompasses social norms, trust, 
family values, civic virtue and the likes. The outcomes from this body of research suggest 
that culture affects economic outcomes and individual behaviour even when controlling for 
institutional and economic factors. Preferences for labour market regulation as well as 
employment patterns of women and young people are affected by family ties and religion 
(see interalia A. F. Alesina et al., 2010; Algan & Cahuc, 2006, 2007). ). Likewise, cultural 
factors influence individuals’ priors on social mobility (Alberto Alesina & Glaeser, 2004), 
the exchange of goods and financial assets (Guiso et al., 2004) and GDP growth (Barro & 
McCleary, 2003; Tabellini, 2010). Cultural patterns can also provide a more complete 
answer as to why Europeans have a higher preference for leisure compared to Americans 
(A. Alesina, Glaeser, & Sacerdote, 2005). And last but not least, the literature also documents 
the interplay between civic virtue or trust and the design of labour market institutions (see 
Aghion et al., 2011; Algan & Cahuc, 2009). 
These findings raise questions about how resilient the effects of culture on economic 
behaviour are. That is, when institutional or economic conditions challenge the existing 
cultural norms, which one prevails? Take the case of a policy reform aimed at boosting 
female labour force participation, which will be analysed in chapter 4. In a context of 
traditional family values, it may not yield the expected results if existing values encouraging 
home production prevail over the work-incentives granted by the reform. Similarly, an 
change in economic incentive within a traditional society may result in an increase in family 
support not enjoyed by individuals in societies with more liberal values.  
This paper addresses this question and specifically examines the distinct impact of family 
values on parental help given to adult children when they suffer an adverse change in 
employment status. Three plausible outcomes may arise: in the first one, family values are 
resilient to the change in economic conditions, and their effect is exacerbated by the change 
in employment status. Parental help given is therefore expected to be of a bigger magnitude 
for individuals living in more traditional areas. At the same time, I would expect the type of 
help to differ across areas with different family values. The existing literature on culture 
and more specifically family ties suggests that familistic societies tend to support their adult 
offspring more via co-residence than via financial help (see for example Albertini & Kohli, 
2013). Moreover, I would expect parental help to already differ across areas with different 
family values before any change in economic conditions. A second outcome would see the 
effect of family values maintained. In this case, individuals across areas with different 
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family values would react in a similar way to an adverse change in employment status of 
their offspring. If the probability of providing parental help was already different before the 
change in economic conditions, such similar reaction would actually imply that differences 
in parental help persist. Instead, if the probability of providing parental help was similar to 
begin with, such reaction would imply that family values never mattered at all, even prior 
to the change in employment status. Finally, it could be that parents in more liberal areas 
experience a greater increase their probability of providing help than their counterparts 
living in more traditional areas. This could be the case if the probability of providing help 
was lower for the former, and the adverse change in economic conditions leads to a 
convergence in the likelihood to provide help. In that case the effect of family values would 
not be resilient to such change. 
The results of this paper point towards an important role of family values. They show that, 
first, the probability of providing parental help when children are employed is higher 
among individuals living in more traditional areas. The subsequent disaggregation of types 
of help provided shows that this difference in the probability of giving help is mainly due to 
financial help. Conversely, the probability of co-residence is of a similar magnitude across 
areas with different family values. Second, when the adult child is hit by an adverse change 
in employment status, parents in traditional areas significantly increase the probability of 
providing help, whereas their counterparts in liberal areas barely change their probability. 
Note however, that the disaggregation of types of help provided gives a more nuanced 
picture: parents across different family values areas see a similar increase in their 
probability of giving financial help, but only parents from traditional areas experience an 
increase in the probability of providing co-residence.   
These results are relevant as they provide evidence for the role of family values in whether 
and how parents react to offspring in need. It suggests that adult children facing an adverse 
change in employment status may not only receive different amounts but also different 
types of support. The impact of the change on the offspring’s income is therefore dependent 
on the prevailing family values. At this point, it is important to note that the type of help 
provided not only has short-term consequences for income, but may also have long-term 
implications. The literature suggests that co-residence patterns affect future earnings, as 
one can invest more time in finding a better job match without the pressing need to find an 
easy and safe job sooner (Kaplan, 2012:450). At the same time, co-residence helps to 
smooth consumption patterns and decreases the incentives to save (ibid.).  The findings 
also shed light on potential problems that the EU may encounter should it embrace the idea 
of a fully-fledged fiscal union with a European welfare state. In line with what the 
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introduction of the thesis suggests, preferences are – at least to a certain extent and in the 
short run – deeply engrained in family values, and may be difficult to change as a result. 
These findings are in line with the growing body of literature which draws upon the so-
called epidemiological approach to disentangle institutions from cultural constraints. By 
analysing the economic behaviour of migrants in the country of residence, this approach 
provides a natural experiment to analyse the strength of cultural factors as opposed to the 
influence of institutions and economic conditions. First and second-generation migrants 
appear to behave differently depending on their origin in several aspects of life, and 
decisions on female labour force participation, fertility, geographical mobility, and living 
arrangements among others seem to have a strong basis in the individual’s cultural 
background (A. Alesina & Giuliano, 2010; Fernandez & Fogli, 2009; Fernandez & National 
Bureau of Economic Research., 2007; Giuliano, 2007).  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the 
literature on intergenerational transfers, with a focus on social norms and family values. 
Section 3 explains the empirical and identification strategy, and section 4 describes the 
data. Section 5 presents the empirical analysis and results and section 6 runs some 
robustness checks. Then finally, we conclude with section 7.   
2. Background 
The intergenerational contract in Europe and the relevance of family values 
The recent economic crisis has returned the issue of ‘intergenerational contract’ to the top 
of the political agenda. Faced with scarcer resources and a rhetoric dominated by austerity, 
governments are pushed to cut different areas of welfare resulting in a redistribution of 
resources across different age groups. The terms of the debate are still very much focused 
on institutional dimensions, namely, how to reform welfare and social institutions and what 
level of welfare mix to provide. As important as the institutional debate is, this focus has 
tended to overlook one key provider of intergenerational help: the family. Recent analyses 
focusing on family assistance suggest that intergenerational help is characterized by a high 
element of reciprocity. However, detailed analyses of the net flow of help – both in terms of 
financial help and social support – suggest that more elder parents are net providers than 
net receivers of help (Albertini, Kohli, & Vogel, 2007; Grundy, 2005). Although this pattern 
is more pronounced when the children are young, it persists in all age groups (Albertini et 
al., 2007).    
The economics and sociological literatures on intergenerational help emphasise two 
competing explanations for family exchanges. The first is grounded in altruism, and 
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suggests this is the driving force behind help within the family and across generations 
(Altonji, Hayashi, & Kotlikoff, 1997). One implication of this explanation is that parents will 
provide more help to their disadvantaged or poor children (Grundy, 2005). The second 
explanation suggests instead that family exchanges are based on rational choices about the 
costs and benefits of providing help, with parents more likely to provide assistance to the 
offspring from whom they receive most help. Reciprocity would therefore be key in 
explaining family exchanges, rather than children’s income levels (ibid).  
This framework has provided significant insight on the role of socio-demographic factors 
such as income, social class or gender on intergenerational help. However, evidence is still 
inconclusive, with results depending on the countries studied or the level of development 
among others (Grundy, 2005). More importantly, the dichotomy between rationality and 
altruism are not only difficult to define and discern, but it overlooks an important variable: 
social norms and family values. Arguably, the level and conceptualization of altruism and 
rationality expected depend to a large extent on the social norms regarding the role of 
family in a society.  
Grundy (2005) suggests that reciprocity and altruism may not extend to individuals who 
do not subscribe to normative expectations about the role of family in providing help.  
Manacorda and Moretti (2005) raise a similar issue in their paper. They argue that if 
parents like to live with their offspring but this desire is not reciprocated by the latter, they 
will ‘bribe’ their children to live with them. However, they admit that the assumption that 
parents ‘like’ to live with their children is controversial and may depend on the society 
explored. This is confirmed by Giuliano (2007), who found that living arrangements of 
second-generation migrants in the US depend on their country of origin, further suggesting 
that family values and social norms matter.  
On a more theoretical note, Postlewaite (2011) suggests that the claim that social norms 
affect economic behaviour can embrace both altruistic and rational explanations. Social 
norms could be linked to altruism if it is assumed that individuals are the same at birth, but 
interactions with their respective communities differentially shape their preferences (e.g., 
what makes them happy or sad) as adults. As it applies to intergenerational care, this 
explanation could be interpreted as parents feeling sad whenever they are unable to 
provide for an offspring in need. Alternatively, it could be that two individuals share the 
same deep preferences, but the social structures in the society of residence provide 
different incentives for behaviour. Therefore, help from parents to adult children could be 
interpreted as a transactional exchange subject to costs and benefits which vary depending 
on the societal structures (e.g., provide help to adult children with the expectation that they 
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will return the favour when they need it). The subject of analysis here has thus shifted from 
the altruism-rationality dichotomy to social norms. 
This paper follows this approach and studies the role that social norms, and specifically 
family values, play in the decision to provide parental help to an adult offspring in need. 
Following Reher’s understanding of the concept, family values are defined according to the 
strength and resilience of family loyalties, allegiances and authority within a society (Reher, 
1998). Individuals living in societies with traditional family values will exhibit a tendency 
to believe that the family group takes priority over the individual, and this will shape their 
economic, political and social preferences. These societies’ display of family and kinship 
solidarity is rooted in a strong sense of moral obligation (Flaquer in Naldini, 2003; Pfenning 
et al., 2000), and therefore, they are more likely to turn to the family in times of economic 
problems. By contrast, individuals in more liberal societies believe in individual personal 
empowerment (Esping-Andersen, 1990). While kinship solidarity may empower those in 
crisis, it may also pose problems for those individuals in the family who are in the position 
to provide help. Help is therefore expected from the state, either for those at the fringes of 
society or for everyone. 
Note that this paper focuses on societal family values as opposed to individual ones. 
Although the latter may differ from the former, as Inglehart and Baker claim, ‘generations 
have collective memories, imprinted in adolescence and early adulthood that persist 
throughout the life cycle’ (R. Inglehart & Baker, 2000). In this sense, the concept of ‘values’ 
here is understood as the most invariant part of the set of beliefs linked inextricably to 
affects that guide our preferences, attitudes and behaviour (Schwartz, 2012).  
3. Empirical and identification strategy 
This paper examines the effect of an adverse change in employment status on the 
probability of receiving parental help for individuals living in areas characterized by 
different family values. The intuition underlying the study is that a child’s utility is a 
component of parents’ utility, with the weight placed on the former dependent on the 
strength of family values. Hence, an adverse change affecting a child’s employment status 
should generate higher disutility for those living in areas with traditional values than those 
living in less traditional areas. Whether this is indeed the case is the empirical question that 
this paper aims to address.   
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To this end the paper uses child-parent dyad panel data from the SHARE survey (Survey of 
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe) for the years 2004, 2006 and 201314 to perform 
a series of Linear Probability Model15 specifications of the following type: 
P(yjkt=1) = α + β1Eit + β2fvk + β3Eitfvk + β4Xj + β5Xi  + β6dc + ε                                               (1) 
where yjt denotes the probability of a parent j living in an area k with family values fvk to 
provide help to an offspring who has employment status Eit in year t. fvk can range from 
very traditional, traditional, liberal and very liberal and are calculated at an ‘area’ level16, 
whereas Eit is a binary variable which can take the form of either employed or not employed 
(i.e. adult child is either unemployed or disabled). Xi and Xj are child and parent controls: 
gender, education, number of children, income levels, marital status, age, and health status. 
dc are country dummies17, with standard errors clustered by country. As Cameron and 
Miller (2015) suggest, failure to control for within-cluster error correlation may result in 
deceptively low standard errors and low p-values, even when country fixed effects are 
included. The paper is mainly interested in whether parental help given when the child 
faces an adverse change in employment status differs across individuals living in areas with 
different family values. Therefore, the main coefficient of interest is the interaction of β3. 
Longitudinal data 
The use of longitudinal data is one of the pillars of the empirical strategy for the paper. 
Compared to analyses that rely on cross-sectional data, the use of longitudinal data 
increases the precision in estimation by following the same individuals over a certain 
period of time (A. C. Cameron & Miller, 2015). More importantly, it also allows for the 
control of individual-specific effects, so the problem of omitted variable bias is alleviated 
(Wooldridge, 2010). This is best done with fixed-effects models, as they allow such 
individual characteristics to be correlated with the regressors. Random-effects models by 
contrast ‘treat any unobserved individual heterogeneity as being distributed independently 
of the regressors’ according to Cameron and Trivedi (2005:697). This is a strong 
assumption and, may lead to inconsistent estimates if untrue.  
However, fixed-effects model also come with significant drawbacks which are particularly 
salient for this paper. First, the estimates derived may be very imprecise (i.e., high standard 
                                                 
14 Further details on the data are provided in the next section. 
15 The model used is the Linear Probability Model (LPM). Although the dependent variable is binary, 
Angrist and Pischke (2009) suggests that LPM does a good job in estimating marginal effects. They 
emphasise that although LMP will not give the ‘true’ marginal effects from the right non-linear model, 
neither will the ‘wrong’ nonlinear model. Therefore, it doesn’t really make a difference to use LPM or a 
nonlinear model such as logit or probit.  
16 By area I mean NUTS 2 regions grouped together. More about family values measurement in the 
following section. 
17 See chapter 2 for a rationale for including country dummies but not regional dummies. 
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errors) if most of the variation is cross-sectional rather than over time (A. C. Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2005:715). This makes intuitive sense given that we are using individuals as their 
own controls, and there should be variability within them. With around 40,000 
observations at three different times, the data in this paper is not immune to this problem. 
Second, fixed-effects models are not useful in estimating the coefficients of time-invariant 
variables, as its effect is absorbed by the individual-specific effect (A. C. Cameron & Trivedi, 
2005). One of the main variables in this paper is family values, which are assigned to each 
individual depending on the area of residence. Therefore, the variable is time invariant and 
would be wiped out of the regression if the fixed-effects model was used. Finally, when data 
used does not cover the entire population (i.e., the dataset does not consist of all potential 
observations in the population, as it would if the subjects were firms in a country) and is 
instead a random subset of the population, then random-effects model are more useful, as 
it allow us to make inferences about other members of the population (Kennedy, 
1998:227).  
Identification strategy 
With all of this in mind, the paper uses a random-effects panel data model, and alleviates 
the omitted variable bias by adding individual controls for both the adult children and the 
parents. Despite the addition of such controls, causal interpretation may still be difficult. 
One specific concern regarding causality is the effect of anticipation. Arguably, employment 
status is not exogenous, and it is plausible that parents who anticipate their child to suffer 
an adverse change in employment status may increase help provided ahead of the actual 
event. So an omitted variable that would likely affect the level of help provided (and 
correlated with regressors) is previous help – not including it can undermine the effect of 
the adverse change in employment status on parental help provided. Although this is an 
important omission, we believe it is unlikely to affect the interaction coefficient 
significantly, as there is no reason a priori to suspect that the anticipation effect differs 
across areas with different family values. A similar concern is the influence that past help 
may have on employment status. On one hand, it could be argued that high level of support 
from parents can enhance the child’s probability of staying employed (e.g., by helping them 
make ends meet, topping up income, etc.). On the other hand, high support can be seen as a 
safety net with detrimental effects on employment status. Causality concerns are therefore 
likely to persist. 
The ‘filtering’ role of family values 
As stated in section 2, this paper is more concerned with the role that societal family values, 
rather than individual family values, play in influencing economic behaviour. While we 
could choose to measure family values at the country level, an individual is arguably more 
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likely to be affected by values closer to his or her own environment – that is, prevalent 
values in his/her city or county rather than those estimated at the country level. 
Unfortunately because the dataset does not include information on the county (NUTS 3 in 
EU terminology) where the individual lives, the paper attributes societal family values at a 
regional level (NUTS 2) as the basis of the study. To do so, we take the questions from the 
European Value Study (EVS) to construct a family values composite index18 at NUTS 2 level, 
then assign the resulting values to individuals in the SHARE dataset according to the region 
where they live19. Given that many regions across Europe have similar family values, the 
responses are clustered into four categories: very traditional, traditional, liberal and very 
liberal. As a result, some countries in our analysis will have regions with different family 
values categories, and regions in different countries may be grouped into the same 
category.  
Two identification problems arise when the resilience of family values and its effect on 
economic behaviour is tested. The first one relates to the empirical isolation of the effects 
of societal family values, or more generally social norms, from the effects of institutional 
and economic variables. The strategy that this paper adopts is controlling for country and 
regional effects. This, in effect, results in an underestimation of the effect of family values, 
as they may be engrained in the specific region or country. But simultaneously, this 
approach derives estimates which can more credibly be assigned to family values (Guiso et 
al., 2003). The second identification problem stems from endogeneity concerns. Decisions 
to provide help to your adult offspring are likely to be influenced by societal family values, 
and at the same time, these same decisions reinforce societal family values. This paper 
attempts to mitigate endogeneity problems by constructing family values categories with 
EVS questions from years prior to the analysis.  
4. Data 20 
The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE21) is a cross-national panel 
database which contains micro data on health, socioeconomics and family networks. Every 
other year, it interviews individuals over 50 years old and their partners, regardless of their 
                                                 
18 See Chapter 2, section 3 on the thought that went to construct the variable family values.  
19 Next section Data to describe in detail how the variable is constructed. 
20 Refer to Appendix J to see a detailed account of the construction of each variable. 
21 This paper uses data from SHARE Waves 1, 2, 3 (SHARELIFE), 4 and 5 (DOIs: 10.6103/SHARE.w1.260, 
10.6103/SHARE.w2.260, 10.6103/SHARE.w3.100, 10.6103/SHARE.w4.111, 10.6103/SHARE.w5.100), 
see Börsch-Supan et al. (2013) for methodological details. The SHARE data collection has been primarily 
funded by the European Commission through FP5 (QLK6-CT-2001-00360), FP6 (SHARE-I3: RII-CT-2006-
062193, COMPARE: CIT5-CT-2005-028857, SHARELIFE: CIT4-CT-2006-028812) and FP7 (SHARE-PREP: 
N°211909, SHARE-LEAP: N°227822, SHARE M4: N°261982). Additional funding from the German Ministry 
of Education and Research, the U.S. National Institute on Aging (U01_AG09740-13S2, P01_AG005842, 
P01_AG08291, P30_AG12815, R21_AG025169, Y1-AG-4553-01, IAG_BSR06-11, OGHA_04-064) and from 
various national funding sources is gratefully acknowledged (see www.share-project.org). 
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age. A proportion of these individuals are followed over the years, and new individuals are 
added to the sample in every wave. This article employs panel data from the first (A. Börsch-
Supan, 2013a; A. Börsch-Supan et al., 2013; A.  Börsch-Supan et al., 2005; A. Börsch-Supan 
& Jürges, 2005), second (A. Börsch-Supan, 2013b; A. Börsch-Supan et al., 2013; A. Börsch-
Supan et al., 2008) and fifth (A. Börsch-Supan, 2015; A. Börsch-Supan et al., 2013; Malter & 
Börsch-Supan, 2015) waves, which took place in 2004/05, 2006/07 and 2013 
respectively22 and includes the following 12 countries: Austria, Germany, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, Greece, Switzerland, Belgium and the Czech 
Republic. After deleting the observations for which we do not have the variables required 
to perform the analysis, we are left with 40,000 observations, with ~3,000 per country on 
average.  
SHARE also provides information on the children of the individuals interviewed. This 
information includes age, gender, work status, marital status, education and number of 
children for the four younger children. Crucially, it also includes the amount and type of 
help that each child receives from parents, which is our variable of interest. I then construct 
parent-child dyad for each of the reported children, so each observation is a paired parent-
child observation.  
Dependent variables 
This paper aims to understand the role of family values on the probability of providing 
parental help and the type of help provided when the adult child is faced with an adverse 
change in employment status. To this purpose, the analysis uses three main dependent 
variables: The first one is general help, which includes both financial help and co-residence. 
The variable can take the value of zero or one, zero being that no parental help has been 
received, one being otherwise. The second dependent variable is financial help. The 
respondent is asked the following question: in the last 12 months, have you given financial 
help > 250€? If yes, to whom? The answer is coded yes if help has been given to the child 
corresponding to the parent-child dyad, and is coded no if otherwise. The third dependent 
variable refers to the living arrangement of the child, and specifically, whether there is 
parental co-residence. The question asked is: Where does the child live? And the answers 
can be a) in the same household, b) in the same building, and the other options state the 
distance between the child and parents in kilometres. The variable co-residence is coded 
yes if the child lives in the same household, and no if otherwise. 
                                                 
22 Wave 3 and 4 were not selected as they do not contain the variables needed for the analysis. However, 
wave 4 (A. Börsch-Supan, 2013c; A. Börsch-Supan et al., 2013; Malter & Börsch-Supan, 2015) was used to 
get data for Wave 5. Wave 3 is called ‘Sharelife” and focuses on people’s retrospective life with regard to 
children, work, partners, housing and health. In wave 4, the children mentioned in the social networks 
section cannot be linked to information on the ‘Children’ section, so we cannot know basic information 
about the child (e.g., date of birth, work status, etc.) that receives help from parents. 
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Independent variable: adverse change in employment status  
This paper is interested in how an adverse change in employment status affects parental 
help provided. To ascertain the child’s employment status, the following question is used: 
what is [child’s name]’s employment status? The answers have been coded as follows: zero 
when the child is full-time employed, part-time employed or self-employed. By contrast, if the 
answer is unemployed, permanently sick or disabled, it has been coded as one. All other 
answers, including in vocational training, retraining or education, parental leave, in 
retirement or early retirement, looking after home or family and other – have been dropped. 
This is because the analysis focuses on children’s reliance on parents when the former are 
affected by an adverse event. Of the employment status options provided, the only ones that 
can unequivocally be categorized as ‘adverse’ are being unemployed or permanently sick 
or disabled.  
Independent variable: family values 
This paper uses questions related to family issues23 from the European Values Study (EVS) 
to construct a ‘family values’ composite index at the regional level (NUTS 2) using Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA). For this purpose, the paper takes the questions related to 
family values available in the EVS from 1981 and 1990 (for Greece only 2008 is available), 
which are shown in Appendix B. The categorization of each question is changed, so that the 
answer is always between 0 and 2 (i.e., three answers can be provided), with the higher 
number representing a more traditional view. Descriptive statistics for each variable are 
presented in Appendix F. Prior to carrying out PCA, I took the average of the individual 
answers by country-region (NUTS 2 except for Germany, where NUTS 1 are used), and 
constructed the correlation matrix. Appendix G shows that the difference between the mean 
and the median values for each country-region is low, showing that the distribution of 
values within regions is normally distributed.  
This regional composite index, whose results are in Appendix H, will then be assigned to 
each parent-child dyad in the sample according to the region where the parents live. The 
resulting family values variable is a measure of the average values predominant in the 
region where the individual lives. 
In order to avoid causality problems – namely, parental help affecting family values – I 
looked at survey questions from 1981 and 199024. I then tested how representative the 
answers are of family values in 2004, 2006 and 2013 by comparing the answers to those 
                                                 
23 Examples of questions and statements included are: Children need both parents to grow up happily, or 
parents’ duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being, qualities 
that children should learn at home, among others.   
24 One exception is Greece, for which there was only data for 2008. 
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from the EVS in 2008. Most correlations are above 70%, with a few around 60%. I therefore 
concluded that the family values composite index is representative of the values in the 
2000s. By multiplying each of these scores for the standardized variables (grouped by 
region) by the PCA weights and adding them up, I derived a family values coefficient for 
each country-region. Because of the way PCA has been conducted, negative coefficients 
belong to regions which are more liberal than the average, and the opposite is true for 
positive coefficients. Figure 5 below shows the variability of the coefficients by country, and 
Appendix I shows the variability within country and across regions. It can be seen here that 
most Nordic countries exhibit more liberal values than most Mediterranean countries, 
leaving Continental countries somewhat in the middle. Needless to say, the index must be 
carefully interpreted. Building on existing literature about the role of the family in different 
European societies, a plausible interpretation is that countries or regions with a higher 
family values score tend to have a more communalistic ethic which emphasizes family ties 
and responsibilities, in significant contrast with the individualistic ethic more predominant 
in the Nordic countries. Using Gal’s words, regions where family values are more traditional 
can be thought of as those where there is still ‘an enduring sense of strong and extended 
family obligations’ (2010).  
Once coefficients have been assigned to individuals in every region, I categorize the 
coefficients using the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile, effectively creating four categories of 
family values, from very traditional (0), traditional (1), liberal (2), to very liberal (3). The 
paper will also present the results derived using a binary family values variable later on in 
the paper (see section on robustness checks). Table 9 below shows how many regions in 
each country belong to each family value category. Most countries in the Table contain more 
than one category of family values, with the exception of the Netherlands and Denmark. 
This suggests that, as suspected, a categorization of family values at the country level would 
have been overly simplistic.  
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Figure 5 Family values – weighted sum of standard deviation, by country 
 
Note: the weighted sum of standard deviation is the result of multiplying the 
PCA weights to each score of standardized variable (previously grouped by 
region) and adding up the results for each country-region. In this graph, the 
grouping has been done by country, to illustrate country-differences. 
Table 9 Percentage of regions per country belonging to each category of family 
values 
Country Obs. 
Family values 
Total % 
Total 
num. of 
regions 
V. 
traditional Traditional Liberal 
V. 
liberal 
AT 7,147   78% 22%   100% 9 
BE 10,691 18% 36% 45%  100% 11 
CH 4,841  14% 43% 43% 100% 7 
CZ 7,523 67% 33%   100% 3 
DE 5,728 25% 13% 63%  100% 16 
DK 6,098    100% 100% 1 
ES 7,506 11% 83% 6%  100% 18 
FR 10,063 56% 44%   100% 9 
GR 4,428 92% 8%   100% 13 
IT 7,885 50% 39% 11%  100% 18 
NL 7,961    100% 100% 12 
SE 8,187     75% 25% 100% 8 
 
Control variables 
Several control variables are included in the regression, both from the parents and the 
children’s side. Any variable which is likely to be influenced by family values has been 
included as a control. This way, what is tested is if family values have any effect ‘beyond the 
ways in which it is already reflected in these choices’ as Fernandez (2010) claims. In the 
case of providing help to children, family values are likely to influence parental education 
as well as the number of children. For instance, highly educated parents may have more 
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liberal values and be less receptive to co-residence. As a result, they may be more likely to 
provide help in a financial way. Education is measured using the ISCED-97 classification. 
With regards to the number of children, one may expect individuals in traditional areas to 
have more children per family. However, as the literature suggests (see for example 
Giuliano, 2010) other factors such as the delay in moving out from parental home (also 
arguably influenced by family values) may have a negative effect on fertility, suggesting that 
traditional values may be linked to fewer number of children per family. The controls 
should also include any variable that is likely to exert an influence on parental help 
received, so that the effect of the two variables of interest is more credible and does not 
suffer from bias. 
On the parents’ side, empirical evidence show that income is likely to have a positive effect 
on financial help received (Grundy, 2005). However, the effect on co-residence is not as 
clear-cut. If co-residence is regarded as a substitute for financial help, then its relationship 
with income should be negative. However, some previous research (see Manacorda & 
Moretti, 2005) suggests that higher parental income allows parents to offer their children 
higher consumption in exchange for co-residence. Income levels are therefore included as 
a categorical variable which asks whether parents have very difficult, difficult, fairly easy 
or very easy ways to make their ends meet. Marital status is also likely to affect parental 
help. We expect parents to co-reside more with children if the parent is widowed, divorced 
or not married. But in this situation, we also expect parents to provide less financial help. 
Marital status is categorized as either married or non-married, with the latter including 
widowed, divorced, or otherwise non-married parents. The number of children that 
parents have is likely to negatively affect the amount of help given, as there will be more 
‘competitors’ for parental help. Poor parental health is included as a five-category variable 
ranging from excellent to poor. I expect it to negatively affect financial transfers, although 
a priori it is not clear how it would affect co-residence. Children can decide to co-reside 
with parents if they have poor health, or conversely, they can regard themselves as a burden 
and co-reside less. A similar argument can be made with parental age in terms of co-
residence. In terms of financial help, older parents may be less inclined to help their 
children, as they may have less savings left. But they may also want to help them more as 
they have less time to spend it for them. Children controls such as marital status, number 
of children, education levels, age and gender are also added, as these characteristics will 
very likely have an impact on parental help received.  
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Descriptive statistics 
Table 10 presents the descriptive statistics of the data. 17% of observations in the sample 
engage in at least one type of parental help. The percentage of parent-dyad engaging in 
financial help is significantly higher than the percentage engaging in co-residence – 13% 
compared to 6%. Most of the observations are employed, with 7% of the sample being 
unemployed or permanently sick. With regard to family values, given that it has been 
categorized according to percentiles, the mean is in between traditional and liberal. Most 
of the sample is married and the average number of children from the offspring is around 
one. The sample is biased towards children with upper & post-secondary and tertiary 
education. Their average age is 42 years-old and there are as many men as women. With 
regard to parents, the average age is 70 years old and most of them are married. Their 
average number of children is around 3 and their average health status is good. Most of 
them do not have pressing problems with income and are on average low educated. 
 
Table 10 Descriptive statistics 
Name var Measurement Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Parental help received 
Categorical:  
[0] - no parental help received 
[1] - parental help received 
87,875 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Parental financial help 
received 
87,214 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Parental co-residence 72,279 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Employment status 
Categorical:  
[0] - employed 
[1] - unemployed or perm. sick 
77,673 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Family values 
Categorical:  
[0] - very traditional 
[1] - traditional 
[2] - liberal 
[3] - very liberal 
68,690 1.51 1.11 0 3 
Marital status - child 
Catgorical: 
[0] - non-married 
[1] - married 
71,502 0.68 0.47 0 1 
Number of children - 
child 
Categorical 55,410 1.49 1.19 0 23 
Education level - child 
Categorical:  
[0] - primary or less 
[1] - lower secondary 
[2] - upper & post-secondary 
[3] - tertiary 
53,649 2.02 0.87 0 3 
Age – child Categorical 88,058 42.71 8.62 30 70 
Gender – child 
Categorical: 
[1] - Male 
[2] - Female 
88,057 1.49 0.50 1 2 
Age  Categorical 88,055 70.01 9.25 50 104 
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Name var Measurement Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Is parental hh a poor 
household? 
Categorical:  
[1] - with great difficulty 
[2] - with some difficulty 
[3] - fairly easily 
[4] - easily 
75,200 2.86 0.98 1 4 
Marital status 
Categorical: 
[0] - married 
[1] - non-married 
69,099 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Number of children Categorical 88,058 2.89 1.38 1 17 
Health status 
Categorical: 
[1] - excellent 
[2] - very good 
[3] - good 
[4] - fair 
[5] - poor 
87,991 3.17 1.05 1 5 
Education level 
Categorical: 
[0] – none 
[1] – primary education 
[2] – lower secondary educ 
[3] – upper secondary educ 
[4] – post-secondary educ 
[5] – tertiary – first stage 
[6] – tertiary – second stage 
 
66,865 2.34 1.49 0 6 
5. Empirical analysis and results 
The structure of the empirical analysis is as follows: the first section focuses on the effects 
that an adverse change in employment status has on the probability that adult children 
receive any kind of help from parents. The second section considers the different types of 
parental help that children may receive, and analyses which one prevails in the event of an 
adverse change in employment status. The two types of help considered are co-residence 
and financial assistance. Robustness checks can be found in section 6.  
All regressions use a probability linear model (OLS) with panel data in which the dependent 
variable is the probability that parents provide help via financial transfer and/or co-
residence. The results are presented in terms of Average Marginal Effects (AME) and 
predicted probabilities. 
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5.1. The effects of an adverse change in employment status on the probability that adult 
children receive any kind of parental help 
Parameter estimates for the effect that an adverse change in employment status has on the 
probability that parents provide help are presented in Table 11. The first column presents 
the results from estimation of the variables of interest – family values and change in 
employment status. Column 2 adds the interaction effect between family values and the 
change in employment status. Finally, columns 3 and 4 add individual controls for adult 
children and parents, respectively.   
The results in column 4 (the full model) show that first, the probability that employed adult 
children receive parental help is very similar across areas and only statistically different for 
liberal and very liberal areas at 10% significance level. . Second, the impact of the change in 
employment status on the probability that children receive parental help is dependent on 
prevailing family values. The likelihood that individuals living in traditional and very 
traditional areas will receive parental help increases by 13% to 15% when an adverse 
change in employment status occurs. Conversely, children living in more liberal areas do 
not experience any significant increase in help received. Third, as Table 12 and Figure 6 
show, the probability that adult children without employment will receive parental help is 
higher in very traditional and traditional areas than in liberal and very liberal ones. 
Individuals living in the former areas have a 30% likelihood of receiving parental support, 
versus ~20% for individuals living in the latter areas. These results suggest that first, 
parents of employed children give similar help to their offspring. Second, help is more 
stable in more liberal regions – i.e. help provision is more sensitive to changes in 
employment status in very traditional and traditional areas. 
Table 11 Average Marginal Effects of an adverse change in employment status on 
the probability to receive parental help, by family values. 
GENERAL HELP (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Base Base+ 
interaction 
Controls 
children 
Controls parents 
& child. 
Fam v. [base: v.Trad)     
Traditional 0.037 0.042 0.021 0.002 
 (0.007)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)** (0.011) 
Liberal 0.054 0.064 0.053 0.035 
 (0.011)*** (0.012)*** (0.017)*** (0.019)* 
V.Liberal 0.055 0.067 0.047 0.038 
 (0.014)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.020)* 
Not-employed effect 0.089    
Average (0.024)***    
Not-employed effect  0.147 0.132 0.154 
V. Traditional  (0.044)*** (0.037)*** (0.038)*** 
Not-employed effect  0.111 0.115 0.133 
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GENERAL HELP (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Traditional  (0.043)*** (0.025)*** (0.022)*** 
Not-employed effect  0.046 0.022 0.023 
Liberal  (0.019)** (0.025) (0.023) 
Not-employed effect  0.023 -0.005 -0.005 
V. Liberal  (0.007)*** (0.014) (0.017) 
non-married(0)   -0.117 -0.123 
   (0.031)*** (0.032)*** 
Child's no of children   -0.010 -0.007 
   (0.003)*** (0.003)** 
Educ [base: tertiary]     
Primary/ less   -0.033 0.038 
   (0.014)** (0.013)*** 
Lower sec   -0.044 0.006 
   (0.011)*** (0.010) 
Upper/post sec.   -0.026 0.004 
   (0.006)*** (0.007) 
Age child   -0.006 -0.006 
   (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Male (0).   -0.008 -0.007 
   (0.007) (0.007) 
Age    0.000 
    (0.001) 
make ends meet [base: difficult]    0.046 
    (0.004)*** 
Marital status    -0.009 
    (0.009) 
Number of children    -0.027 
    (0.004)*** 
Self-perceived health    -0.003 
    (0.002) 
Respondent´s education    0.014 
    (0.003)*** 
Constant 0.168 0.162 0.542 0.398 
 (0.006)*** (0.009)*** (0.047)*** (0.067)*** 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 overall 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.10 
N 60,591 60,591 44,669 37,772 
Groups 36,330 36,330 32,125 27,844 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Robust clustered st. errors by country 
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Table 12 Predicted probabilities to receive help when an adverse change in 
employment status occurs 
Predicted probabilities to receive help when an adverse change in 
employment status occurs 
 Employed Non-employed 
   
V. Traditional family values 0.17 0.32 
 (0.01)*** (0.04)*** 
   
Traditional family values 0.17 0.30 
 (0.01)*** (0.02)*** 
Comparison to prob for v.traditional fv (0.01) (0.04) 
   
Liberal family values 0.20 0.22 
 (0.01)*** (0.03)*** 
Comparison to prob for v.traditional fv (0.01)* (0.05)* 
   
V. Liberal family values 0.20 0.20 
 (0.01)*** (0.02)*** 
Comparison to prob for v.traditional fv (0.02)* (0.05)** 
   
Obs 37,772 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis. The second row of standard errors and stars tells us 
the difference in probabilities compared to the probabilities of receiving help for 
individuals living in very traditional regions. 
 
Figure 6 Predicted probabilities to receive help when an adverse change in 
employment status occurs. 
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The results are robust to the inclusion of several control variables. In particular, the 
difference in reaction between individuals living in areas with different family values when 
an adverse change in employment status occurs becomes more salient once we add 
children’s controls. The marital status of the child affects the probability of help in a very 
significant and expected way: married children are approximately 12% less likely to receive 
help than non-married ones. The child’s age and the number of offspring are also 
statistically relevant and negatively correlated with the probability of receiving help, 
although their coefficient is very small. Children with lower levels of education receive 
more help, although the difference here is only significant for the very poorly educated. 
With regard to parents’ characteristics, the most relevant are the ability of households to 
make ends meet, the number of children they have in total, and the education of the primary 
parent. As expected, receiving help from parents is 5% more likely when it easier is for them 
to make ends meet. If parents have more children, the probability of receiving help from 
them is 3% lower, and more educated parents are 1.5% more likely to provide their 
children with help.  
5.2. Dealing with heterogeneity of help provision 
Parents can provide help to their adult children through two main avenues: financial help 
or offer of co-residence25. By analysing these two types of help separately, we attain a better 
understanding of the two means of help used by individuals living in areas with different 
family values. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 13 below show the results for financial help and 
co-residence, respectively. These results show that first, there are no substantial 
differences between financial help received by employed individuals from very traditional 
areas and that received by the rest. Interestingly enough, individuals in liberal and very 
liberal areas are 1% more likely to co-reside with their offspring than their counterparts 
living in very traditional areas. The effect is significant at 5% confidence level. The first 
column of Table 14 and Table 15 tell the same story, showing the predicted probabilities of 
receiving financial help and co-residence for employed individuals by family values areas.  
Second, the overall difference in the probability of receiving help in the event of an adverse 
change in employment status across family values areas is explained by an increase in both 
co-residence and financial help for individuals living traditional and very traditional areas. 
Note however that the increase in co-residence is higher than the increase in financial help. 
This is shown in Table 13 and Figure 7and Figure 8. Column 2 in Table 13 shows that 
individuals living in more traditional areas experience a higher increase in the probability 
                                                 
25 A third alternative would be to consider time help, for which the survey also has data. Nevertheless, 
given that the change considered is a negative employment one, basic descriptive statistics – not shown in 
the paper – suggest that time help decreases, as arguably children have more time to spend.  
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of co-residing than their counterparts living in more liberal areas. When an employment 
change occurs, they are between 9% and 11% more likely to start parental co-residence, 
compared to the much smaller effect seen among individuals living in more liberal areas. 
By contrast, column 1 shows that the probability of receiving financial help increases 
between 4% and 6% for individuals with more traditional family values. The comparative 
difference in reactions is illustrated in Figure 7, which shows the Average Marginal Effects 
of an adverse change in employment status on the probability of receiving financial help, 
and Figure 8, which shows the same effect on the probability of co-residence.  
Third, parents in more traditional areas increase the provision of both types of help when 
an adverse change in employment occurs, although the increase in co-residence is larger. 
By contrast, parents in more liberal areas barely increase help.  
Table 13 Average Marginal Effects of an adverse change in employment status on the 
probability of co-residence and receiving financial help for individuals living in 
regions with different family values. 
 (1) (2) 
 Financial help Co-residence 
Family values [base: v.Traditional)   
Traditional -0.000 0.003 
 (0.011) (0.006) 
Liberal 0.030 0.010 
 (0.019) (0.005)** 
V.Liberal 0.032 0.011 
 (0.019)* (0.005)** 
Not-employed effect 0.060 0.106 
V. Traditional (0.031)* (0.039)*** 
Not-employed effect 0.037 0.086 
Traditional (0.015)** (0.019)*** 
Not-employed effect 0.014 0.015 
Liberal (0.020) (0.009) 
Not-employed effect 0.023 -0.029 
V. Liberal (0.020) (0.010)*** 
Children’s controls Yes Yes 
Parents controls Yes Yes 
Country & region fixed effects Yes Yes 
Constant 0.206 0.224 
 (0.031)*** (0.062)*** 
R2 overall 0.07 0.16 
N 37,562 37,752 
Groups 27,730 27,830 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Robust clustered st. errors by country in parenthesis 
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Table 14 Predicted probabilities of receiving financial help before and after an 
adverse change in employment status, by family values 
Predicted probabilities of receiving financial help when an adverse 
change in employment status occurs 
 Employed Not-employed 
   
V. Traditional family values 0.12 0.18 
 (0.01)*** (0.03)*** 
   
Traditional family values 0.12 0.16 
 (0.00)*** (0.01)*** 
Comparison to prob for v.Traditional fv (0.01) (0.03) 
   
Liberal family values 0.15 0.16 
 (0.01)*** (0.01)*** 
Comparison to prob for v.Traditional fv (0.02) (0.03) 
   
V. liberal family values 0.15 0.17 
 (0.01)*** (0.02)*** 
Comparison to prob for v.Traditional fv (0.02)* (0.04) 
Obs 37,562 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis. The second row of standard errors and stars tells us 
the difference in probabilities compared to the probabilities of receiving help from 
individuals living in very traditional regions. 
 
Table 15 Predicted probabilities of co-residing with parents before and after an 
adverse change in employment status, by family values. 
Predicted probabilities of co-residing with parents when an adverse 
change in employment status occurs 
 Employed Not-employed 
   
V. Traditional family values 0.05 0.16 
 (0.00)*** (0.04)*** 
   
Traditional family values 0.05 0.14 
 (0.00)*** (0.02)*** 
Comparison to prob for v.Traditional fv (0.01) (0.03) 
   
Liberal family values 0.06 0.08 
 (0.00)*** (0.01)*** 
Comparison to prob for v.Traditional fv (0.01)** (0.04)* 
   
V. liberal family values 0.06 0.03 
 (0.00)*** (0.01)*** 
Comparison to prob for v.Traditional fv (0.01)** (0.03)*** 
Obs 37,752 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis. The second row of standard errors and stars tells 
us the difference in probabilities compared to the probabilities of receiving help from 
individuals living in very traditional regions. 
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Figure 7 Average Marginal Effects of an adverse change in employment status on the 
probability of receiving financial help, by family values. 
 
 
Figure 8 Average Marginal Effects of an adverse change in employment status on the 
probability of co-residence, by family values. 
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6. Robustness checks 
Three main robustness checks are carried out in this section. They pertain to the 
measurement of family values and potential omitted variables, as well as the measurement 
of the treatment effect.  
6.1. Measurement of family values 
In the previous section family values have been treated as a four-category variable, ranging 
from very traditional to very liberal. Results are very similar when binary family values 
variable is used instead. For each dependent variable, Tables 16-18 compare the main 
results in the previous section with the results produced using dichotomized family values. 
Table 16 shows the comparative results for help in general. In both cases (four-category 
variable and binary variable), the impact of an adverse change in employment on the 
probability of receiving help is dependent on family values, with individuals living in 
traditional areas experiencing significantly greater increase in the probability of receiving 
help than those living in areas with more liberal values.  
Table 17 shows the comparative results for financial help specifically. Again, the binary 
categorization of family values does not affect the overall result. As seen in the previous 
section, financial help increases with an adverse change in employment status for 
individuals living in more traditional areas.  
Finally, Table 18 shows the corresponding results for co-residence, which again are very 
similar regardless of whether the four-category or binary variable is used. Parents living in 
more traditional areas significantly increase their probability to offer co-residence when an 
adverse change in employment status occurs, whereas their counterparts living in more 
liberal areas do not undergo any significant change in co-residence patterns.  
6.2. Family values and potential omitted variables 
The results from the main analysis suggest that individuals from traditional areas are more 
likely to see an increase in the probability of co-residence in the event of an adverse change 
in employment status than their counterparts from more liberal areas. One critical issue 
here is to rule out the potential existence of omitted variables which affect co-residence 
patterns and/or vary in a systematic fashion across family values areas. The existing 
literature on co-residence patterns emphasises two main macroeconomic variables that 
impact co-residence levels: housing costs and unemployment rates (see for example 
Manacorda & Moretti, 2005) – two variables that could plausibly vary based on family 
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values area. For instance, it could be argued that higher unemployment rates are more 
prevalent where family values are more traditional. Indeed, Alesina et al. (2010) suggest 
that family ties make labour mobility costlier, and individuals with strong family ties will 
thus choose regulated labour markets which usually lead to lower employment. It could 
also be argued that housing costs are more expensive in areas where family values are more 
traditional, since countries with strong family ties have higher rates of homeownership 
(Castles & Ferrera, 1996). However, the link between family values and housing costs is 
relatively indirect with weak empirical evidence. With this in mind, I have compiled 
regional data on unemployment rates and housing costs from Eurostat26 and constructed a 
four-category variable for each measure to add to the regression. If either of these variables 
co-vary with family values areas, we would expect the latter to be insignificant.  
Results in Table 19 below demonstrate that the inclusion of these two variables does not 
render family values insignificant and results do not change significantly. Additionally, it 
seems to confirm that in the absence of an adverse change in employment status help 
provision is not statistically different across family values areas. 
Table 16 Average Marginal Effects of an adverse change in employment status on the 
probability of receiving general help for individuals living in regions with different 
family values. Comparison between four-category and binary family values. 
(1) (2) 
Four-category family values Binary family values 
Family values  
[base: v.Traditional) 
 Family values  
[base: traditional) 
 
Traditional 0.002   
 (0.011)   
Liberal 0.035 Liberal 0.023 
 (0.019)*  (0.02) 
V.Liberal 0.038   
 (0.020)*   
Not-employed effect 0.154 Not-employed effect 0.142 
V. Traditional (0.038)*** Traditional (0.03)*** 
Not-employed effect 0.133   
Traditional (0.022)***   
                                                 
26 Code for unemployment rates: [lfst_r_lfu3rt] - Unemployment rates by sex, age and NUTS 2 regions (%), 
from 25 years old or over and years 2004, 2006 and 2013. 
With regard to housing costs, I have taken the ratio of the allocation of primary income account of 
households by NUTS 2 regions on paid property income [code: nama_r_ehh2p] to disposable income of 
household at the same regional level [code: nama_r_ehh2inc]. Data was available until 2011, so I have taken 
data from 2004, 2006 and used 2011 data for year 2013. 
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(1) (2) 
Not-employed effect 0.023 Not-employed effect 0.014 
Liberal (0.023) Liberal (0.02) 
Not-employed effect -0.005   
V. Liberal (0.017)   
N 37,772 N 37,772 
Groups 27,844 Groups 27,844 
Note: all regressions include children and parental controls, country dummies and a constant. 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Robust clustered st. errors by country in parenthesis. 
 
Table 17 Average Marginal Effects of an adverse change in employment status on the 
probability of receiving financial help for individuals living in regions with different 
family values. Comparison between four-category and binary family values. 
(1) (2) 
Four-category family values Binary family values 
Family values  
[base: v.Traditional) 
 Family values  
[base: traditional) 
 
Traditional -0.000   
 (0.011)   
Liberal 0.030 Liberal 0.018 
 (0.019)  (0.02) 
V.Liberal 0.032   
 (0.019)*   
Not-employed effect 0.060 Not-employed effect 0.049 
V. Traditional (0.031)* Traditional (0.02)** 
Not-employed effect 0.037   
Traditional (0.015)**   
Not-employed effect 0.014 Not-employed effect 0.019 
Liberal (0.020) Liberal (0.01) 
Not-employed effect 0.023   
V. Liberal (0.020)   
N 37,562 N 37,562 
Groups 27,730 Groups 27,730 
Note: all regressions include children and parental controls, country dummies and a 
constant. 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Robust clustered st. errors by country in parenthesis. 
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Table 18 Average Marginal Effects of an adverse change in employment status on 
the probability of co-reside for individuals living in regions with different family 
values. Comparison between four-category and binary family values. 
(1) (2) 
Four-category family values Binary family values 
Family values  
[base: v.Traditional) 
 Family values  
[base: traditional) 
 
Traditional 0.003   
 (0.006)   
Liberal 0.010 Liberal 0.007 
 (0.005)**  (0.01)** 
V.Liberal 0.011   
 (0.005)**   
Not-employed effect 0.106 Not-employed effect 0.095 
V. Traditional (0.039)*** Traditional (0.03)*** 
Not-employed effect 0.086   
Traditional (0.019)***   
Not-employed effect 0.015 Not-employed effect -0.003 
Liberal (0.009) Liberal (0.01) 
Not-employed effect -0.029   
V. Liberal (0.010)***   
N 37,752 N 37,752 
Groups 27,830 Groups 27,830 
Note: all regressions include children and parental controls, country dummies and a constant. 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Robust clustered st. errors by country in parenthesis. 
 
Table 19 Average Marginal Effects of an adverse change in employment status on the 
probability of receiving general help, financial help or offer of co-residence for 
individuals living in regions with different family values. Inclusion of regional 
housing costs and unemployment rates in shaded columns. 
HELP TYPE General help Financial help Co-residence 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Fam. v. [base:v.Trad.)       
Traditional 0.002 -0.009 -0.000 -0.008 0.003 -0.000 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.006) (0.009) 
Liberal 0.035 0.016 0.030 0.015 0.010 0.005 
 (0.019)* (0.012) (0.019) (0.013) (0.005)** (0.008) 
V.Liberal 0.038 0.012 0.032 0.012 0.011 0.003 
 (0.020)* (0.012) (0.019)* (0.013) (0.005)** (0.009) 
Not-employed effect       
V. Traditional 0.154 0.148 0.060 0.051 0.106 0.106 
 (0.038)*** (0.041)*** (0.031)* (0.027)* (0.039)*** (0.046)** 
Traditional 0.133 0.135 0.037 0.041 0.086 0.085 
 (0.022)*** (0.023)*** (0.015)** (0.016)*** (0.019)*** (0.019)*** 
Liberal 0.023 0.031 0.014 0.019 0.015 0.018 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.009) (0.009)* 
V. Liberal -0.005 -0.003 0.023 0.024 -0.029 -0.028 
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HELP TYPE General help Financial help Co-residence 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.010)*** (0.011)*** 
N 37,772 34,275 37,562 34,075 37,752 34,255 
Groups 27,844 25,908 27,730 25,795 27,830 25,892 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Robust clustered st. errors by country in parenthesis. 
Note: all regressions include children and parents controls, country and regional dummies and a constant. 
Note columns: (1) No housing costs or unemployment rates included; (2) Housing costs and unemployment rates included 
 
6.3. Treatment on the treated 
The main analysis has focused on the average treatment effect, meaning that the expected 
value of those whose employment status has not changed has also been taken into account. 
This approach can arguably bias the impact of an adverse change in employment. 
Individuals who have never worked may in general receive much more help than those who 
have just stopped working. Including such subjects will therefore overestimate the impact 
of an adverse change in employment status.  
One way to overcome this potential overestimation effect is to only include individuals who 
have suffered an adverse change in employment status at some period of time – i.e., 
calculate the treatment on the treated. Note however, that this approach comes with one 
drawback: anticipation effects are likely to be exacerbated, leading instead to an 
underestimation of the effect of employment change on parental help. This is because those 
individuals who work in all time periods, and those who are arguably less prone to 
receiving help relative to those who suffer from an adverse change in employment at some 
period of time are excluded from the analysis. The calculation of the effect of the treatment 
on the treated is therefore useful as the lower bound effect, whereas the calculation of the 
average treatment effect could be considered as the upper bound effect.  
Table 20 shows the Average Marginal Effects (AME) of the treatment on the treated for 
general help, financial help and offer of co-residence. Only those individuals who suffer an 
adverse change in employment are included, which leaves us with around 1,000 
observations. For comparison, the table also includes the results from the previous analysis, 
showing the average treatment effect for general parental help (full model from Table 11, 
column 4), financial help and co-residence (Table 13). These results show that first, relative 
to the average treatment effect coefficients are smaller in all cases, and not statistically 
significant. This is consistent with the above-mentioned hypothesis that the effect of the 
treatment on the treated would be useful as the lower bound effect. Higher variance seen 
here may be due at least in part to the significant reduction in observations. Second, and 
more importantly, the trends are similar, especially in the case of general help and co-
residence patterns. Average increase in probability for these two types of help is greater for 
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very traditional and traditional parents than those with liberal and very liberal family 
values.  
Table 20 A comparison of the effect of the treatment on the treated and the average 
treatment effect for different types of help, by family values areas. 
 Treatment on the treated Average treatment effect 
 Gen. 
help 
Fin. 
help 
Co-resid. Gen. help Fin. help Co-resid. 
Very traditional 
0.099 -0.013 0.074 0.154 0.060 0.106 
(0.075) (0.057) (0.052) (0.038)*** (0.031)* (0.046)** 
Traditional 
0.044 0.033 0.017 0.133 0.037 0.085 
(0.025)* (0.022) (0.020) (0.022)*** (0.015)** (0.019)*** 
Liberal 
0.005 0.029 -0.013 0.023 0.014 0.018 
(0.020) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.009)* 
Very liberal 
0.006 0.004 -0.001 -0.005 0.023 -0.028 
(0.031) (0.025) (0.006) (0.017) (0.020) (0.011)*** 
Num. obs 1,056 37,772 37,562 37,752 
Note: all regressions include children and parental controls, country dummies and a constant. 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Robust clustered st. errors by country in parenthesis. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has examined the filtering effect of family values on parents’ decision to provide 
help for their adult children in the event of an adverse change in the latter’s employment 
status. Results suggest that after controlling for both institutional and economic 
environment, the effect of family values on help given is significant. Three main points are 
worth mentioning: first, parents from different family values areas have a similar likelihood 
of providing with any type of help when their child is employed. Second, when adult 
children experience an adverse change in employment status, parents from very traditional 
and traditional areas experience a 13-16% increase in their likelihood of provide help. 
Conversely, parents living in liberal and very liberal areas do not experience a significant 
increase in help given. Third, this heterogeneity across family values areas is driven by both 
co-residence and financial help pattern, although the increase in the former is higher.  
These findings add to three strands of literature. First, they contribute to the literature on 
culture and economics. The paper shows that family values are resilient even with a change 
in economic conditions. As demonstrated, with institutions controlled for, when an adverse 
change in employment status occurs, parents in more liberal family values areas are less 
likely to provide help to their offspring relative to those in more traditional areas. Within 
this literature, the role of culture on female labour force participation has been extensively 
analysed, and yet, the analysis of social policy has been generally neglected. By focusing on 
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intergenerational help, this paper sheds light on another aspect that intersects with labour 
force participation. 
Second, the paper contributes to the literature on social policy, and more specifically, to 
that on intergenerational contract. This literature has focused largely on the role played by 
public institutions on the provision of welfare surrounding the intergenerational contract 
– i.e., unemployment benefits and pensions among others. This has meant that the role of 
the family has sometimes been overlooked. This paper suggests that family, with a focus on 
parents, is still a relevant pillar when it comes to smoothing the effects of negative change 
in employment status on individuals. At the same time, it has shown that parental help 
decisions are filtered significantly by societal family values, which affect both the intensity 
and the type of help provided.       
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Chapter 4 Pace of return to work after childbirth: the effect of 
a parental leave policy reform and family values. 
Do family values affect the pace of return to work after childbirth?  
Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of the 2007 parental leave policy reform in Germany on the 
pace of return to work following childbirth for mothers with different family values 
background. Using data from before and after the reform and an epidemiological approach 
to family values, the paper demonstrates that the policy reform accelerated the pace of 
return to work mainly for mothers with traditional family values background, thus leading 
to overall convergence between mothers with different family values backgrounds. 
However, the magnitude of convergence differs across education levels. Mothers with 
vocational education exhibit high levels of convergence, followed by mothers with low 
education, who exhibit low but significant levels of convergence. Conversely, highly-
educated mothers diverge in their pace of return to work. This paper thus suggests that 
mothers with traditional family values background may use the educational system either 
as way to enhance their cultural investment or as a marriage market, and therefore will not 
be very sensitive to changes in economic incentives.  
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1. Introduction 
Female labour force participation has been on the rise across Europe and other developed 
economies over the last few decades. Several factors have contributed to this rise: the 
spread of durable household goods, medical advances in contraception, and broader access 
to childcare among others. And yet, even after accounting for these material and 
institutional changes, differences across societies remain salient. This has prompted 
economists to turn their attention to beliefs and values in order to account for cross-
country differences in labour market outcomes (see for example Aghion et al., 2011; A. 
Alesina & Giuliano, 2010; Algan & Cahuc, 2007; Fernandez, 2007).  
This paper investigates how a parental leave policy reform interacts with family values 
background to affect the pace of return to work after childbirth. The paper will show that 
the policy reform accelerated the pace of return to work mainly for mothers with traditional 
family values background, thus leading to overall convergence between mothers with 
different family values backgrounds. However, the magnitude of convergence differs across 
education levels. Among mothers with traditional family values background, it is those with 
vocational education and (to a lesser extent) low education who significantly accelerate 
their pace of return to work, therefore contributing to the aforementioned convergence. 
This is in stark contrast with highly-educated mothers, who do not react to the policy in any 
significant way. This lack of response, together with a strong reaction from highly-educated 
mothers with liberal family values, results in a divergence in the pace of return to work for 
highly-educated mothers with different family values. This finding is policy relevant as it 
points at the limits of labour market interventions in increasingly multicultural societies, 
and it speaks to the limitation of policy transfers. Furthermore, the findings from this paper 
may be of interest for countries which, having a low female labour force participation, 
attempt to replicate successful care policies of countries whose population has different 
family values on average. 
Establishing a causal effect of family values on female labour market participation is 
difficult because of omitted variable bias. In particular, mothers may choose to stay at home 
because of lower career aspirations, or because they are less successful, or for another 
reason that is difficult to identify and/or measure. I therefore use a natural experiment in 
Germany aimed at accelerating mothers’ pace of return to work after childbirth. This 2007 
policy reform incentivized an earlier return to work by reducing the paid parental leave 
subsidy from two to one year. In order to disentangle any possible institutional effects from 
the effects of family values, I use migrant population in Germany to compare the effect of 
the reform across mothers who have different migrant origin. This identification strategy 
is known in the literature as the epidemiological approach (Fernandez, 2010), and it is 
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especially useful in disentangling the institutional effects from the “cultural” ones. Migrant 
groups face the same institutional and economic environment as the native individuals in 
the country of residence, but they are assumed to preserve, to a certain extent, family values 
of their country of ancestry. Thus, individual migrants are assigned the historic family 
values of their country of ancestry, to avoid reverse causality problems.  
The analysis uses the cross-section form of the German Socio-Economic Panel data (GSOEP) 
for the years 2005 to 2009 – therefore including observations before and after the policy 
implementation. The paper discusses the potential anticipation effects that may give rise to 
biased results and runs some robustness checks to rule them out. In order to identify 
whether the reform has a different impact on mothers with different family values 
background, it interacts family values with a time dummy that represents the reform cut-
off point.   
This paper contributes to the literature on social economics by examining how family 
values affect the effectiveness of a policy reform, and by suggesting that the former is a 
factor that explains the lack of convergence across societies. Institutional economic 
approaches have either pointed to the persistence of inefficient formal institutions to 
explain this limited convergence or to the existence of different types of institutional 
settings corresponding to equally efficient labour market performance (Amable, 2003; R. 
Freeman & Schettkat, 2001; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Scharpf & Schmidt, 2000).  
But despite their vast contribution to the understanding behind the lack of convergence in 
economic outcomes, these approaches have arguably led to more questions. First, empirical 
analyses suggest that the residual is large even after accounting for differences in 
institutions (Del Boca, Pissarides, & Boeri, 2005). Second, the persistence of inefficient or 
different institutional settings cannot be fully understood unless beliefs and values are 
taken into consideration. This is particularly true for labour market institutions and policies 
that are closely related to family life, such as childcare and parental leave policies. 
Consequently, a growing body of research in the field of economics has turned to values, 
social norms and beliefs to explain the differences in institutions and economic outcomes. 
In this field, recent analyses on the persistence of certain labour market institutions 
support this view by showing that beliefs and values co-evolve with labour market 
regulations, reinforcing each other and creating multiple equilibria from which it is difficult 
to depart (Aghion et al., 2011; Aghion, Algan, Cahuc, & Shleifer, 2010).  
The acknowledgement of the existence of this two-way interaction between values and 
institutions broadly enhances our understanding of the persistence of such institutions. 
And yet, it does not tell us much about what would happen to female labour force 
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participation if this co-evolution were to be broken and instead, an institutional change in 
contradiction with the engrained values in society took place. And this is what this paper 
aims to do – it analyses whether the power of engrained family values is strong enough to 
dampen the effects of new institutional changes/policy reform on female labour force 
participation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the policy reform and 
section 3 explains the empirical strategy. Section 4 provides an explanation of the data used, 
and section 5 presents the results. Then finally, I conclude in section 6. 
2. Background 
2.1. An overview of Germany’s parental leave reforms 
Numerous parental policy reforms implemented in Germany in the past three decades 
reflect an ongoing conflict between the traditional breadwinner model and the dual-earner-
carer model, as can be seen in detail in Table 21. Women today enjoy 14 weeks of leave with 
full wage replacement (6 before the child is born and 8 after childbirth), but the 
introduction of maternity leave dates back to the 1920s. Then in 1979, parental leave 
period after the statutory maternal leave was implemented for the first time on the basis of 
protecting women’s health and well-being (Leitner, 2010). Subsequent reforms of the 
1980s and 1990s were to a great extent the continuation of the traditional breadwinner 
model (see Fleckenstein, 2011; Leitner, 2010 for a review of the main reforms). This 
changed at the start of the twenty-first century, when new reforms began to acknowledge 
the individual right to parental leave by permitting both parents to take leave 
simultaneously, allowing for some part-time work. There was also a commitment to expand 
childcare facilities for children under the age of 3. By the end of 2006 (and before the 2007 
reform), employed and non-employed new mothers and fathers were paid a means-tested, 
flat-rate benefit of up to €300 per month for two years. Additionally, parents were allowed 
an unpaid parental leave period of one more year with part-time work permitted. 
The 2007 reform – called Elterngeld – represented a further step away from the traditional 
breadwinner model. It replaced the flat-rate benefit with a wage-replacement benefit of up 
to 67% of earnings before maternity leave, funded by the federal government through 
public taxation (Blum, 2012). A cap of €1800 with a minimum of €300 was set, and the non-
employed were entitled to this minimum. Perhaps more importantly, the reform also 
decreased the benefit span from two years to one year, and committed resources to the 
expansion of childcare facilities. 
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2.2. The expected benefits of the 2007 parental leave reform 
The Elterngeld policy was deliberately designed to alter the work behaviour of both low- 
and high-income mothers. Prior to the reform, low-income mothers were entitled to a 
maximum of €300 per month, whereas after the reform, they were entitled to 67% of their 
pre-maternal earnings with a minimum of €300 – a substantial increase in benefit. 
However, employed low-income mothers experienced a total elimination of the benefit in 
the second year. The work behaviour of high-income employed mothers is more likely to 
change in the first year versus the second year. Before the reform, high-income mothers did 
not receive any benefit.  Following the reform, they would receive 67% of their earnings 
during the first year (with a cap of €1800) and nothing in the second year.   
The argument this paper makes is that preferences to work are likely to be influenced not 
only by the reform, but also by family values. As Bork states in his paper (2011), attitudes 
towards working mothers in Germany have been rather negative over the years, especially 
in West Germany. A term has even been coined to describe working mothers with young 
children: ‘Rabenmütter’ (raven mother). Fleckenstein (2011) makes a similar point in his 
paper when he argues that, despite a decline in traditional family values, ‘West Germany 
remains relatively conservative by international standards’ (p. 548). Therefore, this paper 
suggests that the impact of the reform on the pace of return to work will differ depending 
on the mothers’ family values background.   
Table 21 Parental policy reforms in Germany since 1970s. 
Year of reform 1979 1986 1993 2000 2007 
Duration of paid 
parental leave (in 
months) 
6 months 10 months 24 months 24 months 12-14 months 
Duration of non-
paid parental 
leave (in months) 
- - 12 months 12 months 22-24 months 
Total duration of 
parental leave (in 
months) 
6 months 10 months 36 months 36 months 36 months 
Benefits 
- Capped-
earning related  
- Partner's 
earnings not 
accounted 
- Flat-rate benefits 
- Partner's earnings 
accounted 
- Flat-rate  
- Higher if 
benefit span 
reduced from 2 
to 1 year 
- Wage-
replacement up 
to 67% wage. 
- Capped at 
€1,800 
- Minimum of € 
300. 
Target 
Formerly 
employed 
mothers 
Employed and non-
employed mothers 
Employed and 
non-employed 
mothers 
- Employed 
- The non-
employed are 
entitled to the 
minimum 
benefit 
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Year of reform 1979 1986 1993 2000 2007 
Part-time work not allowed 
allowed: up to 18-19 
hours week 
allowed: up to 
30 hours week 
allowed: up to 
30 hours week 
Parental leave for 
fathers 
not allowed allowed 
allowed, and 
simultaneously 
with the 
mother 
allowed, and 
simultaneously 
with the 
mother 
Source: own elaboration, based on Leitner (2010) and Ostner, Reif, Schmitt & Turba (2003). 
Notes: This table shows how the different reforms affected the period of paid and non-paid parental leave, 
the calculation of the benefits, the potential beneficiaries and whether part-time work was allowed.  
3. Empirical and identification strategy  
3.1. Identifying the effects of the policy reform 
Two main identification issues are discussed. The first one relates to isolating the effect of 
the policy from other existing trends. The second one relates to anticipation effects.  
As mentioned above, the paper is interested in analysing whether the policy reform has 
different effects on the pace of return to work for mothers with different family values 
background. In other words, the interest is on the interaction term between the policy 
reform and family values, as opposed to the effect of the policy per se. In order to be able to 
infer that it is the effect of the policy that it is being measured - and not other potentially 
confounding trends - it is important to check that the trends of the two groups before the 
policy are similar. Figure 9 shows the months of total leave taken by mothers in 2005 and 
2006, which shows a similar trend (as well as a similar level of average leave). 
Figure 9. Trend in average parental leave taken by mothers with different family 
values before the 2007 policy reform. 
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With regard to anticipation effects, the analysis is likely to lead to reliable estimates insofar 
as the parents do not change their fertility behaviour as a consequence of anticipating the 
reform. Two changes in fertility behaviour are considered. One refers to the aggregate 
number of births in the preceding and succeeding years. Could parents anticipate the 
reform and give birth before January 2007 in order to get a longer parental leave subsidized 
period? If that was possible, our estimates could overestimate the impact of the policy, as 
those mothers who would have preferred longer leave could have given birth before the 
policy was implemented. As Bergemann and Riphahn (2010) and Kluve and Tamm (2009) 
suggest, this seems rather implausible, as the legislation process was fast enough to prevent 
fertility behaviour to be affected. The main features of the reform were discussed in May 
2006 and drafted in June. Then, the law was passed in September 2006 before going into 
effect on 1 January 2007 (J. T. Kluve, M., 2009). Error! Reference source not found. also 
shows that there is no sign of aggregate number of births spiking in 2006. 
There is however another plausible change in fertility behaviour, which is the timing of 
birth for those births which had to take place around the implementation of the policy. 
Parents could potentially try to either schedule births forward or delay them by some days, 
depending on their incentives to do so.  The Elterngeld reform is suggested to have different 
effects on households depending on their income level and the labour force participation of 
the mother. In general, high income households or households where women were working 
before childbirth would receive more benefit payments with the reform than prior to it. The 
opposite was true for low income households or households where women were not 
working before childbirth (Bergemann & Riphahn, 2010; Tamm, 2013).  
In effect, Figure 10 below shows the number of monthly births from 2004 to 2009 and it 
seems to suggest that the number of births was higher in January 2007 than in December 
2006 compared to other years. This result is also confirmed by Tamm (2013), in a paper 
where he concludes that more than 1,000 parents postponed the delivery of their children 
from December 2006 until January 2007. In order to account for this possible bias, the 
paper includes a robustness check where the observations from January 2007 and 
December 2006 are dropped. The results remain the same.  
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Figure 10. Birth by months across years. 
 
Source: German Federal Statistical office 
3.2. Identifying the effects of family values 
The paper’s main interest is to understand whether the reform affected the length of 
parental leave depending on the family values background of the mother. The difference in 
the level of impact across groups is then captured by an interaction term between family 
values and a time dummy. Family values background, and more generally ‘cultural factors’ 
are nonetheless difficult to identify. In the past decades an increasing availability of survey 
data has made it easier for values to be identified.  
However, identification problems still remain, not least because of the difficulty of 
disentangling the effects of formal institutions and economic circumstances from values 
and culture. In this sense some notable advancements have been made within the literature 
of social economics with the use of the so-called epidemiological approach. This approach 
uses migrants to isolate the effects of values and culture. Migrant groups face the same 
institutional and economic environment as the native individuals in the country of 
residence, but they are assumed to preserve, to a certain extent, family values of their 
country of ancestry. Thus, and using survey data, individual migrants are assigned the 
family values of their country of ancestry, and in order to avoid reverse causality problems, 
historic data is used.  
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There are several different ways of proxying family values within the epidemiological 
literature27. Carroll, Rhee and Rhee (1994) use a dummy variable for the immigrant’s home 
country region. As Fernandez (2007) points out, this has the drawback of not being clear 
on what is being measured, and why it matters that someone is from a different country or 
region. Fernandez and Fogli (2009) use the female labour force participation rates of the 
country of ancestry as cultural proxies. These rates are likely to reflect individual factors as 
well as economic, institutional and cultural factors of the country. Then, as Fernandez 
(2007) points out, if these rates have explanatory power for why, in a certain country, 
“women from one ancestry work more than women from another ancestry after controlling 
for their individual economic attributes, only the cultural contribution to this variable can 
be responsible” (p. 312).  
Nevertheless, this choice also comes with some drawbacks. For example, female labour 
force participation rates in one country with traditional family values may be very high due 
to high female wages. In this case, female labour force participation rates would not be an 
accurate representation of existing family values (Fernandez & National Bureau of 
Economic Research., 2010). Another alternative suggested and used by Fernandez in some 
of her papers (see for example Fernandez & National Bureau of Economic Research., 2007) 
is to proxy family values with attitudes towards women with children and work expressed 
by individuals in the migrant’s country of origin in previous years, in order to avoid reverse 
causality. This approach follows a similar logic to that stated above. Attitudes towards 
women and work in the country of ancestry may reflect individual factors as well as 
economic and institutional ones. If these attitudes are useful proxies for attitudes of women 
from the same country of origin who live in another country (with different economic 
circumstances and institutional settings), then it suggests that cultural aspects of these 
attitudes has explanatory power. 
The observations included in the analysis are women who have given birth at some point 
between 2005 and 2009. The inclusion of these years allows the inclusion of an acceptable 
number of observations and at the same time it accounts for potential delays in behavioural 
changes.  
The paper therefore runs a series of logit specifications of the following type: 
 
P(yit=1) = α + β1Tit + β2fvj + β3 Titfvj+ β4Xi +ε                                                                 (2)  
 
                                                 
27 For a thorough discussion on the epidemiological approach see Fernandez (2010). 
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where yit is mother i’s labour market outcome (i.e., the probability of preferring a fast return 
to work after maternity). Tit stands for the timeframe (i.e., whether the observation takes 
place before or after the policy), fvj is a proxy for the family values of each individual who 
can hold either traditional or liberal family values, Titfvj is the interaction between the time 
dummy and family values, and Xit includes a set of individual characteristics as controls. 
Standard errors are clustered by country of origin. 
4. Data 
The data used in the analysis come from the German Socio-economic panel data (GSOEP)28, 
an annual longitudinal dataset (available from 1984 through 2011, the latest wave) which 
interviews all members of the household, including newcomers and leavers in new 
households. The GSOEP has gradually increased its sample over the years, with some of the 
increase attributable to a focus on migrants (see Appendix K for details on sample). The 
present analysis examines women who work and have had a child in one of the years from 
2005 to 2009 (see coding of childbirth in Appendix K). After dropping missing observations 
and coding all of the necessary variables, 300 to 450 observations remain (depending on 
the specification). 
4.1. Dependent variable 
The policy is intended to reduce the number of months mothers spend on parental leave by 
up to one year (twelve months). Therefore, the variable of interest would ideally be the 
number of months spent in parental leave. Unfortunately, the dataset only provides 
information on the total number of months spent on maternity and parental leave together. 
Given that maternity leave is compulsory for eight weeks following childbirth (and only 
optional for a maximum of six weeks preceding childbirth), the cut-off point of interest will 
be fourteen months (rather than twelve), to accounting for a minimum two extra months 
attributable to this compulsory maternity leave. With fourteen months thus as the cut-off 
point, the dependent variable – total number of months in maternity and parental leave – 
can be dichotomized either as a fast or a slow return: fast if the mother returns within 
fourteen months, and slow if she returns after fourteen months. To avoid misclassifying 
mothers who spend some or all of six optional weeks of maternity leave before childbirth 
as “slow returners,” robustness checks are performed with the cut-off point set at fifteen 
months. 
                                                 
28 The data used in this paper were extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz v4.0 (Oct 2012) for 
Stata. PanelWhiz was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@panelwhiz.eu). The PanelWhiz 
generated DO file to retrieve the SOEP data used here, and any Panelwhiz Plugins are available upon 
request. Any data or computational errors in this paper are my own. Haisken-DeNew and Hahn (2010) 
describe PanelWhiz in detail. 
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4.2. Independent variable 
The main independent variables are family values and a time variable to identify an 
observation as before or after the reform. 
Family values  
This paper proxies family values with attitudes towards women with children and work 
expressed by individuals in the migrant’s country of origin in previous years. For this 
purpose it first identifies the country of origin of each individual, and then it relies on 
attitudinal survey data to assign corresponding family values to the same individuals. The 
country of origin is detailed in the GSOEP dataset, which provides each individual’s 
migration background with the categories being “no migration background”, “direct 
migration background” (i.e., first generation migrant), or “indirect migration background” 
(i.e., second generation migrant). For individuals with direct and indirect migration 
background, the country of origin and the parental country of origin are provided. The 
dataset also contains information to differentiate observations from East and West 
Germany. Therefore, those observations with “no migration background” would be coded 
as natives from either East or West Germany (see Appendix A  for details). 
With the information on migration background gathered, data from the 1990s waves29 of 
the World Value Survey (WVS, 2006)  and the European Value Survey (EVS) are used to 
construct a proxy for family values. First, a question related to women, children and work 
is chosen: ‘Do you agree with the following statement? A working mother can establish just 
as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work’30. Then, 
I look at how the country of origin affects the response to this question, controlling for other 
relevant variables such as age, age squared, size of town, marital status, sex, and education. 
Following Fernandez (2007) I perform an individual probit regression, with the response 
to the question as the dependent variable and country dummies as the main independent 
variable to isolate the effect. The base ‘country’ is ‘West Germany’ and the country dummy 
coefficients are used as a proxy for the independent variable. That is, these coefficients 
estimate the likelihood that an individual from a certain country or region will agree with 
the previous statement compared to an individual from West Germany.  Figure 11 depicts 
the results. All coefficients are statistically significant (most of them at 1% significance 
level) with the exception of Macedonia, Australia and Spain.  
                                                 
29 Mostly the wave 1995-1998.  
30 Data for this question is not available for the following countries of origin in my sample: Austria, 
Switzerland, Iran, Bolivia, Tunisia, Cuba, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Eritrea, Uzbekistan. This amounts to 
around 20 observations. 
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Figure 11 effects of country of origin on ‘working mother’ acceptance 
 
Source: World Values Survey (wave 1995-1998) and European Values Survey (1999). 
Note: the bars represent the effect of country/region dummies on the attitudinal question 
selected relative to people with ancestors from West Germany, the excluded region. The 
dependent variable is as follows: ‘Do you agree with the following statement? A working mother 
can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not 
work’. Therefore, a coefficient of, say, 1.202 (Portugal), suggests that an average individual from 
Portugal is 20% more likely to agree with the statement than an average individual from West 
Germany. 
 
Before proceeding, it is important to confirm that these country coefficients are a good 
proxy for family values of the individuals in the study sample because while family values 
are thought to change slowly, it may be that family values of first and second-generation 
individuals in the 2000s have completely evolved from the family values of individuals in 
their country of origin in the 1990s.  To check, I compare the country coefficients derived 
with the current family values of first and second-generation migrants in Germany. A high 
correlation would suggest that the proxy used – family values expressed by individuals in 
the migrant’s country of ancestry in the 1990s – is a good one.  
To obtain the current family values of first and second generation migrants in Germany I 
use the German sample of the European Social Survey (ESS) database (ESS, 2004, 2010) for 
the years 2004 and 2010 – that is, before and after the policy reform. In an ideal scenario, I 
would find the same question from the WVS in the ESS database, run an individual-level 
probit regression with the question as a dependent variable and country dummies as the 
main independent variable, then compare these coefficients with the country coefficients 
of the proxy used. Unfortunately, the ESS does not include the same statement on working 
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mothers as the one found in the WVS. But it does include a similar question, namely: 
‘Women should be prepared to cut down on paid work for sake of family”. Furthermore, the 
ESS also includes another question about job scarcity – ‘men should have more right to 
women to work when job is scarce’ – which is also included in the WVS in several waves. 
These two questions are used to run a similar individual-level probit regression as the one 
described above, with the country dummies as the main independent variable. Because the 
German ESS sample of first and second-generation migrants is rather small, only those 
countries with more than twenty observations are retained (the result is also robust if only 
those countries with more than fifty observations are kept) to carry out the analysis, which 
leaves nine countries for each question31.  The resulting correlation between the 
coefficients from this regression for both questions and the coefficients from the previous 
regression using the WVS is very strong at around 0.80. This suggests that family values 
with regard to women, children and work have not evolved in a very substantial way, and 
therefore the proxy used in the study is valid.  
The initial country coefficients are then assigned to the individuals in my sample who have 
migration background from the relevant country. For those with indirect migrant 
background, the mother’s migrant origin is used32. Each observation is then assigned either 
traditional or liberal family values background according to whether the value is below or 
above the mean value. Following Fernandez (2007), observations with indirect migration 
background whose parents came from a country that became a centrally planned economy 
during World War II (11 observations) are dropped. This is because there may be a 
possibility that their parents emigrated during or before this time, and therefore it would 
not be accurate to assign them the values of these countries in 1990. The following table, 
Table 22, shows the migration background and the number of observations. Unfortunately, 
as the table shows, most of the observations are from East and West Germany, weakening 
the effect of the epidemiological approach.  
  
                                                 
31 These countries are: Austria, Serbia, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Italy, Poland, Romania, Russia and 
Turkey, altogether adding up to roughly 500 observations aside from West and East Germany, with roughly 
5,000 observations. 
32 Father’s country of origin differs from that of the mother in only five observations. Empirical results (not 
shown in the paper) do not change when mother’s country of origin is substituted with that of the father.  
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Table 22 Country of origin of observations 
No migration 
background 
East Germany 145  
West Germany 401  
Direct migration background 84 
Turkey, Greece, Italy, Austria*, 
France, USA, Rumania, Poland, 
Iran*, Hungary,  Bolivia*, 
Portugal, Czech Republic, Russia, 
Philippines, Tunisia*, Cuba*, 
Brazil*, China, Moldova, 
Kazakhstan*, Lebanon*, Ukraine, 
Eritrea*, Uzbekistan*, The 
Netherlands, Croatia, Bosnia, 
Macedonia, Slovakia, Kosovo, 
Serbia,  
Indirect migration background 48 
Turkey, Greece, Italy, France, 
Portugal, Australia,  
TOTAL 678  
Source: own elaboration based on GSOEP.  
Note: this table shows the migration background of the sample. The indirect migration background shows the 
mother’s country of origin. Countries with asterisk do not have information on family values from the WVS. 
 
Time variable 
As noted earlier, the other independent variable of interest is the time variable, with the 
value of 0 assigned for years before the policy (years 2005 and 2006), and 1 assigned for 
years after the policy (years 2007 to 2009). The analysis also includes an interaction term 
between family values and the time variable (the difference-in-difference estimator). 
4.3. Control variables  
Several control variables are included in the regression, including those pertaining to the 
individual and the partner, as well as regional fixed effects. A good selection of controls is 
critical to make a persuasive argument that family values matter. This is because, as 
Fernandez (2010) points out, many of these controls may be influenced by the individual’s 
family values. For example, with working behaviour, family values are likely to influence an 
individual’s education as well as her choice of partner (more specifically, the partner’s age, 
education, and/or income). Therefore, failure to include such variables can raise doubts on 
what the family values proxy is measuring. By including those same variables, we ensure 
that – borrowing Fernandez’s words – what is effectively being tested is “whether [family 
values] have an influence on work outcomes beyond the ways in which it is already 
reflected in these choices” (2010). Mother’s education is therefore included using the 1997 
ISCED classification, further grouped into elementary, vocational, and higher education 
categories33. For partners, age, education (using the same classification as the mother) and 
                                                 
33 The 1997 ISCED classification available in the dataset is as follows: general elementary, middle 
vocational, vocational plus abitur, higher vocational and higher education. This more disaggregated 
categorization does not give different results (results not shown).   
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net income are included. Other variables that are likely to be orthogonal to family values 
and exert an influence on working behaviour are the age of the mother, marital status, net 
household income and the presence of children younger than 16 years old at home. 
Measurement of these variables is included in Table 3. Regional fixed effects have also been 
included to account for regional institutional differences such as availability of childcare, 
tax incentives, and other influences. 
4.4. Descriptive statistics  
Table 23 presents some basic descriptive statistics of the data before and after the policy. 
The data reveals statistically significant differences in the means of revealed preferences, 
with mothers accelerating their pace of return to work after the policy. With regard to the 
independent and control variables, there are no significant differences between the two 
periods (i.e., before and after the policy), with the exception of number of children younger 
than 16 at home – there are more individuals with children at home after the policy than 
before the policy. The data also shows a bias towards observations with more traditional 
family values. The average maternal age is around 31 years old, and most of the 
observations in both periods are married. Average household income amounts to 
approximately €2800 per month, and the average level of educational attainment for the 
sample is vocational training. With regard to partner’s characteristics, they tend to be 
slightly older than their spouses, with a similar average education and a mean net income 
of around €2000 a month.  
Table 23 Descriptive statistics 
 Measurement 
Before the 
reform 
2005-2006 
 
After the reform 
2007-2009 
Number of 
children born 
 
269  277 
Variables  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Pace to return to 
work (0/1) 
Categorical:  
[0] – within 14 months 
[1] – after 14 months. 
0.39*** 0.49  0.53*** 0.50 
Family values (0/1) 
Categorical:  
[0] – traditional family 
values 
[1] – liberal family 
values 
0.41 0.49  0.33 0.47 
Age Continuous 31.15 6.04  31.69 5.32 
Marital status (0/1) 
Categorical:  
[0] –separated, single, 
divorced, widowed 
[1] – married 
0.67 0.47  0.71 0.46 
Net income 
household 
Continuous 
2860.57 1558.6  2789.48 1182.25 
Net income 
household (0/1) 
Categorical:  
0.47 0.50  0.52 0.50 
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 Measurement 
Before the 
reform 
2005-2006 
 
After the reform 
2007-2009 
[0] – below the median 
(€2,500) 
[1] – above the median. 
Education (0, 1, 2) 
Categorical:  
[0] – elementary 
[1] – vocational 
[2] – higher education. 
1.13 0.61  1.20 0.58 
Children<16 at 
home (1/2) 
Categorical:  
[1] – yes 
[2] – no 
1.39** 0.49  1.31** 0.46 
Partner age Continuous 34.5 6.68  34.9 6.22 
Number of 
children born 
 
269  277 
Variables  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Partner education 
(0, 1, 2) 
Categorical:  
[0] – elementary 
[1] – vocational 
[2] – higher education 
1.18 0.63  1.22 0.59 
Partner net income Continuous 1990.98 1130.87  1952.02 1079.9 
Partner net income 
(0/1) 
Categorical:  
[0] – below the median 
(€2,500) 
[1] – above the median. 
0.50 0.50  0.48 0.50 
Note: this table contains descriptive statistics from the main variables used in the regression analysis.  T-
tests indicate statistically significant differences between subgroups at 1% and 5% levels.  
5. Empirical analysis and results 
The structure of the empirical analysis is as follows: the first section focuses on the 
aggregate effects of the 2007 Elterngeld policy reform on mothers with different family 
values background. Table 24 and Table 25 present the results of the empirical analysis. All 
regressions use a logit model in which the dependent variable is the probability of returning 
to work after childbirth within 14 months. The results are presented in terms of Average 
Marginal Effects (AME) and predicted probabilities. Then, the second section examines the 
role of education and its interaction with family values background in greater detail. Finally, 
the section concludes with robustness checks.  
5.1. The aggregate effects of the Elterngeld policy reform 
Parameter estimates of the policy reform are presented in Table 24. The first column 
presents the results from estimation of the impact of the variables of interest – namely, 
family values and policy reform – on the pace of return to work. Column 2 adds the 
interaction effect between family values background and the policy reform, and columns 3 
and 4 add on individual controls and partner’s controls, respectively. Finally, column 5 
shows the results with regional dummies added to account for regional institutional 
differences such as availability of childcare, tax incentives and other influences.  
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These results show that first, family values background is consistently significant 
throughout the different iterations of the model. Column 5 (the full model) suggests that 
before the policy reform, mothers from a more liberal family background are around 15% 
more likely to return to work at a faster pace than mothers from a more traditional family 
background. Second, the reform has had a significant effect of accelerating the pace of 
return to work for all mothers; this result in line with existing literature on the effect of the 
Elterngeld reform (see for example Bergemann and Rhiphan, 2010). Third, the magnitude 
of this effect is dependent on family values background, albeit not in the direction that this 
paper initially suggested. The policy has had a stronger effect on mothers with traditional 
family background relative to mothers with liberal family background. Specifically, the 
former are 21% more likely to return to work within 14 months of taking parental leave 
than before the policy. This figure is in contrast with 10% for mothers with a liberal family 
background. The combination of these three findings suggests that while mothers with 
traditional family background returned to work at a slower pace than mothers with liberal 
family background before the policy, this difference has practically disappeared after the 
policy, resulting in a convergence of the pace of return to work for mothers from different 
family values background.  
Table 24 Average Marginal Effects (AME) of parental leave reform policy on the 
probability of return to work within 14 months for mothers holding different family 
values. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Fv: [0]tradit; [1] liberal 0.076*** 0.108*** 0.102*** 0.174*** 0.145*** 
before the policy (0.028) (0.026) (0.038) (0.048) (0.052) 
Policy treatment 0.156***     
Average (0.018)     
Policy treatment  0.183*** 0.201*** 0.222*** 0.214*** 
Traditional fv  (0.034) (0.048) (0.041) (0.037) 
Policy treatment  0.118*** 0.134*** 0.119*** 0.103* 
Liberal fv  (0.026) (0.022) (0.040) (0.057) 
Age   -0.067** -0.102*** -0.145*** 
   (0.028) (0.030) (0.039) 
Age sq   0.001** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Marital st [base:single]   -0.011 0.081* 0.101* 
   (0.023) (0.049) (0.059) 
Dummy net income median   0.025 0.164*** 0.165*** 
   (0.033) (0.030) (0.033) 
Educ [base: elementary]   0.020 0.119 0.138** 
Vocational   (0.046) (0.101) (0.065) 
Educ [base: elementary]   0.110 0.216*** 0.217*** 
Higher educ   (0.068) (0.064) (0.071) 
Childr<16 at home   0.093*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 
   (0.031) (0.028) (0.036) 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
This finding is corroborated by examining the predicted probabilities of return to work. As 
Table 25 and Figure 12 show, mothers from a traditional family background had a 29% 
probability of going back to work within 14 months before the policy, which is significantly 
lower than 46% probability for mothers from a liberal family background. The confidence 
intervals in Figure 12 suggest that this difference is significant. However, after the 
Elterngeld policy reform the picture changes: mothers from a traditional family background 
now have a 50% probability of going back to work within 14 months, which is only 5% 
lower than mothers with a liberal family background. And as Figure 12 shows, this 
difference is not statistically significant.  
These results are robust to the addition of several control variables. In particular, the effect 
of family background on the probability of returning to work remains significant after 
controlling for mother’s education and partner characteristics. Mother’s education has a 
significant influence on the probability of accelerating the pace of return to work, 
something that was both expected and in line with the literature on human capital. Age has 
a strong negative relationship with working behaviour, with the probability of accelerating 
the pace of return to work decreasing by 14% with each year. Being married has a positive 
but barely significant effect on work behaviour. With regard to partner’s characteristics, 
net income is the most relevant variable. Women with high-income partners are less likely 
to accelerate their pace of return to work relative to women with low-income partners. At 
the same time, women with a high net household income are more likely to accelerate their 
pace of return to work. But the dataset shows a strong correlation between net household 
income and partner’s income to the tune of 0.73%, suggesting that the effects are likely to 
at least partially offset in the sample. Partner’s education is statistically insignificant and 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age partner    0.009*** 0.012*** 
    (0.003) (0.004) 
Educ partner [base: 
elementary] 
   0.060 0.035 
Vocational    (0.136) (0.103) 
Educ partner [base: 
elementary] 
   0.049 0.048 
Higher educ    (0.142) (0.106) 
Dummy net income 
median hubs 
   -0.151*** -0.116** 
    (0.052) (0.051) 
Regional fixed effects no no no no yes 
Observations 455 455 430 308 307 
Log pseudo likelihood -304.6 -307.3 -285.8 -195.5 -184.1 
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.13 
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age is significant with an increase in one year having a 1% effect on the probability of 
accelerating the pace of return to work. Given the strong correlation between mother’s age 
and partner’s age (75%), coupled with significantly stronger effect of mother’s age over 
partner’s age, the effect of the latter does not seem to change the picture in a substantial 
way. Finally, having children below sixteen years old at home increases the probability of 
having a faster return to work.  
Table 25 Predicted probabilities of return to work within 14 months 
Predicted Probability of return to work within 14 months 
Before policy  
Traditional family values 0.285*** 
 (0.033) 
Liberal family values 0.457*** 
 (0.033) 
After policy  
Traditional family values 0.500*** 
 (0.025) 
Liberal family values 0.559*** 
 (0.028) 
  
Observations 307 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Figure 12 Predicted probability of return to work within 14 months 
 
5.2. Considering heterogeneity effects: the role of education for women with different family 
backgrounds  
Convergence in the pace of return to work between mothers with different family 
backgrounds suggests that pre-policy differences in their choice of work can be minimized 
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by affecting their economic incentives. In other words, it can be suggested that while family 
values matter, economic incentives such as those created by policy reforms can diminish 
their significance. In this section, we suggest that this convergence in the pace of return to 
work between mothers with different family values background is subject to the mother's 
level of education.  
One strand of literature on education and female labour force participation argues that 
education strengthens the attachment of women to the labour market by increasing their 
potential earnings and reducing the scope of specialization within the couple (Jaumotte, 
2003). Furthermore, highly educated women in higher level occupations face higher 
opportunity costs when taking leaves from work because their jobs are more typically 
characterized by career ladders and deferred rewards (Smeaton, 2006). Therefore, the 
effect of the policy should be driven mainly by highly-educated mothers. Given the stronger 
initial predisposition of mothers with liberal family values to go back to work earlier and 
the convergence (in the pace of return to work) achieved after the policy, one would expect 
highly-educated mothers with traditional family background to be the ones reacting most 
strongly to the policy.  
This view is in contrast with another perspective which emphasizes the heterogeneous 
effects of education on female labour force participation based on different ‘lifestyle 
preferences’. This literature (see for reference the work of Hakim, 2000) argues that 
regarding education as an investment in human capital is useful in understanding why most 
men and some women choose to pursue higher education. But in doing so, it fails to explain 
the decisions of ‘home-centred’ women who place priority on children and family life over 
work. This group of women may choose not to work outside home or defer work until they 
get married and/or have children. They can also return to work under certain 
circumstances: at few hours a week, under pleasant social contacts, and/or nearby home 
(Hakim, 2000, p. p.159). And yet, contrary to what is often assumed in economics, home-
centred women do not necessarily have low educational attainment. Education is regarded 
as a cultural investment or even as a means to enter the marriage market (Hakim, 2000, p. 
p.160), and as a consequence, they are more likely to choose non-vocational education 
paths. This line of reasoning suggests that in effect, the policy reform is unlikely to have a 
significant effect on highly-educated mothers with traditional family background. In terms 
of convergence, this implies that convergence can still happen in aggregate, mostly due to 
the effects of the policy on mothers with traditional family values who hold low or 
vocational education. However, highly-educated mothers with different family values may 
not experience a convergence in the pace of return to work, and may even experience 
divergence if those with liberal family background react strongly to the policy.  
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The results below confirm that education is understood in different terms depending on 
the family background of the mother. As a result, women sharing similar levels of education 
have reacted differently to the policy depending on their family values background. Figure 
13 (and table in Appendix L) shows the average marginal effects for the main variables 
based on the level of education. For mothers with traditional family background, the impact 
of the policy is stronger when they have vocational education: with vocational education, 
their probability of accelerating return to work is about 32%, compared to 14% for low 
educated and null for highly educated. Conversely, for mothers with liberal family 
background the effect is only significant for the highly-educated group. This group has a 
25% probability of accelerating their return to work. Mothers with vocational training do 
not significantly accelerate their return to work after the policy, and the effect on mothers 
with low education is uncertain, as the variation is too large to draw meaningful 
conclusions.  
Figure 13 Average Marginal Effects of the policy reform on the probability to return 
of work within 14 months. 
 
 
A note of caution must be added here. The variation of the effect among highly-educated 
mothers with traditional family background is quite large, suggesting a more 
heterogeneous response from this group relative to their counterparts with liberal family 
backgrounds. However, the predicted probabilities in Table 26 and Figure 14 suggest that 
the policy has exacerbated the difference in the pace of return to work among highly 
educated mothers in a statistically significant way. After the policy, highly-educated 
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mothers with a liberal family background have almost 80% probability of accelerating their 
return to work, compared to 40% probability for their counterparts with traditional family 
background. For those in the other two categories of education – and especially for 
vocational education – the effect has been one of convergence.  
Table 26 Predicted Probability of return to work within 14 months 
  
 Before policy After the policy 
Low education   
Traditional fv 0.13 0.28 
Liberal fv 0.56 0.50 
   
Vocational education   
Traditional fv 0.26 0.57 
Liberal fv 0.42 0.42 
   
Higher education   
Traditional fv 0.40 0.41 
 Liberal fv. 0.50 0.76 
   
Observations 307 307 
Note: all values are significant at 1% level except for the ones related  
to the low educated with traditional family values, significant at 5% level. 
 
Figure 14 Predicted probabilities of return to work within 14 months 
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6. Robustness checks 
This section conducts robustness checks on the results above. These checks show that, 
firstly, an alternative measurement of the dependent variable does not significantly change 
results. Secondly, an analysis of income is performed in order to rule out that this variable 
could act as an alternative explanation to the results found in section 5.2. Finally, 
observations from December 2006 and January 2007 are dropped to rule out that the 
results are biased due to parents choosing the timing of birth. 
6.1. Measurement of the dependent variable 
For reasons explained in section 4.1, the cut-off point used to dichotomize the dependent 
variable reflects the number of months for paid parental leave under the new Elterngeld 
policy (12 months) plus the number of months for compulsory maternity leave (2 months). 
However, mothers also have six optional weeks of maternity leave before childbirth. 
Therefore, using fourteen months as the cut-off creates a risk of underestimating the effect 
of the policy, especially if most mothers redeem these optional weeks. Conversely, if most 
mothers forego these optional weeks, establishing the cut-off at fifteen months may yield 
an overestimation of the policy effects. Given that the paper is focused on the effect of the 
policy on the pace of return to work for mothers with different family values background, 
the cut-off dilemma is not of critical importance. An exception would be if mothers with 
different family values background systematically redeem non-compulsory maternity leave 
at a significantly different rate. It is not implausible that this may be the case, and thus there 
is a possibility that the impact of the policy for mothers with traditional family backgrounds 
may have been underestimated.  
Table 27 reproduces the original model in column 1 (model 5 from Table 24), together with 
a new model in column 2, with the dependent variable cut-off established at 15 months. 
The resulting differences between the two models are minimal. One exception is the effect 
of the policy for the traditional low-educated mothers. Here, column 2 shows a bigger effect 
of the policy, suggesting that convergence in the pace of return to work after the policy 
reform takes place not only for mothers with traditional family background and vocational 
education, but also for their less-educated counterparts. This result, however, does not 
significantly change the conclusion of the paper; if anything, it reinforces it.  
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Table 27 Comparison of the Average Marginal Effects (AME) of the policy reform on 
the probability of return to work within 14 months and within 15 months. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
               *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
6.2. Income: the key missing variable? 
Together with education, income is the one variable that has a significant impact on the 
pace of return to work. Given its relevance, there is a need to discuss and confirm that it is 
education – together with values – which explains the lack of convergence on the pace of 
return to work for highly-educated mothers with different family backgrounds.  
Figure 15 shows that, other things equal, mothers with low income have reacted more 
strongly to the policy than mothers with high income. Before the policy, their pace of return 
to work differed, and after the policy it has converged. This result is consistent with other 
research on the effect of the Elterngeld policy reform on the pace of return to work for 
mothers with different levels of income34.  
Given the stronger reaction from low-income mothers, there are two cases in which the 
results seen in the previous section could be attributed to income rather than education 
levels:  
The first case is represented in Figure 16. This figure shows a hypothetical relationship 
between education and income which is dependent on family background. Specifically, it 
shows a positive correlation for the sample of mothers with traditional family background, 
                                                 
34 See for example Bergeman and Riphahn (2010). They even suggest that high-income mothers may 
return later after the reform due to wealth effects, although their claim is not substantiated by their 
empirical analysis.  
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
     
Family values: [0]tradit; [1] liberal 0.145*** (0.04) 0.127*** (0.04) 
Policy treatment     
Traditional fv 0.214*** (0.04) 0.241*** (0.03) 
Policy treatment     
Liberal fv 0.103* (0.06) 0.080 (0.05) 
Policy + traditional fv     
Low educ 0.144* (0.08) 0.316*** (0.10) 
Vocational educ 0.316*** (0.04) 0.340*** (0.07) 
Higher educ 0.010 (0.17) 0.016 (0.16) 
Policy + liberal fv     
Low educ -0.060 (0.25) 0.038 (0.20) 
Vocational educ -0.000 (0.08) -0.030 (0.06) 
Higher educ 0.25*** (0.05) 0.240*** (0.05) 
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with a negative correlation for the sample of mothers with liberal family background. If 
these correlations hold for my sample, the results in the previous section – which found 
that low educated mothers from traditional family backgrounds and highly-educated 
mothers with liberal family values had a stronger reaction to the policy reform – could be 
perfectly explained in terms of income: low income mothers with traditional family 
background are those with low education, and low-income mothers with liberal family 
background are those with high education.  
Figure 15 Predicted probabilities of return to work within 14 months for mothers 
with different income levels. 
 
Figure 16 Hypothetical inverse correlation between education and income 
depending on family values background. 
 
A priori there is no theoretical foundation for family background to affect the direction of 
correlation between income and education. Moreover, data from Table 28 confirms that 
correlation between these two variables is positive regardless of family background. 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
P
ro
b
. 
re
tu
rn
 t
o
 w
o
rk
 <
 1
4
 m
o
n
th
s
before policy after policy
policy treatment
income below median income above median
Predicted Probability of return to work within 14 months
95% CIs
130 
 
Table 28 OLS simple regression of income on education levels for subsamples of 
traditional and liberal family values background. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
               *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The second case is represented in Figure 17. Here, the figures show a hypothetical 
relationship between family values background and income dependent on education levels. 
Specifically, it shows a positive correlation for the sample of mothers with low or vocational 
education, with a negative correlation for the sample of mothers with high education. Again, 
if these correlations hold for my sample, the results in the previous section could be 
perfectly explained in terms of income: low income mothers with traditional family 
background are those with low education, and low-income mothers with liberal family 
background are those with high education.  
Figure 17 Hypothetical inverse correlation between family values background and 
income depending on education levels. 
 
As with the preceding hypothetical case, a priori there is no theoretical foundation for 
education to affect the direction of correlation between income and family values 
background. Moreover, data from Table 29 confirms that correlation between these two 
variables is negative regardless of education levels. 
  
Dependent variable: levels of education (ISCED) 
 (1)  
Traditional family 
background 
(2) 
Liberal family background 
     
Income (low/high) 0.525*** (0.06) 0.277*** (0.08) 
R2 0.18  0.05  
N 301  182  
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Table 29 OLS simple regression of income on family values background for 
subsamples of highly-educated and low/vocationally educated individuals. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
               *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
6.3. Timing of birth and its effect on coefficient bias 
Section 3 discussed the possibility of parents manipulating the timing of birth and it made 
reference to a paper (Tamm, 2013) which suggested that this had been the case, with some 
parents postponing the delivery of their children from December 2006 to January 2007. If 
this is the case in the paper’s sample, then the results may suffer from bias, as the parents 
who self-selected for the new policy may have a preference for an early return. The 
plausibility of this effect showing in the paper’s results is low, as the sample has only 6 
observations in December 2006 and January 2007. Moreover, given that the paper includes 
observations beyond January 2007 (from 2007 to 2009), the extent of the bias, if existent, 
should be mitigated. In spite of this low plausibility, a sensitivity test dropping these 
observations is carried out.  
Table 30 shows the full model (from Table 5, column 5) in the first column compared to the 
new model without observations from December 2006 and January 2007 (second column). 
As it can be seen, the results remain very similar, which suggests that the analysis done in 
the paper does not suffer from bias due to the manipulation of the timing of birth.  
Table 30. Comparison of the Average Marginal Effects (AME) of the policy reform on 
the probability of return to work excluding observations in Dec’06 and Jan’07. 
 
 
Dependent variable: family values (traditional – liberal) 
 (1)  
Low and vocat. educated 
(2) 
Highly educated 
     
Income (low/high) -0.135*** (0.05) -0.433*** (0.09) 
R2 0.02  0.14  
N 348  135  
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
   
Fv: [0]tradit; [1] liberal 0.145*** 0.140** 
before the policy (0.052) (0.057) 
Policy treatment 0.214*** 0.222*** 
Traditional fv (0.037) (0.038) 
Policy treatment 0.103* 0.106* 
Liberal fv (0.057) (0.057) 
Observations 307 301 
Log pseudo likelihood -184.1 -179.5 
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.13 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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7. Conclusion 
This paper investigated the effect of a parental leave policy on the pace of return to work 
for mothers with different family values backgrounds. In line with previous analyses of the 
same policy (Bergemann & Riphahn, 2010; J. T. Kluve, M., 2009), this paper suggests that 
the policy has had an overall positive effect in accelerating the pace of return to work for 
mothers in Germany. The paper’s focus on family values reveals that it is those mothers 
with traditional family values background who react most to the policy, as opposed to their 
peers with more liberal family values background. Given that their pace of return to work 
differed before the policy, the results lead to convergence on the pace of return to work for 
mothers with different family values background 
 However, the paper also finds that the magnitude of convergence is dependent on the 
mother's level of education, with only those mothers with vocational education converging 
in their pace of return to work. Conversely, the difference in the pace of return to work for 
low educated mothers narrows, but convergence is not achieved. At the same time, and 
perhaps more surprisingly, highly-educated mothers from different family values 
background do not converge in their pace of return to work and, if anything, divergence is 
observed. The paper suggests that family values may impose an upper limit on the effect of 
education on the decisions to return to work, a limit which would have already been 
reached by highly educated mothers with a traditional family background.  
The paper contains some limitations. The small number of observations has an effect on the 
additional analyses on education, with standard errors being too large to allow for a robust 
interpretation of the results. Relatedly, the number of individuals with migrant background 
is small, with most of the sample being composed of East and West German individuals. 
This waters down the epidemiological approach and therefore it weakens the 
disentanglement of ‘culture’ and institutions that the paper aimed to achieve.  
The findings contribute to the literature on culture and economics. The consensus within 
this literature is that family values –and more generally attitudes towards women, family 
and work – have explanatory power in understanding women’s participation rates in the 
formal labour market, along with other economic variables such as household arrangement 
or fertility outcomes (see for example A. Alesina & Giuliano, 2010; Fernandez, 2007; 
Fernandez & Fogli, 2009; Giavazzi, Schiantarelli, & Serafinelli, 2013). The literature on the 
topic also emphasize the feedback effect between economic policies and attitudes towards 
women and work (see for example Aghion et al., 2011). This paper adds to this literature 
by providing some evidence for the idea that differences in behaviour attributable to 
‘culture’ can be partially offset by policy reforms.  
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Chapter 5  Conclusions 
The overarching objective of this thesis has been to investigate the resilience of the effects 
of family values on individuals’ behaviour in the light of a change in economic incentives. 
The thesis has presented a conceptual framework which brings together the different 
relationships between institutions, changes in economic incentives and outcomes. The 
existing institutionalist and social economics literature has previously explained some of 
the relationships within the framework. It is now widely established that formal and 
informal institutions affect economic outcomes. At the same time, institutionalist 
economists have extensively documented that any change in economic incentives is very 
likely to be ‘filtered’ by formal institutions, therefore giving rise to different economic 
outcomes depending on the formal institutions in place. In other words, the effect of formal 
institutions is usually resilient to changes in economic incentives.  
With this in mind, the thesis has asked whether a similar resilience can be found in the 
effects of informal institutions on outcomes in the light of a change in economic incentives. 
In other words, the aim has been to understand whether the same change in economic 
incentives taking place in societies with different informal institutions will result in 
different economic outcomes. This is the main contribution of the thesis. While the 
literature on social economics had previously examined and asserted the effects of informal 
institutions on outcomes and on formal institutions, their resilience to changes in economic 
incentives had been understudied.  
The thesis focuses on individual behaviour and preferences for social care; that is, 
preferences for elderly care, amount and type of parental support for adult children and 
duration of parental leave. With regard to informal institutions, the focus is on social norms, 
and more specifically, on those concerning the role of the family in society, that is, family 
values. The first paper has examined the heterogeneity of the effect of family values on 
preferences for elderly care prior to any change or policy reform. The aim has been to 
understand whether the effect of family values was resilient to different socio-economic 
characteristics, and specifically, education attainment. The second paper has examined the 
resilience of the effect of family values on parental support given to offspring when the 
latter experienced a change in economic incentives given by an adverse change in their 
employment status. An the third paper has analysed the resilience of the effect of family 
values on the pace of return to work after a policy reform on parental leave was 
implemented in Germany. 
The papers have relied on an understanding of the relevance of informal institutions 
provided by the growing literature on social economics. This one focuses on culture, values, 
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social norms, attitudes and beliefs and argues that their inclusion in economic models does 
not compromise their parsimony. At the same time it helps account for behaviour that 
would have otherwise not been very well accounted for with existing economic tools. 
Borrowing from this framework, the thesis posits that individuals need to choose their 
actions or behaviour – more specifically they need to choose whether to care for their 
relatives or not. Their actions depend on the costs associated to it, but importantly, they 
also depend on their ‘identity’, or the social categories assigned to them. These categories 
refer to the family values they are expected to have; i.e. family values which are prevailing 
in the society they live in, and they are associated with a prescribed behaviour. In 
traditional societies prescribed behaviour assigns a strong caring role to the family 
members, whereas in liberal societies such role is assigned to either the market or the state. 
Therefore, individuals need to take action based on their costs and their identity. A change 
in economic incentives changes the costs, either exacerbating them or decreasing them, 
thus changing the balance between costs and identities. Their behaviour thus depends on 
the resilience of ‘identity’ to changes in economic incentives.  
The research question has been motivated by the trend within the EU to engage in policy 
transfers via changes in economic incentives with the aim of achieving convergence. Given 
that many of these changes can be done within the same formal institutional framework 
(i.e. changing some policies and laws, but not engaging in structural reforms), it is usually 
assumed that there are no major barriers to their successful implementation (one exception 
would be political feasibility). As a result, the effect of informal institutions has been largely 
overlooked.  
In this concluding chapter I first discuss the main results and the overall answer to the 
research question. I then move on to a more detailed analysis of the main findings for each 
paper. Broader implications of the results are then discussed and finally, limitations and a 
proposed future research agenda are presented.  
1. Main results 
Results point towards an existing but limited resilience of the effect of family values on 
individual behaviour in the face of changes in economic incentives. First, all empirical 
analyses confirm previous findings in the literature of social economics that family values 
affect individual behaviour.  
- Chapter 2 (Paper 1) showed that the effect of family values is subject to educational 
attainment, with individuals with higher levels of education being less influenced 
by family values.   
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- Chapter 3 (Paper 2) argued that the effect of family values is exacerbated by a 
change in economic incentives which does not conflict with prevailing values.  
- Chapter 4 (Paper 3) demonstrated that the effect of family values is only partially 
resilient to a policy reform which conflicts with them. The extent of resilience 
depends on the socio-demographic characteristics of the individuals.  
Paper 1 – Are the effects of family values on elderly care preferences resilient to 
changes in educational attainment levels? 
The literature on elderly care provision suggests that there are two main set of factors 
which affect preferences. One is economic incentives, which can range from cost of services 
or availability to more individual constraints such as employment, education, age and the 
like. The other set of factors relate to normative beliefs and social norms about the role of 
the family in caring for relatives. Whereas the economics literature and reports from 
international organizations have focused on the former, sociological literature has focused 
on the latter, mainly using qualitative data and studies.  
The chapter has merged the focus of both groups of literature and, using quantitative 
methods, the interplay between the two set of factors, namely economic incentives and 
normative family values has been explored.  The aim has been to understand how resilient 
normative family values are in the light of different economic incentives faced by 
individuals. To this purpose it has used cross-country European survey data to conduct a 
regression analysis where preferences for elderly care were explained by educational 
attainment, family values and the interaction of the two. Family values have been 
constructed from survey data which includes questions about attitudes and values about 
the family. After the index has been constructed at a regional level, values have been 
assigned to individuals according to the region they live in and values have been 
dichotomised from very traditional and traditional to liberal and very liberal. The paper has 
aimed at identifying the effects of values from other formal institutional effects by 
controlling for country fixed effects. Moreover, the composite index has been constructed 
from historical values, in order to avoid endogeneity problems.  
Results have suggested that resilience of the effect of family values on elderly care 
preferences is mediated by the effect of education. Highly educated individuals in more 
traditional areas are more likely to prefer formal elderly care than their less educated 
counterparts. By contrast, the likelihood to prefer formal care is similar across educational 
levels for individuals living in liberal family areas. These findings suggest that the effects of 
education may be strong enough to override the influence of family values on elderly care 
preferences. Interestingly, the effects of education on preferences happens at different level 
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of education for very traditional and traditional societies. In very traditional societies, 
individuals with twenty plus years of education exhibit a higher likelihood of preferring 
formal care than their less educated counterparts. In traditional societies, the years of 
education which result in a similar shift are instead between 17 and 19 years.  
The paper’s finding that education limits the resilience of the effect of traditional family 
values is partially consistent with the literature on education. This one stresses the higher 
opportunity costs faced by highly educated individuals when taking leaves from work. 
Whereas this is what the paper finds in areas with traditional and very traditional family 
values, education does not seem to play a big role in shaping preferences for elderly care in 
liberal and very liberal areas. These results therefore point at a very different effect of 
education on preferences and, arguably, open questions about the effects of ‘economic 
incentives’ in societies where values are already geared towards more individualist 
purposes.  
Paper 2 – Are the effects of family values on parental support to offspring resilient to 
changes in children’s employment status? 
Family exchanges and support are usually discussed in the literature using two different 
theoretical frameworks. The first one is grounded on altruism, which is argued to be the 
driving force behind support provided within the family and across generations. The 
second framework suggests instead that family exchanges are based on rational choices 
about the costs and benefits of providing help, with parents more likely to provide 
assistance to the offspring from whom they receive most help. Whereas in the former 
framework children’s income levels would be a key variable in the decision of providing 
support, in the latter the key variable would be reciprocity.  
Evidence on which framework has a greater explanatory capacity is inconclusive. This 
paper suggests that the dichotomy between rationality and altruism overlooks an 
important variable: social norms and family values. Arguably, the level and 
conceptualization of altruism and rationality expected depend to a large extent on the social 
norms regarding the role of family in a society. The paper therefore shifts away from the 
discussion on altruism and rationality and focuses on the impact of social norms about the 
family on the decision to give parental support. More specifically, the paper has aimed at 
understanding the resilience of prevailing family values on the decision to give parental 
support to offspring when they suffer an adverse change in employment status. 
To this end the paper uses longitudinal survey data which covers 12 European countries to 
carry out regression analyses. The probability of parental support provided to offspring 
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and the type of support – financial and co-residence – is calculated both when offspring are 
employed and when they suffer an adverse change in employment status. The variable to 
explain is therefore parental support and type of support, and the main factors to analyse 
are employment status of the offspring, family values and the interplay between the two. 
As with the previous paper, a family values composite index is constructed with questions 
from survey data at a regional level, assigned to individuals depending on the region they 
live in and then grouped into four categories – very traditional, traditional, liberal and very 
liberal.  
Results have suggested that the effect of family values on help given is significant and 
exacerbated by the change in employment status. They have showed that, first, the 
probability of providing parental help when children are employed is similar among 
individuals living in different areas. Second, when the adult child is hit by an adverse change 
in employment status, parents in traditional areas significantly increase the probability of 
providing help, whereas their counterparts in liberal areas barely change their probability. 
The results are driven by both an increase in the willingness to permit co-residence and an 
increase in the provision of financial help, although the increase of the former type of help 
is larger. These findings suggest that an adverse change in employment status produces 
heterogeneous responses in terms of parental help, both in intensity and types of support 
provided.  
The findings are in line with the literature on social economics which emphasises the effects 
that social norms have on individual behaviour.It shows that parental support after an 
adverse change in employment status of the offspring is dependent on family values. The 
findings are of relevance for the literature on social policy, and more specifically, the one 
concerned with the intergenerational contract. The focus has usually been on formal 
institutional differences, overlooking social norms. The results suggest that even within the 
same institutional setting, the effects of a change in employment status may result in 
different levels of intervention by families.  
Paper 3 – Are the effects of family values on the pace of return to work after childbirth 
resilient to parental leave policy reforms? 
Germany has traditionally been a country where the male breadwinner model 
predominated, which was reflected in maternity and parental leave policies in the 1980s 
and the 1990s. Arguably, these policies have been partially rooted in the traditional family 
values that West Germany has. A term even exists for these mothers who decide to work 
instead of taking care of their small children: rabenmutter. Nevertheless, at the turn of the 
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century new reforms began to acknowledge individual rights to parental leave and there 
was a commitment to expand childcare services.  
This paper has analysed one of these reforms, the 2007 Elterngeld reform, which aimed, 
among other things, at decreasing the period of paid parental leave from two years to one 
years, therefore increasing the incentives of mothers to return to work earlier. The goal of 
the paper has been to understand whether the effect of the reform differed for mothers with 
different family values background. As with the previous papers in this thesis, its basic 
premise is that mothers with traditional family values will face a conflict between the 
reform and their normative values.   
The paper has adopted a regression discontinuity design model using German household 
survey data to establish the effect of the policy reform on the duration of parental leave. 
Moreover, a difference-in-difference design has allowed the comparison between the 
effects of the policy on mothers with distinct family values background. An epidemiological 
approach has been used to analyse the effect of values, using migrant population in 
Germany and assigning them a family values background according to the family values in 
their country of origin.  
In line with previous analyses of this policy, the findings have pointed out at an overall 
positive significant effect in accelerating the return to work of mothers in Germany. More 
importantly for the purposes of the paper, the effect of the policy has been bigger for 
mothers with traditional family values, therefore increasing convergence in the pace of 
return to work for mothers with different family values background. Resilience of the effect 
of family values is therefore put into question. A closer look at the convergence rate reveals 
that the magnitude of convergence is dependent on the mother's level of education, and not 
entirely in the way predicted by existing literature on education and human capital.  
Mothers with vocational education exhibit high levels of convergence, followed by mothers 
with low education, who exhibit low but significant levels of convergence. Conversely, 
highly-educated mothers diverge in their pace of return to work. The paper has suggested 
that mothers with traditional family values background may use the educational system 
either as a way to enhance their cultural investment or as a marriage market, and therefore 
will not be very sensitive to changes in economic incentives. By contrast, mothers with 
liberal family values background may use the educational system as a way to enhance their 
human capital, which can then be deployed at work. This suggests that the latter will be 
more sensitive to changes in economic incentives than the former. 
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The findings contribute to the literature on social economics by providing evidence that the 
effect of family values is partially resilient even in the case of a policy reform which 
‘conflicts’ with traditional family values. At the same time, it contributes to the literature on 
social policy by focusing on a variable– social norms – which has been largely overlooked. 
In increasingly heterogeneous societies in terms of cultures and values, it is worth 
identifying potential causes that may limit the effect of social policies.  
2. Policy recommendations 
Overarching recommendation 
The ongoing and increasing amount of policy transfers within the EU, especially in the 
aftermath of the crisis, has generally assumed that there is a set of good practices which 
countries need to follow to achieve convergence in outcomes. The thesis stresses the 
necessity of taking family values into account when assessing the reforms a country’s needs, 
especially when it comes to policy transfers related to care.  
Measurement of family values and other social norms has been made available via cross-
country surveys with extensive information on attitudes and beliefs. At the same time, 
methods to isolate the effects of social norms from formal institutions and other economic 
variables have been improved and they have been able to benefit from the increasing 
availability of longitudinal household surveys. With all these new data and methods, 
excluding social norms from country analyses and policy recommendations may lead to less 
effective policies being implemented.  
Similarly, the analysis of the consequences of common problems would also benefit from 
an inclusion of social norms. Policy recommendations sometimes follow after such common 
problems. As the thesis has hopefully conveyed, such problems do not necessarily lead to 
the same behaviour, and one source of such heterogeneity is social norms.  
Specific policy recommendations 
a. Choice agenda in elderly care 
As Chapter 2 documents, one common ground of EU reforms regarding elderly care has 
been to allow more choice between in-kind services and cash-for-care. On the one hand, 
institutional choice has been welcome as a way to ensure carers and carees’ preferences 
are respected. On the other hand, choices depend to a great extent on the social norms 
prevailing in a society. Given the consequences that caring has on the potential earnings, 
job prospects and eventually income for retirement of the carers, social norms can be a 
source of inequality exacerbated by choice.  
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As Chapter 2 findings suggest, individuals with distinct socio-demographic characteristics 
are influenced by the social norms in society to a different extent. More specifically, 
education seems to be key to override the effects of social norms on preferences for elderly 
care. This effect therefore suggests that institutional choice may lead low educated 
individuals living in more traditional societies to choose informal care as a default option. 
Instead, their more educated counterparts are more likely to choose formal care as the 
default option. Social norms can thus be not only a source of inequality across societies with 
different norms, but also within societies where traditional social norms prevail. 
b. The effects of co-residence as an answer to a change in employment status 
The literature (see for example Kaplan 2012) suggests that co-residence with parents in the 
event of unemployment acts as a channel of insurance against labour market risks. The 
consequences in regards to consumption and saving patterns as well as labour elasticities 
and earnings are not negligible: consumption reacts less to job losses, there are lower 
savings, higher long term earning growth and higher labour elasticity for the youth (Kaplan 
2012).  
This ‘insurance’ effect of co-residence suggest that big changes in employment status in 
societies with traditional family values may potentially lead to longer-term unemployment, 
and while this may not translate in a sharp decrease in consumption patterns, it may lead 
to households spending retirement income and increase the risk of poverty at old age. 
Although these effects may be far-fetched, European policy makers need to factor them in 
when giving policy recommendations to countries with different social norms. Similarly, in 
countries where social norms differ a lot – be it for historical differences or because of an 
increase in migrant population holding different normative beliefs on the role of the family 
– a common problem may lead to very asymmetric consequences in terms of consumption, 
savings and potential earnings. Again, such countries should think about how their policies 
will affect individuals with different social norms who use different channels to counter the 
negative effects of unemployment.  
c. Parental leave policies to boost female labour force participation 
Chapter 4 has suggested that parental leave policies which incentivise mothers to return to 
work are, to a certain extent, effective. The thesis therefore supports the view that such 
policies should be promoted if the goal of a government is to increase female labour force 
participation. At the same time, the findings point at a lower reaction to economic 
incentives from low and high educated mothers – as opposed to those with vocational 
education – from a traditional background. This hints at the possibility that social norms 
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have a stronger influence on their decisions, and therefore, for these groups, economic 
incentives might need to be of a higher magnitude to override the effect of social norms.  
The recent suggestions in Germany to pay stay-at-home mums who choose to care for their 
babies at home goes in the opposite direction of the 2007 parental leave. The policy has 
been finally implemented in Bavaria, and, as policy implications in (a) have suggested, 
increasing choice might lead to stark differences in choices that mums from different family 
values background take. Choice in itself is of course legitimate, but consequences stemming 
from different social norms need to be considered in full when assessing the effects of the 
policy. 
3. Limitations and future research agenda 
3.1. Limitations of the study 
Limitations fall under three broad categories: data availability, measurement and methods. 
Data availability 
Chapter 2 (Paper 1) uses Eurobarometer data to examine the impact of family values on 
preferences for elderly care for individuals with different educational attainment. The 
dataset only provided stated preferences for elderly care. That is, the dependent variable 
used in the paper has been taken from the following question: Imagine an elderly father or 
mother who lives alone and can no longer manage to live without regular help because of his 
or her physical or mental health condition. In your opinion, what would be the best option for 
people in this situation?’ Answers have been coded according to the informal-formal 
spectrum. Stated preferences are interesting to analyse because they do not include 
unexpected or unwanted circumstances that may affect final decisions. In some way, they 
are ‘purer’, free of noise. However, they can also undermine the actual role economic 
incentives play and overestimate the impact of norms or wishes relative to what actual 
choices may suggest. Further research examining revealed preferences is therefore 
desirable to complement these results. 
Chapter 3 (Paper 2) uses SHARE data to examine the impact of family values on parental 
support given to adult children when the latter suffer an adverse change in employment 
status. The type of support analysed is financial support and co-residence. The dataset 
included a third type, namely time help, which includes help given to their offspring on 
practical household chores, paperwork or personal care. The amount of individuals 
providing time help to their offspring however was very low. Of a total of around 38,000 
observations, only 3,000 reported giving time help. Although it would have been interesting 
to understand what happens to this specific type of help, its exclusion is not a big drawback, 
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as I expect time help from parents to offspring to decrease when unemployment hits the 
adult child, and the paper is more interested in evaluating the increases of help and the 
extent to which this differs depending on family values.  
Chapter 4 (Paper 1) has two problems of data availability. The first one is the overall 
number of observations. The German SOEP is a large dataset. Yet, after dropping missing 
observations and leaving only mothers who gave birth between 2005 and 2009, the number 
of observations amounts to between 300 and 450, depending on the specification. This 
suggests that the groups that form the interaction between family values and the policy 
treatment are even smaller, which may have effects on the consistency of results. The 
second problem is that the number of migrants is also rather low, amounting to 132. The 
rest are observations from East and West Germany. Given the large differences in family 
values between the two regions, the results are still interesting. However, this slightly 
undermines the epidemiological approach used in the paper.  
Finally, a data availability problem which affects the three papers is the fact that family 
values are assigned to individuals depending on the region they live in. Ideally, and 
endorsing the hypothesis that basic values are largely fixed by the time individuals reach 
adulthood (Inglehart and Baker 20020), values should have been assigned according to the 
region where individuals grew up. Unfortunately none of the dataset provide information 
on this aspect, and therefore, it is their actual region which has been taken as the basis for 
their values. In chapter 4 therefore I may have miscategorised some eastern and western 
Germans, affecting the consistency of results. In the two other chapters the problem is 
arguably less pressing, as regional family values have been further re-categorised in four 
big areas – very traditional, traditional, liberal and very liberal – and therefore any mobility 
within those areas does not represent a problem.  
Measurement 
One of the dependent variables in Chapter 3 (Paper 2) is financial help. The question used 
in the database is whether financial help of more than 250€ has been given in the past 12 
months, and if this is the case, to whom. The database also includes another question asking 
the amount of help given. However, information on this question contained a lot of missing 
values and, more importantly, it was not available for the last wave. Given this drawbacks, 
the paper has not analysed the question from the point of view of intensity of transfers. 
Nonetheless, recent research on intergenerational transfers has found that while 
individuals in Mediterranean countries report giving less financial support to their 
offspring, the intensity of the exchange is larger; i.e. the amount given for each exchange is 
greater than in other countries (Albertini and Kohli 2012). This is therefore one substantial 
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limitation of the paper, as it directly affects the conclusion. Nevertheless, it can be argued 
that, if anything, this result from other papers would reinforce the findings by pointing at 
an even greater support from parents to offspring in traditional family values areas.  
In Chapter 4 (Paper 3) the dependent variable may also suffer from measurement 
problems. The policy analysed aims at reducing the number of months mothers spend on 
parental leave up to one year. Ideally, therefore, the variable of interest would be the 
number of months of parental leave, and further dichotomize the variable between those 
individuals who spend twelve months and those who spend more than twelve months. 
Unfortunately, the database only contains the number of months of maternity and parental 
leave together. Given that maternity leave is compulsory for eight weeks following 
childbirth (and only optional for a maximum of six weeks preceding childbirth), the paper 
has taken as a cut-off point fourteen months (rather than twelve), to account for a minimum 
two extra months attributable to this compulsory maternity leave. However, there is still 
the risk that mothers spending some or all six optional weeks of maternity leave before 
childbirth are categorized as “slow returners,”. To minimize the mistake, robustness checks 
are performed with the cut-off point set at fifteen months.  
The last relevant measurement problem encountered in the thesis refers to the 
measurement of family values and affects chapter 2 and 3 (Papers 1 and 2). Family values 
in the thesis refer to the social norms on the role of the family to which individuals in a 
social group try to conform. As explained in both papers, the variable family values has been 
taken from the European Value Study, it has been aggregated at NUTS 2 regional level and 
further dichotomized so that there would be four main ‘family values areas’ ranging from 
very traditional and traditional to liberal and very liberal. This aggregation has allowed a 
better control of institutional and economic variables by adding NUTS2 and country level 
dummies. However, this has been done at the expense of aggregating family values to very 
large areas. An alternative could have been to aggregate the family values index at a NUTS3 
level, still allowing for the inclusion of NUTS2 and country dummy variables, but having a 
more precise measure of family values. I could have also dichotomized it as robustness 
checks if needed. Unfortunately, this alternative has not been possible to take on board 
given the lack of data on NUTS3 regional level in the databases.  
Methods 
Endogeneity problems are present in Chapter 3 (Paper 2). The paper has assumed that the 
adverse change in employment status is a exogenous. However, this may not be necessarily 
the case and the results may suffer from the Omitted Variable Bias (OVB) problem. At the 
same time, reverse causality problems are likely to be present. One of the variables which 
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might affect employment status is parental support. Those individuals who know their 
parents are likely to support them in case of being unemployed may be more prone to 
experience a change of status towards unemployment. This may result in inconsistent 
estimators. Ideally, the use a of fixed-effects model would have alleviated the OVB problem. 
However, a random-effects model was eventually chosen for the reasons explained above 
in the chapter. Therefore, the problem persists and causality is unwarranted.  
The epidemiological approach used in Chapter 4 (Paper 3) has its own set of problems as a 
method. These are discussed in detail in Fernandez (2007) and Fernandez (2010), so I am 
only going to briefly mention them in here. First, immigrants in the host country may 
exhibit a different behaviour due to the shock of moving countries (i.e. language barriers, 
discrimination, uncertainties and the likes). Second, because culture is socially constructed 
it might not necessarily replicate in a similar way when it is taken out of context. Third, 
immigrants may assimilate into the culture and norms of the host country, therefore 
weakening the influence of their native culture. These three drawbacks are likely to 
underestimate the effect of culture and, in this thesis, the effect of family values. Therefore, 
if I still find an effect, as I do in Chapter 4 (Paper 3), then it is very likely that the actual effect 
of family values is still bigger.  
There are however two more relevant limitations of the approach used in the Paper, also 
discussed in the two aforementioned papers. First, migrant women in the sample may not 
be a random selection of their country of origin, and therefore, a positive coefficient of 
family values may be driven by selection bias. More precisely, if there is an identical 
distribution of family values across different countries, problems of selection would arise 
if the sample of women from countries of origin where attitudes are liberal were taken from 
the low-disutility-of-labour portion of the distribution, and the sample of women from 
countries of origin where attitudes are traditional were taken from the high-disutility-of-
labour portion of the distribution (Fernandez 2010). This is a limitation of the paper, as the 
problem cannot be ruled out. However, as Fernandez notes, ‘selection is a problem for all 
empirical methodologies’ (2010:19).  
Another limitation refers to the omitted variable bias problem. It may be the case that there 
is an omitted variable which varies in a systematic fashion across countries of origin for 
purely economic reasons (Fernandez 2010:19-20). This is why it is so important to control 
for individual education, husband’s education or income and other variables which are 
likely to reflect differences across individuals rather than family values. However, there are 
other sets of variables which are more difficult to control for, because they may be 
unobserved. Fernandez notes that in the case of female labour force participation one of 
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these variables might be unobserved human capital. She then suggests ideas to control for 
it, which the paper has not applied.  
 3.2. Avenues for future research 
The evidence in this thesis points to several ideas that could be further explored: the 
resilience of the effect of family values and the role of socio-economic characteristics; the 
long-run consequences of ‘weak resilience’ of the effect of family values; the role of family 
values in shaping different purposes of educational attainment and further analysis on 
policy changes and family values. 
Resilience of the effect of family values: the role of socio-economic characteristics 
Results from Chapter 2 (Paper 1) have pointed towards different levels of resilience of the 
effect of family values depending on educational attainment. Two main potential avenues 
for research stem from here. One is to systematize the effect of socio-economic 
characteristics; that is, which individual characteristics are likely to override effects of 
family values? Two potential candidates are educational attainment and income, but others 
may also be relevant. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) suggest that identity and social categories 
can to a certain extent be ‘chosen’ and as a consequence experiences such as professional 
and graduate schools as well as political involvement can alter the identity of an individual.  
This leads to the second avenue of research. What is the mechanism through which socio-
economic characteristics override the effect of family values? Following Akerlof and 
Kranton’s framework (ibid.), at least two mechanisms arise: first, socio-economic 
characteristics may change economic incentives; second, one’s own ‘identity’ can be altered 
by certain characteristics and therefore conflict with the prescribed behaviour assigned to 
the social identity. In the first case it would be the effect of social norms which ceases to be 
resilient for individuals with certain characteristics (say, because their effect is override by 
economic incentives); in the second case it would be the social norm in itself which ceases 
to be followed by the individual. Take the case of higher education in Chapter 2. The reason 
why highly educated individuals have a higher preference for formal elderly care can be 
ascribed to the fact that their opportunity costs of not working is higher to their less 
educated counterparts. This does not necessarily imply that their individual family values 
are in conflict that of the society or group the individual belongs to. Alternatively, it could 
be that higher education has indeed altered this individual’s family values, which cease to 
be in line with that of the society.  
One could think that the difference is fairly irrelevant, as in the end, regardless of whether 
it is family values or economic incentives that change, the outcome is the same: a higher 
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likelihood of preferring formal elderly care. But as Postlewaite (2011) suggests when he 
talks about deep and reduced form preferences, the difference is not trivial. If it is only 
economic incentives but not family values that change, at the time of bargaining with the 
family – in this case the elderly parents – these ones will have more bargaining power than 
if the individual’s family values have also changed. This is because in the former case, the 
individual is conflicted between the economic incentives and his family values, and in the 
latter this conflict disappears.  
The long-run consequences of weak resilience of the effect of family values  
An implication of the aforementioned claim that one individual’s own family values may 
enter in conflict with that of the society he inhabits may be that, if enough individuals find 
themselves in such situations, society’s family values may be altered over time. The pace at 
which this happens and the role of different socio-economic characteristics or shocks can 
be an interesting further avenue for research. This partially relates to Chapter 3 (Paper 2) 
and the potential long-run effects that a large shock such an economic crisis may have on 
attitudes, values and social norms.  
The role of family values in shaping different purposes of educational attainment  
One of the findings in Chapter 4 (Paper 3) points towards the different effects education 
has on individual’s behaviour depending on the prevailing family values. Education appears 
to increase the likelihood of an early return to work for individuals with liberal family 
values. This is not the case for highly educated individuals with traditional family values 
background, for whom the pace of return to work remains unchanged. While I have already 
warned in the limitations section in this chapter of the consistency of these results due to 
the small number of observations, the finding in itself is interesting and challenges the 
conventional explanations on the effects of education. A plausible explanation, in line with 
what Hakim (2002) argues, would be that educational attainment and other economic 
incentives have less of an effect on labour force participation for who she calls ‘home-
centred’ mothers. An avenue for further research would be to empirically test this 
hypothesis against the more conventional hypothesis which regards educational 
attainment as a source of human capital.  
Policy changes and the resilience of family values  
Chapter 4 (Paper 3) has analysed how a policy reform has impacted the resilience of the 
effects of family values, with results pointing at partial resilience depending on the 
educational attainment of the individual. An interesting avenue for further research would 
look at a) the characteristics of policy reform that makes them successful in the light of 
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conflicting family values (the extent of economic incentives, their implementation, their 
design…), b) the different areas of policy reform; i.e. some areas such as social care are 
arguably more likely to be affected by family values than other areas. Acemoglu and Jackson 
(2014) suggest that smoking regulations are one example of changes in law which have 
been successfully implemented. They ascribe at least part of this success to the gradual 
implementation of the reforms, which made a change in social norms possible over time.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Construction of family values composite index - regional categorisation 
EVS database contains data on regions. In most cases, these regional groupings coincide 
with the Eurobarometer regional groupings. When that was the case, NUTS 2 groupings 
were preferred, given that it allows for regional differences within countries (and therefore 
getting a more precise estimate of family values), while simultaneously providing enough 
observations per region to allow the analysis. There are two cases in which regional 
grouping were not conducted using NUTS 2. The first one concerns the cases where splitting 
the data into NUTS 2 would result in very small groups. In these cases, the whole country 
has been used. The second case pertains to situations where the EB and EVS regional groups 
differ. In these cases, either NUTS 1 or a larger categorization that allows comparison 
between EB and EVS data has been used. 
Table 31 Regional categorization of family values 
Regional categorization  
Country NUTS 
Austria NUTS 2 
Belgium NUTS 2 
Denmark NUTS 2 
Finland no nuts, 1 region only 
France NUTS 1 
Germany NUTS 1 
Greece NUTS 1 
Ireland no nuts, 1 region only 
Italy NUTS 2 
Luxembourg no nuts, 1 region only 
Netherlands NUTS 2 
Portugal NUTS 2 
Spain NUTS 2 
Sweden NUTS 2 
Great Britain no nuts, larger categorization 
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Appendix B. Questions in family values in the European Value Study. 
Table 32 Questions on Family Values in the EVS 
QUESTIONS ON FAMILY VALUES IN THE EVS (1981,1990) 
Love and respect for parents: 
Which of these two statements do you tend to agree with? 
A) Regardless of what the qualities and faults of ones parents are, one must always love and respect them. 
B) One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their behaviour and 
attitudes 
Parents responsibilities to their children 
Which of the following statements best describes your views about parents' responsibilities to their children? 
A) Parents’ duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being. 
B) Parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of 
their children. 
C) Neither 
Children responsibilities to their parents  
Which of the following statements best describes your views about responsibilities of adult children towards 
their parents when their parents are in need of long-term care? 
A) Adult children have the duty to provide long-term care for their parents even at the expense of their own 
well-being 
B) Adult children have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the 
sake of their parents 
C) Neither 
Learn children at home 
Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to 
be especially important? 
- Independence, feeling of responsibility, obedience 
Abortion when woman is not married 
Do you approve or disapprove of abortion under the following circumstances? Where the woman is not 
married. 
Trust  
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing 
with people? 
Children need both parents to grow up happily 
If someone says a child needs a home with both a father and a mother to grow up happily, would you tend to 
agree or disagree? 
Women need children in order to be fulfilled 
Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary? 
Marriage is outdated 
Do you tend to agree or disagree with this/the following statement? Marriage is an outdated institution 
Woman single parent 
If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent, but she doesn't want to have a stable relationship with a 
man, do you approve or disapprove? 
Working mother and children 
Can you tell me how much you agree with the following statement? A working mother can establish just as 
warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work 
Housewife being fulfilling 
Can you tell me how much you agree with the following statement? Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as 
working for pay 
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QUESTIONS ON FAMILY VALUES IN THE EVS (1981,1990) (continued) 
Contribution of both spouses to household income 
Can you tell me how much you agree with the following statement? Both the husband and wife should 
contribute to household income 
Working mother and pre-school children 
Can you tell me how much you agree with the following statement? A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his 
or her mother works 
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Appendix C. Descriptive statistics and PCA details. 
Table 33 EVS questions - descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics EVS questions 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Love and respect for parents should be earned 29,942 0.66 0.94 0 2 
Parents responsibilities to  children w/o much 
sacrifice 
31,303 0.54 0.83 0 2 
Children should learn to be independent 32,501 0.90 1.00 0 2 
Children should learn to be responsible 32,504 1.44 0.90 0 2 
Children should learn to be obedient 32,495 0.60 0.92 0 2 
Abortion when woman is not married is OK 30,687 0.65 0.94 0 2 
People can't be trusted 30,061 1.24 0.97 0 2 
Children need both parents to grow up happily 31,424 1.73 0.68 0 2 
Women need children in order to be fulfilled 28,871 0.92 1.00 0 2 
Marriage is outdated 30,273 0.37 0.78 0 2 
Woman being a single parent is OK 31,423 1.06 0.87 0 2 
Working mother cannot take care of children 25,668 0.62 0.92 0 2 
Housewife is as fulfilling as full-time job 23,626 0.86 0.99 0 2 
Contribution of both spouses to household income is 
OK 
24,901 0.49 0.86 0 2 
Working mother can take care of pre-school children 25,276 0.67 0.95 0 2 
Note: This table contains all variables from Table 31 except for the one related to ‘Children 
responsibilities to their parents’. This is because data for this variable was not available in the 1981 
and 1990 waves.   
 
Table 34 EVS questions - Comparative descriptive statistics for Spain and Sweden 
Comparative descriptive statistics EVS question for Spain and Sweden – as example to see the 
differences 
  Spain Sweden 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Love and respect for parents should be earned 17 0.34 0.17 8 0.98 0.13 
Parents responsibilities to  children w/o much sacrifice 17 0.39 0.19 8 0.50 0.09 
Children should learn to be independent 17 0.73 0.17 8 0.70 0.13 
Children should learn to be responsible 17 1.63 0.11 8 1.79 0.08 
Children should learn to be obedient 17 0.78 0.22 8 0.50 0.13 
Abortion when woman is not married is OK 17 0.62 0.22 8 0.78 0.15 
People can't be trusted 17 1.25 0.21 8 0.66 0.12 
Children need both parents to grow up happily 17 1.88 0.05 8 1.73 0.09 
Women need children in order to be fulfilled 17 0.96 0.22 8 0.39 0.05 
Marriage is outdated 17 0.36 0.17 8 0.27 0.06 
Woman being a single parent is OK 17 1.47 0.11 8 0.76 0.14 
Working mother cannot take care of children 17 0.59 0.25 8 0.57 0.12 
Housewife is as fulfilling as full-time job 17 0.87 0.27 8 0.75 0.17 
Contribution of both spouses to household income is OK 17 0.30 0.17 8 0.23 0.09 
Working mother can take care of pre-school children 17 0.98 0.19 8 0.52 0.13 
Principal component analysis 
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The results of PCA – shown in Table 35 and Table 36– suggest that several components are 
useful in explaining the variance in the data.  According to Table 35, nearly 30% of the 
variance in the data is captured by the first component. The normalized loadings in Table 
36 shows the relative contributions of each variable to each of the components (I have just 
included the first three components in this table). The Table also shows that some of the 
variables contribute disproportionately to the variance, whereas others have a very small 
contribution. I use only those loadings larger than 50%, which deliver a high KMO (Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin) value, indicating that overall, variables have much in common and thus PCA 
analysis is warranted. I interpret the first component as a general measure of family values. 
Overall, the sign of the contribution of each variable is as expected, in accordance with the 
way the question was formulated. 
I then obtain the weights that I will apply to each variable for each observation, and after 
standardizing the variables, I multiply them by the weights. The final result is a single score 
for each country-region, generating a family values coefficient for each country-region. 
Keeping in mind that more liberal regions will have a lower and probably negative score, 
we should interpret the family values scores as follows: if a country-region has a score 
which is very close to zero, this suggests that compared to other regions, it has ‘average’ 
family values – not too liberal, not too traditional. Whenever the score is negative, it implies 
that, relative to other regions, this region has a more liberal attitude towards family values. 
Given that the variables have been standardized, the final score is the weighted difference 
from the overall mean in number of standard deviations. Therefore, a coefficient of 0.5 for 
a certain country-region indicates that the family values coefficient for this region is half a 
standard deviation above the weighted overall mean. Appendix D shows the regional 
difference in family values by country to provide an idea of how regions in each country 
fare. 
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Table 35 Principal components 
Principal Components (eigenvalues)     
     
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 4.16 1.43 0.28 0.28 
Comp2 2.73 0.52 0.18 0.46 
Comp3 2.21 0.99 0.15 0.61 
Comp4 1.22 0.21 0.08 0.69 
Comp5 1.01 0.24 0.07 0.76 
Comp6 0.78 0.07 0.05 0.81 
Comp7 0.71 0.23 0.05 0.85 
Comp8 0.47 0.08 0.03 0.89 
Comp9 0.40 0.07 0.03 0.91 
Comp10 0.33 0.03 0.02 0.93 
Comp11 0.30 0.06 0.02 0.95 
Comp12 0.24 0.04 0.02 0.97 
Comp13 0.20 0.08 0.01 0.98 
Comp14 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.99 
Comp15 0.11 . 0.01 1.00 
          
Number of observations: 123 Trace: 15  
Number of components: 15  Rho: 1.00000 
      Rotation: unrotated 
 
Table 36 Principal Components Loadings 
Principal Components loadings       
 Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 
Love and respect for parents should be earned 0.86 -0.11 -0.07 
Parents responsibilities to  children w/o much 
sacrifice 0.64 -0.40 0.30 
Children should learn to be independent 0.43 -0.52 0.49 
Children should learn to be responsible -0.17 -0.25 0.66 
Children should learn to be obedient -0.52 0.48 -0.43 
Abortion when woman is not married is OK 0.54 0.44 0.42 
People can't be trusted -0.72 -0.02 0.11 
Children need both parents to grow up happily -0.83 -0.26 0.24 
Women need children in order to be fulfilled -0.64 0.09 0.44 
Marriage is outdated 0.02 0.53 0.11 
Woman being a single parent is OK 0.06 0.47 0.58 
Working mother cannot take care of children -0.22 -0.82 -0.10 
Housewife is as fulfilling as full-time job 0.08 -0.01 0.51 
Contribution of both spouses to household income is 
OK 0.60 -0.26 -0.44 
Working mother can take care of pre-school children 0.45 0.69 0.09 
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Appendix E. Categorization of occupations in the database following ISCO 2008 
standards.  
 
The definition of different skills levels according to ISCO 2008 can be found in the 
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ILO). 
Table 37 Categorization of occupations in the database – following ISCO 2008 standards 
Occupation Observations ISCO classification - 2008 
Unskilled manual worker, etc. 2,846 Skill Level 1 [ Low] 
Farmer 838 
Skill Level 2 [Low-medium] 
Fisherman 24 
Owner of a shop, craftsmen, etc. 1,299 
Employed position, at desk 3,450 
Employed position, travelling 1,062 
Employed position, service job 3,127 
Supervisor 472 
Skilled manual worker 3,959 
Business proprietors, etc. 578 
Skill Level 3 [Medium-high] 
Middle management, etc. 2,903 
Professional (lawyer, etc.) 516 
Skill Level 4 [High] Employed professional (employed doctor, etc.) 606 
General management, etc. 649 
Source: International Standard Classification of Occupations (ILO, 2012). 
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Appendix F. Principal Component Analysis - PCA 
Table 38 Descriptive statistics 
Variable 
Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Love and respect for parents should be earned 23,288 0.65 0.94 0 2 
Parents responsibilities to  children w/o much 
sacrifice 
24,493 0.57 0.84 0 2 
Children should learn to be independent 25,496 0.98 1.00 0 2 
Children should learn to be responsible 25,496 1.51 0.86 0 2 
Children should learn to be obedient 25,496 0.53 0.89 0 2 
Abortion when woman is not married is OK 24,228 0.64 0.93 0 2 
People can't be trusted 23,432 1.23 0.97 0 2 
Children need both parents to grow up happily 24,605 1.77 0.64 0 2 
Women need children in order to be fulfilled 22,508 0.99 1.00 0 2 
Marriage is outdated 23,581 0.34 0.75 0 2 
Woman being a single parent is OK 24,604 1.07 0.86 0 2 
Working mother cannot take care of children 20,252 0.69 0.95 0 2 
Housewife is as fulfilling as full-time job 18,592 0.80 0.98 0 2 
Contribution of both spouses to household income is 
OK 
19,607 0.46 0.84 0 2 
Working mother can take care of pre-school children 19,929 0.65 0.94 0 2 
Note: This table contains all variables from Table 31 except for the one related to ‘Children 
responsibilities to their parents’. This is because data for this variable was not available in the 1981 
and 1990 waves.   
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Appendix G 
Figure 18 Absolute difference between mean and median values for each country 
region 
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Appendix H. PCA results 
Results 
Table 39 shows the eigenvalue of each component and the proportion of the variance in the 
data captured by each one. The first component, which will be the one used as a composite 
index, captures 25% of the variance in the data. The normalized loadings in Table A.4 shows 
the relative contributions of each variable to each of the components. Some loadings are 
negative, suggesting that whenever an observation responds positively to a question with a 
positive loading, it responds negatively to a question with a negative loading. For example, 
according to Table A.4, if an observation agrees that people cannot be trusted, it will disagree 
with the statement that love and respect for parents should be earned. Following this logic, 
when the scores for each country-region is calculated, the more traditional regions will have 
a positive score, whereas the more liberal regions will have a negative score. The table also 
shows that some of the variables – such as the one about love and respect for parents or the 
one on trust – seem to contribute disproportionately to the variance, whereas others have a 
very small contribution, suggesting that they are less useful for the composite index. I use only 
those loadings larger than 50%, which deliver a high KMO (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin) value, 
indicating that overall, variables have much in common and thus PCA analysis is warranted.  
Table 39 Principal Components - Eigenvalues 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 3.73 1.08 0.25 0.25 
Comp2 2.65 0.46 0.18 0.43 
Comp3 2.19 1.01 0.15 0.57 
Comp4 1.18 0.11 0.08 0.65 
Comp5 1.07 0.11 0.07 0.72 
Comp6 0.96 0.20 0.06 0.79 
Comp7 0.76 0.17 0.05 0.84 
Comp8 0.59 0.17 0.04 0.88 
Comp9 0.43 0.02 0.03 0.90 
Comp10 0.41 0.10 0.03 0.93 
Comp11 0.31 0.07 0.02 0.95 
Comp12 0.24 0.02 0.02 0.97 
Comp13 0.22 0.07 0.01 0.98 
Comp14 0.15 0.02 0.01 0.99 
Comp15 0.12 . 0.01 1.00 
          
Number of observations: 123 Trace:15  
Number of components: 
15 
 
Rho: 
1.0000 
 
      Rotation: unrotated 
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Table 40 Principal component loadings 
  
 Comp1 
Love and respect for parents should be earned -0.89 
Parents responsibilities to  children w/o much 
sacrifice 
-0.38 
Children should learn to be independent -0.25 
Children should learn to be responsible 0.02 
Children should learn to be obedient 0.35 
Abortion when woman is not married is OK -0.32 
People can't be trusted 0.73 
Children need both parents to grow up happily 0.87 
Women need children in order to be fulfilled 0.85 
Marriage is outdated -0.21 
Woman being a single parent is OK 0.11 
Working mother cannot take care of children 0.07 
Housewife is as fulfilling as full-time job -0.11 
Contribution of both spouses to household income is 
OK 
-0.62 
Working mother can take care of pre-school children -0.21 
 
I then obtain the weights that I will apply to each variable for each observation, and after 
standardizing the variables, I multiply them by the corresponding weights. The final result is 
a single score for each country region, generating a family values coefficient for each country-
region. Keeping in mind that – as mentioned above – more liberal regions will have a lower 
and probably negative score, we should interpret the family values scores as follows: if a 
country-region has a score which is very close to zero, this suggests that compared to other 
regions, it has ‘average’ family values – neither too liberal nor too traditional. Whenever the 
score is negative, it implies that, relative to other regions, this region has a more liberal 
attitude towards family values. Given that the variables have been standardized, the final 
score is the weighted difference from the overall mean in number of standard deviations. 
Therefore, a coefficient of 0.5 for a certain country-region indicates that the family values 
coefficient for this region is half a standard deviation above the weighted overall mean. Figure 
A.1 below shows the regional difference in family values by country to provide an idea of how 
regions in each country fare. 
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Appendix I. Regional family values by country 
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Appendix J. Description of data mining 
Both the respondent and the partner – whenever there is one – are asked about most of the 
questions. To avoid having duplicate observations, I move the partner’s information to the 
same row as the respondents’. At the same time, each parent will answer the same questions 
about the first four children. I therefore create as many parent-child observations as existing 
children (i.e., up to four). I do this procedure for waves 1, 2, 4 and 5. Wave 4 is used to get 
information needed for wave 5 – some relevant questions ask whether the status quo has 
changed, so it is necessary to know what the status quo in wave 4 was. Once information from 
wave 4 has been retrieved, it is erased. This is because according to SHARE documents, 
information on the ‘children’ module (CH module) cannot be linked to information on help 
modules, and therefore we cannot link the child’s personal characteristics to the recipient of 
help indicated in the help modules. 
I am interested in the longitudinal section of the data, and therefore I delete new observations 
which are not followed in the subsequent year.  
 
1. Coding of the dependent variables 
There are three dependent variables used in the analysis: financial help given, parent-child 
co-residence and the sum of the two, which form overall help.  
Co-residence 
The question asked is: where does the child live? And the answers can be a) in the same 
household, b) in the same building, and the other options state the distance between the child 
and parents in kilometres [code: ch007]. The variable co-residence is coded yes if the child 
lives in the same household, and no if otherwise. 
In the case of couples, for all waves, the survey identifies whether the respondent or the 
partner are in charge of responding to questions about family (variable dumfamr indicates 
this).  
Waves 4 and 5 vary in the way the question is asked for the longitudinal survey. Individuals 
are asked whether child has moved house [code: ch524]. If the answer is no, we take the 
answer from the previous wave. If the answer is yes, they ask about which of the children has 
moved [code: ch525] and where to [code: ch526]. The answer is changed accordingly.  
Financial help 
The question asked is as follows: in the last 12 months, have you given financial help > 250€? If 
yes, to whom? [code ft002 and ft003]. The respondent can list three recipients of help. I have 
coded the answer as ‘yes’ whenever parents answer that they have given financial help and 
the person is the child belonging to the parent-child dyad. 
181 
 
In wave 1, respondents and partners can choose to both answer questions if they state that 
they do their finances separately. Whenever that is the case, and both have answered 
questions on financial help, I have coded financial help as a ‘yes’ if at least one of the parents 
has given help to the child. I have coded ‘no’ if both parents claim that they have not given 
help. In waves 2, 4 and 5, questions on finances are only answered by one person on behalf of 
the couple. 
Overall help 
The variable help is generated and coded yes whenever the answer to financial help or co-
residence is yes.  
Table 41 Number of observations and relationship to support provided 
Type of help 
Observations giving help Observations not giving help 
Absolute 
number 
% Absolute number % 
Co-residence 2,217 6% 35,535 94% 
Financial help 5,165 14% 32,397 86% 
Overall help 7,181 19% 30,591 81% 
 
2. Coding of the children control variables 
Marital status of the child [code: ch012 and ch013] 
Marital status of child is asked and the answer can be: married, separated, divorced, widowed. 
If they answer anything other than married, they are asked if they have a partner. This is 
because someone can be separated and live with a new partner. The answer is coded as 
married whenever the child is married or is not but has a partner.  
Waves 4 and 5 vary in the way the question is asked for the longitudinal survey. Individuals 
are asked whether there has been any change in the marital status of the child [code: ch514]. 
If the answer is no, we take the answer from the previous wave. If the answer is yes, they ask 
which of the children has changed his/her status [code: ch515] and what the new status is 
[code: ch516]. The answer is changed accordingly.  
Child’s number of children [code: ch019] 
Child’s number of children is asked. In waves 4 and 5, individuals from the longitudinal section 
are not asked about child’s number of children, but whether the child has had another child 
[code: ch517]. If the answer is no, we replace the answer with the answer from the previous 
wave. If the answer is yes, the survey asks about which child has had another child [code: 
ch518]. The answer is changed accordingly. 
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Child’s education [code: isced] 
Answers follow ISCED-97 classification and the question is asked in waves 1 and 2. For waves 
4 and 5 and longitudinal survey, questions vary as follows: if child is below 22 years old, the 
survey asks whether the child has obtained a school leaving certificate [code: ch508] and 
which child the respondent is referring to [code: ch509]. If the answer is no, the answer from 
the previous wave is taken. If the answer is yes, a question on the level achieved is asked [code: 
ch510].  
If the child is below 32 years old, the survey asks whether the child has obtained any higher 
education or vocational degree [code: ch512], and which child the respondent is referring to 
[code: ch512]. If the answer is no, the answer from the previous wave is taken, and if the 
answer is yes, the specific qualification is asked [code: ch513]. If child is above 32 years old, 
the question is not asked and I take education level from the previous wave.  
Child year of birth and gender [code: ch006 and ch005] 
The questions are asked in all waves.  
3. Coding of the parental control variables 
Parental education [code: isced] 
Answers follow ISCED-97 classification and the question is asked in wave 1 and 2. For waves 
4 and 5 the answers are taken from previous waves, as suggested in the FAQs of the survey. 
The education level of the respondent is included. 
Year of birth and number of children [code: dn003 and ch001] 
The questions are asked in all waves.  
Marital status [code: dn014] 
Marital status of the child is asked and the answer can be: married, separated, divorced, 
widowed. Wave 2 marital status needs to be taken from wave 1, as there is no such question 
on it. Waves 4 and 5 vary in the way the question is asked for the longitudinal survey. 
Individuals are asked whether there has been any change in their marital status [code: dn044]. 
If the answer is no, I substitute the answer with the one from previous wave. If the answer is 
yes, the survey asks about the change using the same code [code: dn014]. The answer is 
changed accordingly.  
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Health status [code: sphus] 
The question asked is about the self-perceived health status, and the answer can range from 
excellent, very good, good, fair and poor. All waves ask this question. The health of the 
respondent is included. 
Poverty striken household [code: co007] 
The question asked is whether the household is able to make ends meet. The answers range 
from with great difficulty, with some difficulty, fairly easily, easily.  
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Appendix K – Samples in dataset and coding details of some variables 
Table 42 GSOEP samples relation 
 
Source: SOEP Samples Overview – 2011 / Wave 28 
Coding details of some variables 
1 Coding of dummy variable childbirth  
To know whether they had a child, there is a question which asks ‘Has your family situation 
changed after December 31, 200X?’ (200X belongs to n-2, i.e. if the questionnaire belongs to 
year 2008, the question will refer to December 31, 2006). One of the answers is ‘Yes, had a 
child’ and for each answer the respondent is asked whether this was in year n or n-1 (i.e. in 
the questionnaire belonging to year 2008, the options are: 2007 and 2008). Given that the 
interviews happen in different months of the year for each respondent, it can be the case 
that they are asked this question before they have had a child (e.g. the respondent is 
interviewed in January 2007 and she has a child in December 2007). To avoid dropping 
women who have actually had a child, I rely on the answers from year n-1. 
 
2 Coding of country of origin subject to migration background 
For those observations which have ‘direct migration background’, I take the variable ‘country 
of origin’. For the observations with ‘indirect migration background’ the process to trace back 
the country of origin is more complex. Firstly, I look at the variable ‘mother and father country 
of origin’. If this one is existent, I attribute this information to the observation. If the mother 
or father country of origin is not available, I trace back the mother or father personal number 
and their ‘country of origin’. 
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Appendix L – Average Marginal Effects only for the main vars.  
 
Table 43 Average Marginal Effects 
 AME s.e. 
Effects of the policy for:   
Low education   
Traditional family values 0.144* (0.08) 
Liberal family values -0.06 (0.25) 
Vocational education   
Traditional family values 0.316*** (0.04) 
Liberal family values -0.00 (0.08) 
Higher education   
Traditional family values 0.01 (0.17) 
Liberal family values 0.25*** (0.05) 
Individual controls Yes 
Partner’s controls Yes 
Regional fixed effects Yes 
Observations 307 
 
 
